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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM AND THE RESEARCH 
The facts of the election alone stamped Willkie 
as the greatest personality the Republican party had 
developed in a generation. Willkie's personal traits, 
the same earnest and unflagging energy which drove him 
through a campaign schedule that would have killed 
{,'-----------;ma-:rry-a-n-o-th-e·r-ma11-, -ma-d-e~i-t-c-c-erta-:tn-t-ha-t-he~cottl-d-no-tJ--------~-=== 
and ~ould not stop fighting for the principles in which 
he believes.l 
In this rather apt description of Wendell Willkie, the 
1940 Republican presidential nominee, two important character-
istics of the man stand out: his personal traits and energy 
and his strength of conviction in fighting for the principles 
in which he believed. Willkie cannot be regarded a politician 
in the usual sensej he was a businessman who, because of his 
convictions, waged a personal war against Franklin Roosevelt 
and the New Deal--a war conducted outside the realm of parti-
san politics. His successes in the fight with the administra-
tion brought \'lillkie a mea sure of recogniti-on and aroused the 
interest of certain Republicans who held like opin:tons of the 
New Deal; his personality and continued expression of his 
beliefs deepened this interest, resulting ultimately in his 
nomination. It is the purpose of this study to analyze the 
conditions which enabled Willkie to rise from comparative 
111History in the Making, 11 Current Histor~, 52:7, 
November 26, 1940. 
2 
obscurity to become the 1940 G.O.P. standard bearer, present-
ing in the analysis the Republican campaigns for the nom:t.nation, 
the G.O.P. convention, and the influence of Roosevelt's third 
te1•m decision and the European vmr on the selection of the 
party's nominee. 
In the election of 1936 the Republican party's attempted 
challenge of the New Deal and :l.ts chief architect, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, ended with a stunning defeat in which the G.O.P. 
carried only two states. The party's polj.cies and ideals had 
been rejected by the American electorate. During the next two 
years the party leaders worked to rebuild both the organization 
and the i.mage of the Republican party, and in the Congressional 
elections of 1938 the G.O.P. gained sufficient strength to 
become again an effective opposition party. Fortified by 
these victories, they looked forward to re-challenging the New 
Deal in 1940; they were optimistic about their chances, and 
the publ:i.c opinion polls gave them good rea son to be so. 
The enthusiasm and assurance of victory which had 
characterized the party during 1939 suffered a dramatic set-
back when 3 in September, war-broke out in Europe. The exist-
ence of an international crisis, coupled with Roosevelt's 
reluctance to announce his decision regarding a third term, 
made the choi.ce of the G.O.P. nominee a crucial decision; for, 
3 
if the party selected the wrong candidate in such a situation, 
they would face the prospect of another ignominious defeat at 
the hands of the Democratic party and, as many believed,· 
Franklin Roosevelt. 
Faced with political survival in a critical election, 
the Republican party chose as their 1940 standard bearer not a 
politician, but a political amateur from the ranks of American 
business. The explanation Of this occurrence has been debated 
for twenty-five years, during which time many answers have 
been advanced; however, historical agreement as to the ca~se 
of the nomination has not been reached. The present study is 
important because it is essential to American political history 
that the conditions which produced the pheriomenal nomination 
be subjected to careful study and critical historical analysis 
to achieve, for the first time, a complete and accurate explan-
ation as to why the Republican party nominated Willkie to 
represent the party in one of the most crucial elections in 
which they had ever participated. 
II. ORGANIZATION OF Trill STUDY 
The basic organization of the study follows a chrono-
logical presentation of the historical events; and within this 
framev·IOrk, certain significant events have been emphasized to 
facilitate the understanding of both the presentation and the 
conclusions of the study. Chapter II presents an analysis of 
.f 
~l< 
the political climate of the country during the year 1939, 
discussing the revival of the Republican party, the sectional 
outlook of the country, the popula~ity of Roosevelt and his 
third term decision, and the emergence of the Republican 
candidates for the presidency. Chapter III, presenting an 
analysis of the first five months of 1940, discusses the 
Republican pre-primary and primary campaigns, the Democratic 
and Republican primary elections, and the popularity of the 
President and the third term question. Chapters II and III, 
therefore, present an account of the nation's major polit~cal 
activity from January, 1939, through May, 1940. The chrono-
logical analysis is interrupted to trace tbe political rise of 
, Wende 11 Willkie from a critic of the 'l1enne ssee Valley Authority 
and other policies of the New Deal to a presidential contender. 
Chapter V fulfills the dual purpose of presenting information 
relative to the G.O.P. campaigns during the first three weeks 
of June, the period of time immediately preceding the conven-
tion, and of tying in Chapters II and III with Chapter IV; the 
chapter reveals the impact of the Willkie campaign on the 
other Republican presidential aspirants. Chapter VI presents 
the Republican convention, both the outward activity and the 
behind the scenes nmneuvers; the comments of political leaders, 
I 
political ~riters, and newspapers concerning the Willkie nomi-
nation; and a survey of the opinions which have been advanced 
to explain the cause of the upset nomination. ·Chapters II 
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through VI present a factual analysis of the historical events 
from January, 1939, through June, 19lfO, and serve as a basis 
for the conclusions of the study presented in Chapter VII. 
III. HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM 
A search through Dissertation .Abstracts, the Cumu~tiv~. 
Book Inde~., !_h~ Readers Guide to Periodical ~iteE_atu~, and 
the Ne~1 yo_r_! !.i.!~~~ Index revealed that there exists nowherE) a 
complete analysis of Willkie 1 S nomination. The research for 
the study verified this contention and disclosed that the 
election itself has been partially discussed in various works 
in political science concerned with the history of the two 
political partles, presidential elections, and general works 
on American politics; and that the Republi.c.an candidates, 
campaigns, and convention activities have been presented in 
biographies of the candidates and in the magazines and news-
papers of the period. The information derived from the bio-
graph~cal sources was valuable} but the authors of these 
sources did not discuss the nomination in its entirety, but 
only in relation to the subjects of their works. Although 
the magazines and newspapers covered the political events dur-
ing these two significant years quite well, neither presented 
a complete study of the aforementioned subject. In addition, 
no work which attempted to present the development of the 
third term decision in light of its influence upon the Republi-
i. 
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can party could be found. The present study represents not 
only an examination and evaluation of the causes of Willkie 1 s 
nomination, but also a complete picture of the Republican 
campaigns and convention activities and the influence of the 
war and Roosevelt on both. 
1,L_--------------------------------Pl-.-.-~}lli~RE~~~RSH------------------------------~===== 
The source material used in the study was derived from 
articles published in the ~~w York Times, the magazines and 
political journals of the period, biographies of indiv1duals 
discussed in the study, and various works on American polit1cal 
history. 
The source material for Chapters II and III was secured 
from the New ~ Times, magazines, and political journals 
published during the period January, 1939, to May, 1940. Since 
these chapters follow a chronological presentation, the major-
ity of the information was obtained from the ~~ York Times, 
allowing the writer to set down a week-by-week account of the 
campaigns, the sectional outlook, and the popularity of the 
President. The magazines and political journals provided 
information as to the background of the candidates and the 
over-all political picture of the nation during this critical 
period. It might be noted that public opinion polls have been 
utilized to trace the popularity of the Republican candidates, 
the President, and the third term; the relative strengths of 
7 
the two political parties; and the popular reactions to 
certain major domestic and foreign events occurring during the 
period. The two polls used were the li'OJ!tun~ poll, conducted 
by Elmo Roper, and the Gallup Poll, conducted by the American 
Institute of Public Opinion; and the results of these two 
I 
polls represent an essential part of the foundation upon which 
the conclusions of the study have been based. The reliability 
of these polls is demonstrated by the fact that of all the 
public opinion surveys conducted during 1939 and 1940, only 
these two polls proved to be verifiable when compared with the 
results of the election. Both polls traced the ups and downs 
of public opinion during the months of the campaigns, and both 
ar1 .. ived at substantially the same concluslons in their final 
.polls, conclusions which were very close to the actual results: 
Roper came within one-half of one per cent; and Gallup, with 
2 his four per cent error correlation factor, was equally close. 
Based on this information the assumption has been made that 
because both final polls were verifiably accurate, the sampl-
ing techniques utilized by Roper and Gallup throughout the pre-
election period were the same as those producing the final 
polls. In vie'vv of the evidence, the assumption is not unrea-
sonable. 
2 "Why the Polls Failed," rrhe New Republic., 103:6lflJ., 
November 11, 1940. 
-----·----
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The information contained in Chapter IV, the discussion 
of the political rise of Wendell Willkie, was derived from 
newspaper sources, magazines and political journals, and books. 
The majority of the information again came from the New~ 
Times, with the presentation following the same structure as 
that of Chapters II and III; however, much valuable informa-
tion was .obtained from books containing biographical material 
on Willkie and historical references indicating the part he 
played in the growth of the Republican part~. 
For Chapter V, presenting an analysis of the effect of 
the Willkie boom upon the other candidates,. an overwhelming 
majority of the source material came from the Ne!. yor~ Ti.E!.£.~, 
which carried a great many articles on the pre-convention 
.activities, especially on the Stimson-Know appointments and the 
development of Willkie 1 s political career. In addition, infor-
mation concerning the political situation in Philadelphia 
immediately before the convention opened was obtained from 
magazines and political journals; the topic was not developed 
in the book sources. 
The information for Chapter VI, discussing the conven-
tion, came from newspapers, magazines and political journals, 
and books. F1or the most part, the material pertaining to the 
chronological presentation of events was derived from the news-
paper and magazine sources; and the behind the scenes explana-
tions of the events were taken from the biographies of Willkie 
9 
and works on American political history. The discussion of 
the platform has as its basis not only the fuil text of the 
document reprinted in the New York Times; but also comments 
taken from all available sources. The .section presenting the 
reactions to the nomination and the many theories as to its 
cause was composed mainly from material found in magazines and 
political, journalsJ although some was found in the New York 
Times and in book sources. 
Chapter VII contains the conclusions of the study, the 
explanation and interpretation of the facts recorded in the 
study. Since this information has previously been substan--
tiated by citations, only the factual information not found 
in the body of the study will be footnoted in this chapter. 
V. THE METHOD OF PROCEDURE 
The first step in preparing the study was to gather all 
of the available information concerning the problem under anal-
ysis and to arrange it into logical divisions corresponding to 
the propose9 format of the study. Once this had been done, a 
draft of the study was prepared, presenting a chronological 
listing of all events from January, 1939, to July, 1940. Thls 
general picture was then broken down into the lo$ical divisions 
corresponding to the aforementioned format. To this skeletal 
outline was added information explaining the events, molding 
each of the divisions into a stage in the development of the 
10 
problem under study. These divisions were then set down so as 
to form the basis from which the conclusions of the study would 
be drawn. The result of the research and this method of pro-
cedure is a comprehensive analysis of the nomination of 
Wendell Lewis Willkie for the presidency of the United States. 
CHAPTER II 
THE BACKGROUND--1939 
In American political history presidential campaigns 
have traditionally, and quite logically, begun sometime after 
the Congressional elections, two years before the presidential 
election. During this two year period the party in power 
attempts to shore up the administration in preparation for the 
impending attack; the opposition party starts mapping out 
strategy and, more important, sounding out possible candidates 
to spearhead the attack on the administration. During this 
early period trends in voting behavior, candidate popularity, 
and party strength become important as the candidates and 
issues emerge. 
From January to September of 1939 the Republican party 
was characterized by a growing spirit of optimism as a result 
of their comeback in the 1938 Congresslo:r.al elections. This 
spirit of optimism, partially supported by the public opinion 
polls, grew as the candidates began throwing their hats into 
the ring and denouncing the New Deal. 
During this same period the Democratic party suffered 
from indecision and confusion; they had little reason to be 
optimistic because the President had refused to reveal his 
plans for 1940, and no one knew if he were planning to retire 
after his second ~erm, or to run for a third. Such a situation 
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effectively stalled the campaigns of the potential Democratic 
candidates and stifled the enthusiasm of the rank and file. 
The existing political situation was significantly 
altered in September when the Germans invaded Poland, forcing 
Britain and France to declare war on the aggressor. The 
seriousness of the international situation was to affect not 
only the issues of the political campaign, but also the popular-
ity of the candidates and their programs. 
I. THE REBIRTH OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 
After the G.O.P. 's poor showing in the 1936 election, 
it appeared that the party had lost its position as a major 
political force in United States politics. An integral part 
of the background for 1940 is an analysis of the Repu.blican 
party's rebuilding program which removed this stigma of 
defeat and replaced it with a spirit of op~imism. 
In April, 1937, Eort~~ released the results of a public 
opinion survey concerning the future of the GoO.P. Of those 
polled, 21.7 per cent believed that the party would recover in 
something like its old form; 40.0 per cent felt that it would 
revive under new and more liberal leadership; 6.6 per cent 
thought the party would be succeeded by another party; 8.9 per 
cent stated that the G.O.P. was dead; and 22.8 per cent stated 
that they had no opinion. 1 
---~---
1
"The For· tune Quarterly Survey: VIII," F'ort~~-' 15:112, 
April, 1937". 
An interesting feature of this survey concerned the 
40.0 per cent who believed that the party would revive under 
13 
new and more liberal leadership. Of the various economic 
groups sampled, the percentage given to this answer was the 
highest g~ven: 60.8 per cent of the salaried executives, 32.8 
per cent o.f the .laborers and farm~rs, 50.0 per cent of the 
2 students, and 28.9 per cent of the unemployed. 
The 40.0 per cent who believed that the party would 
revive undel"' ne\'1 and more liberal leadership proved to be cor-
rect; and in the 1938 Congressional elections the Republicans 
captured eleven Senate seats, 169 House seats, eighteen gover-
norships3 and control of both houses in nineteen state legis-
latures. 3 
The Amei•ican Insitute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll) 
_reported that the results of the elections indicated a wide 
swing from the New Deal, \'Ihich had sustained losses in thirty~ 
six of the forty-six states carried in 1936.4 Gallup, in his 
interpretation of the election results, stated that so one-
sided a change in public opini.on (five percentage points or 
better in twenty-seven states coast to coast) was not the 
2 
Ibid. 
3rr'The Republican Party: Up from the Grave," Fortun~, 20: 
33, August, 1939. 
4 
N~ York !~~~~~ February 5, 1939, p. 5. 
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result of ~tate and local issues and situations, as reported by 
the administration. In the industrial states of New York, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan--states representing 
142 electoral votes--the Democrats lost an average of eight 
percentage points.5 
The victories of 1938 stimulated Republicans all over 
1940. Their optimism was clearly demonstrated in the Lincoln 
Day oratory of February, 1939. Former President Hoover3 
in a speech before the National Republican Club in New York 
City, declared that the 1938 victol,ies represented encouraging 
signs of a Republican victory in 1940. After criticizing the 
New Deal as a mixture of coercion, collectivism, and lust for 
per•sonal po%'1er :J Hoover declared that the American votex•s had 
sent independent men to vlashington, men who would not be con-
trolled by government. 6 
Republican National Committee Chairman, John D. M. 
Hamilton,. declared that the 1938 victories shmoJed conclusively 
that the party was united and would be victorious in 1940.7 
He also reported that twenty-one of the forty-eight states were 
"unquestionably Republican" and that if the party carried New 
------~---
5Eaitorial in the Ne~ ~ork Ti~, February 9, 1939, p. 20. 
6!'!~ ~k Times, February 14, 1939, p. 1. 




York in 1940, they would put their nominee in the White House. 
The Gallup Poll confirmed Chairman Hamilton's optimism 
with the release of a report which revealed that of all voters 
with opinions, fifty-one per cent had indicated that they 
would like to see the Republican pa1•ty win the p:t•esidency in 
1940.
9 
One month later, in April of 1939, the Gallup Poll 
indicateq that in a cross··section survey of the voting popu-
lation in all states 52 per cent expected a Republ:i.can victol"Y 
in 191JrO. Dr. Gallup presented a statistical pictu.t'e of the 
party's comeback which showed that the Republican party had 
increased its percentage by twenty~two points since January, 
1937. He also stated that du-r>ing the months immediately aftel' 
the party's defeat in 1936, politicians were seriously asking 
.themselves if the Republican party were dead. According to 
Gallup, the gains occurred after the Supreme Cou .. t>t fight, the 
business slump of 1937·~38, and the Democratic purge of 1938. 
These three events brought considerable gains to the Republ1.-
cans, raising the percentage from 30 per cent in 1937 to 52 
per cent by April, 1939. 10 
One of the major reasons for the successful comeback of 
the party was the work of the Republican National Committee 
.. 
8 
N~~ York Time~, February 27, 1939, p. 1. 
9Ne~ York Times, March 29, 1939, p. 1. 
lOEe~ yo~k Time~, April 30, 1939, p. 18. 
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Chairman, John D. M. Hamilton, who had begun rebtdlding the 
G.O.P. soon after the 1936 campaigno He made a study of minor-
ity party practices in the British House of Parliament and 
established a research department under Glenn saxon to obtain 
facts for speeches and bills, a publicity department under 
n----------=F=--=r=-ca=-:_cn=k=l=-y,n Waltman to inform the country of Republ:l.can policy, 
and a women's department under Miss Msrion Martin to coordinate 
the efforts of the National Committee and the various women's 
groups supporting the party. Hamilton also sought to bring 
the Republican party from a "ha t·e Roosevelt 11 stand to one. of 
offering constructive opposition to the New Deal. To this end 
conferences with Republican legislators were held to map out 
strategy by which the legislators could attack New Deal legis-
lation. The G.O.P. 's stand on the issues of the day were given 
to the publicity department for distribution to the mass media 
11. 
of the nation. 
II. THE SECTIONAL OUTLOOK 
The Republican party had come a long way in its attempt 
to recover the reins of government; however, the su.rveys and 
sectional analyses published during 1939 indicated that, while 
the party standings were close, the G.O.P. was still the minor-
ity party. Th~ gains made in New England, the Middle Atlantic 
11 "The Republican Party: Up from the Grave," Fo,!'_!;un~, 
20:97, August, 1939. 
17 
States~ and the Central States were not sufficient to offset 
the Democratic strongholds of the South, the West, and the 
large Eastern cities. This contention was borne out by three 
separ.ate analyses, conducted by Fortune, The Nati_Q!2_, and the 
Republ:tcan National Committee. 
New~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~===== 
In the 1938 elections the Republican vote gained over 
its 1936 totals in all the states in this section, except 
12 
Maine. The Republican National Committee asserted that the 
entir,e reg:lon--Ma ine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, and Connecticut--would vote Republican in 
1940.13 
Fortune in its analysis of Ne\'1 England, declared that - -- ' 
Republican stock had risen considerably in the region. The 
party held six governorships, nine of the twelve Senate seats, 
twenty-one of the twenty-eight Congressional seats, and legis-
lative control in all the state:3, except Connecticut, \'lhere 
they held only the House. The magazine reported that the Demo-
era t:s had written off all of New England, except rlla ssa chusetts 
14 and, possibly, Connecticut. 
--·-~~------
12~~. y~rk ~~me~, February 5, 1939, p. 5 
13~ York T:tmes, February 27, 1939, p. 1. 
-1 1~The Republican Party: Up f1•om the Grave," :E_oE~~' 
20:101, August, 1939·. 
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Joseph F. Dinneen, analyzing the region for The Nation, - ..... --
arrived at approximately the same conclusions as did the FOl"tune 
analysts. He found that the New Deal bad become very unpopular 
in New England because the people believed that they would end 
up paying for the extravagances of the rest of the country. 
1,L__~~~~_.._n~a_d_d_it_Lon_,_blls_ine_s_a_b_a_d____b_e_e_n_s_l9W to recover from the 
Recession of 1937-38, and this had served to dampen the enthu-
siasm for the administration's policies. Dinneen reported 
that Main~, Vermont, and New Hampshire were lost to the Demo-
crats in 19!~0; but that Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and · 
Connecticut had been helped by the New Deal--roads, bridges, 
and jobs--and were considered states which could go either way 
in 194o.
15 
There was, then, in New England a definite trend toward 
conservatism, a move toward Republicanismo The dissatisfaction 
with the Ne\'1 Deal manifested itself in the. elect1.on of Republ:i.·· 
can candidates in 1938. Maine, Ne\'1 Hampshil'•e, and Vermont were 
safely within the hands of the Republican party; and 
Connecticut and Rhode Island were generally conbeded to be 
leaning toward the G.O.P. for 1940. 
The Middle Atlantic States 
In the presidential election of 1936 the Democrats 
carried every state in this region; however, in the Congres-
15 Joseph F. Dinneen, "This Is America: VI. The New 
Yankee G.O.P.," 1'J:.le li.§_i?_ion, 149:168-71, August 12, 1.939. 
19 
sional elections of 1938 the Republicans had staged a strong 
comeback, gaining in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, i 
Delaware, and West Virginia and losing only in Maryland. 16 On 
the basis of these gains the Republican National Committee 
claimed New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania for 1940. They 
also declared New York to be a borderline state, though lean-
ing toward the G.O.P. 17 . 
In their study of the Middle Atlantic States, ~:£rt~ 
reported that the Republicans, in order to win in November, 
had to carry New York; but the magazine also indicated that 
';the party mach:lne in that state was weak. In Penns:ylvania the 
G.O.P. held the governorship, but Govex•nor .Arthur H. James' 
labor policies had antagonized that politically influential 
···group. In New Jersey, the political control of the s tB te rested 
in the hands of Boss Hague and the Hudson County machine, 
and the Republicans were given no chance of capturing th:l.s 
state in 1940.18 
In his analysis of the pol:l.tical situation in the Middle 
Atlantic States, Kenneth G. Crav-Jford, writing in The NaQ,~l'!_, 
came to the conclusion that if Roosevelt were the Democratic 
candidate, the entire section would vote Democratic in 1940; 
-----
16~~ ¥.9!'-~. !'ime~, February 5, 1939, p. 5 
17~ ~ ~~ February 27, 1939, p. 1. 
18"The Republlcan Party: Up from the Grave," Eor.t::.I.?.£, 
20:97-99, August, 1939. 
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however 1 if a non-Roosevelt-supported reactionary became the 
candidate, the party would lose the entire section to the 
Republicans. He contended that F.D.R. 's popularity was so 
great in the section that there was no real evidence that the 
voters would turn down the third term attempt_, if it developed. 
According to Crawford 1 Dewey was the only Republican with a 
following in the region; but his candidacy was opposed by the 
Old Guard 1 who had lined up behind Vandenberg. The only Demo-
crat other than Roosevelt who had Eastern support was Vice-
President Garner. Crawford's analysis of New Yorl<:, New Jersey,., 
and Pennsylvania generally agreed with that presented by 
fi'_'E"'~~; however 1 he declared that the Democratic leadership in 
New York and Pennsylvania was not much better than that of the 
G.O.P. In \'lest Virginia John r,. Lewis' miners v1ere reported 
to be content and still loyal to the New Deal, and in normally 
Democratic Maryland the New Deal was still. populal,. In 
Delaware, the war industries of the duPont family had been 
expanded and were figured to increase Republican popularity 
materially and bring the state back to the fold :tn J.9lfo. 19 
The Central States -- -...~-- ___,_._ 
The Republican party lost this entire twelve state 
·region in 1936; however, in the 1938 elections they gained in 
every state: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, 
19Kenneth G. Crawford, "This Is America: VII. Roosevelt 
and the Vital East," f.E~~ !'Jatio~, 11~9:.237··1+0, September 2, 1939. 
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Minnesota 1 Missouri 1 Kansas 1 Nebraska, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota.20 The Republican National Committee claimed every 
state in this region for 19lW1 except Illino:t.s and Missouri. 
The former was considered to be a borderline state, though 
21 leaning toward the Democratic party. . 
In the Central States, ;EErtu~ repol'•ted, farmers wel..,e 
dissatisfied with the New Dea~ farm program and had expressed 
their feelings by giving over\vhelming support to the Republican 
party in the Congressional elections of 1938. The magazlne 
reported that the Democrats had written off Ohio, Michigan, 
Iowa, Minnesota, and \lfisconsin for 1940, but hoped to maintain 
their hold on Illinois and MissOUl'i. According to ~~, 
Ind:l.ana was rated as borderline, though leaning toward the 
.Democrats by virtue of the state's control by the Paul v. 
22 McNutt machineG 
William L. White, writ:l.ng i.n !}l£ ~~on, indicated that 
there was a definite trend toward conservatism throughout the 
Middle West. He stated that there existed a general feeling 
of warm af~ection for the President, although the same could 
not be said for his program. If war were to break out prior 
to the election, there would be, according to White, a strong 
20Ne~ X9Fk Ti~~' February 5, 1939, p. 5. 
21,lliL~ ¥.2E.~ !J..Ef~, February 27, 1939, p. 1. 
22 "The Republican Party: Up from the Gra".Je," £:~~, 
20:100, August, 1939. 
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movement in this section to dl"aft Roosevelt for a thlrd term; 
however, if the President's interference in European affairs 
brought the United States to the brink of war, then the Middle ; 
West would oppose him and send a large contingent of isolation-
ist Congressmen to Washington in 1940. White also reported 
ll---~~~~~that____the Old Guard Democrats had lined up behind Garner, while 
~~=-~--~~===== 
the Nev1 Dealers had voiced a preference for James Farley, the 
Democratic National Committee Chairman.' In the Republican 
camp many had expressed inte1•est in Dewey '·s candidacy, but 
there existed some skepticism as tb his experience and 
ability. Arthur Vandenberg, no stranger to· the voters of the 
Middle West, bad a considerable following. 23 
Arville Schaleben, in his study of the North Central 
-States, also reported that there existed a good deal of dis~ 
satisfaction with the New Deal, as well as a trend toward con-
servatism, which could result in a Republican S\1eep of the 
section in 1940. He declared that the political situation in 
Michigan and South Dakota pointed to almost certain defeat for 
the Democratic party, even if the country were at war. In 
Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wisconsin the Democrats faced 
probable defeat. Schaleben attributed this reversal to the 
fact that the people of the section \'l'ere tired of unemployment, 
economic strife, and relief. In addition, Roosevelt's foreign 
----·--
23william L. White, "'rhis Is America: I. rrhe fUddlE;J \'lest 
Drifts to the Right," ~ ~ati,2J..1_, 148:635-38, June 3, 1939. 
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policy, with its involvement in European affairs, was not 
popular in the North Central States; and, according to 
Schaleben, the Democrats would find it difficult to popularize 
the war issue in this section to divert attention from domes-
tic difficulties unsolved since 1932. He also reported that 
Vandenberg and Dewey were the two leaders on the region's 
. 2l~ 
G.O.P. presidential preference list. 
The West 
In the presidential election of 1936 the Republicans 
failed to carry a single state in the West; however, in the 
elections of 1938 the G.O.P. made gains in all eleven: Utah, 
Colorado, \'ly'oming, Montana, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, 
California, Oregon, and Washington. 25 The Republican National 
Committee, however, did not believe these gains to be signifi-
cant to claim a majority of the region; f01., the Committee 
declared that only Wyoming and Oregon were ·safely in the G.O.P. 
camp for 1940. Idaho was considered to be a borderline state, 
but leaning toward their party; Montana was also considered 
borderline, but found leaning toward the Democratic party. 26 
Accord:l.ng to the Fort~ study, nearly all the Pacific 
24Arville Schaleben, "This Is America: II. The North 
Central States," Th~ _Nation, 1!~8:690-92, June 17, 1939. 
25~~~- york !!.1!1~~, F'ebruary 5, 1939, p. 5 
26N~ y~~ _!in~, February 27, 1939, p. 1. 
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Coast region rested safely within the Democratic camp. The 
Democrats had control of both California and Washington, lost 
to the Republicans for 1940 because of conflicting local 
ideologies. The magazine gave the G.O.P. only Oregon in this 
section of the country. 27 
In analyzing the political opinions of the Southwest 
for ~ li~~i~£1 Charles Curtis Munz predicted that the region 
would vote Democratic in 1940. Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, 
and Oklahoma were all figured to support the Democratic party; 
however, there existed no concrete evidence that they would 
support a third term, but the President did have many active 
supporters :l.n these four states who v1ould back such an attempt. 
If Roosevelt declined to run in 1940, Garner would receive the 
28 . 
whole-hearted support of the Southwest. 
Howard G. Costigan, in his study of the political climate 
of the Western States, declared that the West had traditionally 
decided the outcome of close presidential elections and that 
the election of 1940 would be such an election. According to 
Costigan, the typical Westerner went to the polls to express 
his traditional protest aga:lnst the stat~ gug,; however, even 
against this background of protest, the West was figured to 
line up behind the Democrats and the New Deal in 1940. He also 
27 "The Republican Party: Up from the Grave," !'....£!:.~~~ 
20:102, August, 1939. 
28 Charles Curtis Munz, ''This Is America: IV. The Garner 
Country," The Nation_, 149:66-·68, July 15, 1939. 
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reported that if the candidates in 1940 were Garner and Dewey, 
the West would vote Republican because the Democrats would 
split into three groups: the Old Guard, \'Jbo would support 
Garner; the liberal faction, who would cross over and vote 
for Dewey; and the New Dealers, who would form a third party, 
at least in the West. On the other band, if Roosevelt decided 
to run for a third term, drafted or otherwise, he would be 
. 29 impossible to defeat in the West. · 
'rhe South 
In the South, Republican hopes \'/ere dim, as usual. In 
1936 the G.O.P. lost all thirteen Southern States, and in the 
Congressional elections of 1938 the Republican party gained 
:i.n only fou.r states: Tennessee, North Carolina, Alabama, and 
Texas. 30 The Republican National Committee did not claim any 
of the states in this region, conceding all thirteen to the 
Democrats.3l 
A discussion of the South bad not been included in the 
Fortune analysis. It was generally conceded that the Demo-
cratic party completely controlled the politics of this 
section, and thel'e was not much danger of the Republican part~' 
making inroads into this Democratic stronghold in 1940. 
29HO\Ilard G. Costigan, "This Is America: v,. 'J.lhe Maverlck 
Far vie st, 11 The Na tl<?.n.' 149:123-26, July 29, 1939. 
30:r-l~ Yor..!s_ :fime_~., February 5, 1939, p. 5. · 




John Temple Graves, II, writing in :J:'he Nation, declared 
that \'lhomever the Democrats nominated for president in 191J.O, 
the South would vote for him because the Democratic party still 
owned the region; the party could count on its political sup-
port. He reported that the Southern ant:l.-New Dealers had 
lined up behind Garner, but that the movement was not a large 
one and did not seriously threaten the New Dealers' position 
in the South~ According to Graves, there existed a gro\'ling 
belief that the only acceptable candidate to the South would 
be one supported by the President, or the President himself. 
With the virtual collapse of the Garner and Hull ~andidacies, 
both lacking support from Southern political leaders, and the 
ver~ weak Republican party, it was clear that Roosevelt needed 
- only to announce his candidacy for a third term and he would 
be sure of receiving nearly every Southern delegation. 32 
The three sources used in this sectional analysis did 
not agree on every state's political leanings; however, they 
agx~eed on the over~all picture wi.thin each section. The Gallup 
sectional poll, published in August, 1939, did not entirely 
agree with the Fortun~ analysis. The Gallup Poll reported 
that the voters of Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois 
favored a Republican victory in 191W by 52 to 51~ pe:t• cent. 33 
32John Temple Gt•aves, II, 11 'l1his Is .America: III. The 
South Still Loves Roo seve 1 t," Tb.~ Na ~~'?n., 149:11-13, July 1, 
1939. 




New York and Illinois had been placed in the Democratic 
column in the Fortune survey. This apparent conflict concern-
ing the political leanings of these two ·important states sub~ 
stantiated the evidence that the Democrats held only a slim 
lead in several states and that a reversal of the existing 
situation could occur at any time. According to the results 
of the sectional analyses 1 the key to the pre-war political 
situation appeared to be the popularity of the President and 
his long-awaited third term decision. 
III, THE POPULARI'rY OF THE PRESIDENT 
The popularity of the President became an important · 
factor in determining the presidential nominees of both parties 
.because as the single most popular "candidate 1 " he could 
dictate the Democratic choice by virtue of his position of 
leadership and could profoundly influence the selection of the 
Republican nominee. Concerning the Democratic nomination, 
Roosevelt could either influence the selection of his successor 
from the fi_eld of potential candidates, or he could attempt to 
secure a th:l.rd term by not choosing a successor and 
accepting a draft at the convention. Roosevelt's ultimate 
decision would also affect the Republ:l.can nomination; 
for if F.D.R. decided to accept a third term draft, 
the G.O.P. would be forced to nominate a colorful candidate in 
an attempt to offset the President's great personal appea~. 
' l 
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If, on the other hand, he decided not to run, the Republicans 
would be free to nominate a safe conservative or a moderately 
liberal candidate, depending on the political currents of the 
time. 
Roosevelt's popularity, therefore, became a prime .con-
sideration of the G.O.P. leadership because if they were able 
to predict correctly the third term decision, their chances to 
emerge victorious in November would be materially better. 
Political writers and analysts, as well as the pollsters, were 
also cognizant of this pqlitical situation and began to explore 
the currents of public opinion, to analyze the chances of the 
potential candidates in both parties, to attempt to second-
guess the man in the White House. These attempts began early 
in 1939 and continued throughout the year. 
In November, 1936, Roosevelt's popularity had reached 
its peak; in the election month, 62.5 per ·cent of the nation's 
voters had indicated that they approved of the President. 
However, Roosevelt had not been able to generate a comparable 
amount of popular support for the 1938 Congressional elections. 
The percentage of voters approving of the President in 
December, 1938, \'Ias 55.5 per cent, a drop of nearly "{ per cent 
from the percentage received two years before. By January, 1939, 
58 per cent of the voters supported the President; this increase 
possibly resulted from the Republican showing in the 1938 
elections. A sectional breakdown of this vote revealed that 
:___:: ________ _ 
Roosevelt had mai.ntained a clear majority in all sections of 
the country: 51 per cent in New England 1 57 per cent i.n the 
Middle Atlantic States 1 55 per cent in the East Central 
States 1 56 per cent in the West Central States 1 68 per cent 
in the South, and 64 per cent in the West.34 
Even more important than Roosevelt's popularity index 
29 
\'las the public reaction to the possibility of the President's 
running for a third term~ In March of 1939 for~,l.P.! asked a 
cross section of the nation's-voters if they believed Roosevelt 
would make such an attempt. The poll indicated that 31.1 .per 
cent thought that he would 1 45.1 per cent that he would not, 
and 23o8 per cent that they did not know.35 
The third term question became more and more of a news 
item and a topic for political hypotheses as one New Dealer 
after another publicly announced that he believed F.D.R. should 
seek a third term. Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, in their 
analysis of this situation, stated that no one knew whether 
Roosevelt had come to share the belief set forth by the New 
Dealers; hor.'<'ever 1 they reported that no other New Dealers had 
a ghost of a chance to get the Democratic nomination because 
they had a 11 been poli ti.ca lly mu-rdered by Democ:t•a tic party 
leaders. The article also indicated that reports of the 
3 1+~~\'i Yorl:f_ T~~ January 8, 1939, p. 35 .. 
35 11 'I'he Fortune Survey: XIX," F~~~~ 19:130, March, 1939. 
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President's private talks seemed to reveal a shift in emphasis 
from discussions of a happy retirement after 1940 to mentions 
of a President's duty to break the third term tradition under 
certain circumstances.36 
Another political analyst interested in the third term 
mystery was Arthur· Krock, a columnist for the New York Times, ------- ~==~------~==== 
who declared that the President's refusal to discuss his 
future plans with any degree of finality until the end of the 
Congressional session (for the announced fear' of losing or 
seriously reducing his influence to conduct policy) might.have 
been a sound maneuver at the start of the session; however, 
the tense international crisis had altered the logic of this 
position. Roosevelt's silence, a cco:r.ding to Krocl{, had 
resulted in a stiffening of the opposition to the administra-
tion's programs and had possibly endangered the nation's 
national defense.37 
Others interested in the third term decision were not 
content to sit back and write about the cont1•oversy. Many 
reporters and political writers attempted to question the 
President, his family, and high admin:i.stration sources in 
order to smoke out the answer to the third term decision, 
------
36Joseph Alsop and Robert Ki.ntner, " 1 President Must Run 
Again 1 Rises as Definite Cry of Nevi Dealers, 11 New York Times, 
1 --------May 2, 1939, p. L . 
37Arthur Krock, "In the Nation: Fear of rrhird Term 
Affects Grave Decisions," Ne~ ~ ~~' April 20, 1939, p. 22. 
---~-------~--
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James Farley, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 
answered reporters' questions as to the party's presidential 
campaigns by declaring that it was futile to talk about the 
candidacies for 1940 until the President made knovm his· 
intentions. Farley, who had just returned from a 7500 mile 
trip from coast to coast to sample public opinion, refused to 
discuss the merits of any possible candidates, although he did 
declare that the Democratic party would carry Oklahoma, Texas, 
New Mexico, Arizona, California, Wyoming, Nevada, and Utah--
all states included in his trip--in 1940.38 
In contrast to the optimism expressed by the Demo-
cratic National Chairman, Fortune published a poll in May 
which indicated that F.D.R. •s popularity had suffel~ed a sub-
stantial drop. The n~gazine reported that ·in March, 63.5 per 
cent of the nation's voters had indicated that they liked the 
President$ and 36.5 per cent had replied that they did not; 
however, b-y May only 58.8 per cent answered i.n the affirma-
tive.39 
The reported decrease in Roosevelt's popularity was 
partially substantiated by the May Gallup Poll, which reported 
that in a hypothetical race between Senator Robert Taft and 
the President, a cross section of the electorate came 
38James A. Hagerty, "Ic'arley Says Trip Shm'ls Party Safe," 
New x_or~ Times_, May 26, 1939, p. 7. 
39"rrhe FortLme Survey: XXI," Eort~, 19:87, May, 1939. 
32 
up with a fifty-fifty split of those expressing an opinion. 
In addition, it was related that in another hypothetical race 
bet\'leen Thomas Dewey and Roosevelt, the President came out on 
the losing end, 45 per cent to 55 per cent. 40 
During the month of June, speculation over the third 
term again made the headlines when Secretary of Interior 
Harold Ickes commented in a national magazine that Roosevelt 
should attempt a third term; Ickes, in hls endorsement, also 
criticized Garner and other Democratic presidential aspirants. 
When repor-~ters attempted to get Roosevelt to comment on the 
Ickes' statements, the President refused to be drawn into a 
. 1 41 
discussion .of his plans for 19+0. In another press con-
ference held two weeks later, Roosevelt refused to answer a 
direct question as to the third term dec:l.sion and told the 
questioner to go stand in a corner. 42 
Some political \•Iriters turned from questioning to pre-
dicting what would occur in 19!W. !b..~. New ~Jl....q_ reported 
that Roosevelt would probably be glad to retire to Hyde Park 
aftel' turning over the position to a Ne\'l Dealer VJho would 
carry on the administration's programs. The magazine stated 
that the President would not allow an outsider who v.Iould undo 
lW!Je~ ¥.2.~ rrime s, rVIa y 31, 1939, P. 8. 
41~~~ York Tim~, June 7, 1939, p. 2. 
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all which had been accomplished in the preceding eight years 
gain control of the Democratic party. Without stating that 
Roosevelt would become ~ candidate, the magazine reported that 
F.D.R. had shown no signs of endorsing Hull, Wallace, or 
Farley. 43 
lj-----------------B=r._.u=c--=e=--=B=--l=i=-v._.e~· n, a 1 so writing in 'J~h-~ N_evv He ~~b l i c , stated 
~------------===== 
in July that if the United States were to become involved in a 
war prior to the election, Roosevelt would be re-elected. If 
this situation did not occur, according to Bl:Lven, the nation's 
4!~ political future would be up in the a:tr. In another issue, 
published during the follovling month, the magazine px•esented 
an analysis of the potential Democratic presidential possibil-
ities and eliminated all of them by stressing the political 
liabilities of each. 45 By implication Roosevelt was held up 
as the only acceptable candidate for the Democratic nomination. 
This one segment of the liberal press believed that if an 
international crisis were to develop_before the election, the 
result would be an increase in the President's popularity; 
with no other Democratic possibility in sight, such a situation 
could have a significant bearing on the third term decision. 
43"washington Notes: The Third Tel~m," 112~. NeJI ~blic_, 
99:187, June 21, 1939. 
44Bruce Bliven, "Looking at 191W," ~ ~.!. !3~:::!1?11.£, 
99:183, June 21, 1939. 
45n'I'hose Charming Young !1en., 11 :£!~~~ !:le!~. Reeublic., 99.:320-21, 
July 26, 1939. 
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As the political guessing game continued~ with 
reporters drawing blanks at the press conferences and polit-
ical writers attempting to predict the future, the President's 
persbnal popularity again began to increase. A Gallup Poll 
sUl~vey of voters of both parties on the hypothetical race 
between Dewey and Roosevelt indicated that F.D.R. had gained 
three percentage points over the May survey; the vote in June 
was 52 per cent for Dewey and 48 per cent for Roosevelt.46 
In July, Roosevelt himself stimulated more third term 
questioning when he asserted in a press conference that there 
were t\•Telve to fifteen "charming" young men in Feder•al service 
who might have presidential aspirations. Speculation around 
Washington covered the interesting point of \'lhether Roosevelt 
had included himself among the "charming" y·oung men he had 
mentioned .. 47 At his next press conference Roosevelt tm .. ned 
aside several questions as to whether he had informed anyone 
that he would pos:ttively run fox• a third term and that he 
wanted Paul McNutt as his running mate.48 Again, one week 
later at another press conference, the President 1 when asked 
if he could indicate when a statement on the third term could 
be expected by the country, chuckled and said that he could 
- .. -------·-
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not. 49 Several days later, on August 1, Roosevelt and the 
press assembled broke into laughter when a reporter asked the 
President if he had a few words to say on the twelfth anniver-
sary of Coolidge's statement, "I do not choose to run;" 
Roosevelt did not answer the question.5° 
While Roosevelt and the reporters were conducting their 
battle of wits, the New Dealers continued to build up strength 
fOl" the third term draft. Several members of the Cabinet 
were outright or sligbtJ:y condi t:lonal advocates of a third 
term for Roosevelt, as vvere many New Deal Congressmen and 
governors and labor organizations all over the cotmtry. A 
national organization to draft Roosevelt for 1940 had been 
established in Chicagoo51 
The efforts of the New Dealel"S appeared to be mal{ing 
some headway, as evidenced by the August Gallup Poll's 
announcement that the nation's young Democrats favored a third 
term. A carefully selected cross section of several thousand 
Democrats between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine were 
polled, and 52 per cent declared themselves in favor of a 
third term. The survey also indicated that Democratic voters 
as a whole opposed. a third term by the same margin--52 per cent 
4~ Yo~ :r'1t!}2_~, July 29, 1939, p. 3. 
50~~~ York Time~, August 2, 1939, p. 5. 
51Turnel~ Catledge, "rl'hird Term Showdovm Expected to 




to 48 per cent. In addition, 38 per cent of those Democrats 
expressing an opinion on a third term stated that they would 
not vote for Roosevelt if he should run in 1940, while 62 per 
cent declared that they would,52 
In mid-September the Gallup Poll reported that the 
President had become the leading choice of Democratic voters, 
citing the results of a nationwide survey of that party. The 
poll also indicated that if the President did not run in 1940, 
Garner would be the leading choice among Democratic voters.53 
The results of the poll are significant in that the effect of 
the outbreak of the European war had not been measu .. -r>ed in the 
survey. In October, the Gallup Poll repor•ted that the ~1ar in 
Europe had trigge:r'ed a definite upturn in the pro-third term 
sentiment. In a cross section analysis of men and women in 
every state, 43 per cent of those polled indicated they favored 
a third term. In May the percentage had been only 33 per cent; 
in August it had risen to 40 per cent. In a sectional analysis 
the October poll showed that in New England 34 per cent favored 
a third term, while 45 per cent in the Middle Atlantic States, 
32 per cent in the East Central States, 37 per cent in the West 
Central States, 61 per cent in the South, and 47 per cent in 
the West expressed a like opinion.54 
52li~~ Iork T~~~~' August 18, 1939, p. 20. 
53!J.~~ ~ T:Smes,. September 13, 1939, p. 30. 





Even though 57 per cent of the nation, according to the 
Gallup Poll, opposed a third term for Roosevelt, the results 
of the survey revealed a significant point. Within the space 
of a month the President had increased his lead over the other "' 
possible Democratic presidential aspirants and had gained 
considerable support for a third term. The effect the war 
would have on public opinion suddenly loomed as the single 
most important factor in the third term decision, for national 
attention had been focused on the foreign affairs issue: the 
part the United States should play, if any, in the conduct of 
the European war. 
Alf Landon, the "nominal" head of the G.O.P., urged 
Roosevelt to disavow the third term in the interest of national· 
defense. He called upon the President to take the proposed 
repeal of the embargo on munitions out of politics by issuing 
a definite declaration that he would not run in 19L10. Landon 
reasoned that Roosevelt's silence might have been justifiable 
during normal times, but in the tense international situation 
the Pres:I.dent•s stand had created resistence to the normal 
cond1.1ct of affairs because many believed that the third term 
issue \'las of greater importance than any change in the 
Neutrality Act. Roosevelt declined to comment on Landon's 
statement, but .expressed hope that partisan politics could be 
adjourned during the crisis.55 
-----------------
55N~~ !ork. ~~~ September 13, 1939, p. 30. 
F.D.R. was destined not to get his wish, for one 
month later Secretary of .Agriculture Henry Wallace stated 
publicly that Roosevelt • s talents, train;l.ng, and experience in 
foreign affairs were necessary to steer the country's domestic 
and foreign policy through the international crisis. .Adminis-
tration leaders refrained from comment on Wallace's reopening 
of the third term controversy, but G.O.P. leaders took the 
opportunity to declare that the statement represented a public 
affirmation of the third term candidacy.56 White House Press 
Secretary Stephen T. Early remarked that it \'lOuld have been 
kind and polite for Wallace to have consulted his "victim" 
before making the statement. Early refused to dlscu.ss the 
matter further when reporters sought to obtain an elabol~ation 
on the remark.57 
Wallace's statement brought forth another round of 
questioning by reporters and guessing by political analysts. 
In a press conference held in late October, Roosevelt again 
laughed at a reporter's question as to the third term decision, 
but no answer was forthcoming.58 The President's wife was 
also subjected to i.ntense questioning, as were members of his 
family. The First Lady, when asked of her husband's plans for 
56~~ York Time~, October 26, 1939, p. 1. 
5?Feli:x Belair, Jr., "Wallace Rebuked by White House," 
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1940, replied that she did not know for she had not asked 
him.59 In mid-November, Roosevelt refused to comment on the 
announcement by Garner supporters that they intended to canvass 
the country to seek delegate strength on behalf of their man. 60 
The President himself deepened the speculation when, speaking 
at the ceremony for the laying of the cornerstone of the 
Jefferson Memorial, he stated that he hoped he would be able 
to come to the dedication in January, 1941. This statement 
was interpreted by some to mean that li'.D.R. wished to make the 
dedicatory ceremonies one of the closing acts of his admini-
stration; others declared that the statement represented an 
indication that the President was looking forward to a con-
tinuation in office after his second te;m had expired.61 
The November Gallup Poll showed that four out of five 
Democrats throughout the nation supported a third term. 
The poll indica ted that the pre-war poli ti·cal situation, 
characterized by the confidence of the Republican party 
that the country would elect a G.O.P. candidate in 1940 and 
that Roosevelt could not be elected if he chose to run, had 
changed with the deepening of the European war. 62 
59!'J..§!."~-i.. Y.2EJi Ti~, November !~I 1939, p. 18. 
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61N~-~ York }.imes, November 16, 1939, p. 1. 




The international crisis had not only strengthened 
F~D.R. 's control of his party, but also had elevated the Demo-
cratic part-y's chances for victory in 19'-J.O. In .April, 1939, 
the Gallup Poll had indicated that 52 per cent of the nation's 
voters f~vored a Republican president fo1~ 1940; by November 1 
the poll indicated that public opinion had shifted and that 
54 per cent favored a Democratic president. 63 .A poll of fifty 
Washington correspondents conducted in .April had predicted a 
G.O.P. victory in 1940; ho\<Jever, by December the poll had 
reversed itself, judging by a two to one margin victory for 
the Democi•:ats. 64 
The European war had substantially strengthened both 
the pro-third term sentiment and the chances for a Democratic 
victory in 1940, but the crisis had not induced the P:eesident 
to make any statement concern:l.ng his future plans. He had 
carefully side-stepped reporters' ingenious inquiries and had 
declared that he was too busy to discuss third terms, third 
parties, or 1940 presidential cand1dates.65 
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CANDIDATES 
The Congressional victories of 1938, and the resulting 
63we'! York 2;ime ~, November 19, 1939, p. 11~. 
64Editoria1 in the !:f.£~ York rrime~, December 2, 1939, p. 16. 
65N~ Yo~ Times, December 23, 1939, p. 6. 
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spirit of optimism, prompted some Hepuhlicans to throw their 
hats into the ring. Throughout 1939, these candidates cam-
paigned for the nomination, seeking to o·btain support from the 
party's rank and file and leaders with programs which indicated 
the New Deal domestic policies; however, the outbreak of the war 
in Europe and Roosevelt's silence on the third term decision 
figured to change the complexion of both the issues of the 
campaign and the popularity of the candidates. 
In January of 1938, EQ?:'tUE.S:. conducted a survey in which 
they asked the natiOn's voters whom they would prefer as 
president if Roosevelt did not run in l940r To this question 
the prosperous and the business executives expr,;:ssed a 
prefel."'ence fo:t• Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg; the poor and the 
.factory laborers indicated a preference for Senstor William E. 
BOl"ah. 66 
By February, 1939, Vandenberg had been replaced by 
Thomas E. Dewey as the cho:Lce of the prosperous and bu.s:tness 
group. This survey, also conducted by Fortune asked voters, 
---~--' 
regardless .of their party affiliation, which Republican they 
would vote for in 1940. Of those sampled, the largest per-
centage, 38 per cent, stated that they did not know for which 
Republican they would vote. The remaining 62 per cent lndi-
cated preferences for a wide variety of potential candidates~ 







In the poll Dewey received the highest percentage, 12.2 per 
cent, with F:torello LaGuardia of New York, 11.5 per cent; 
Arthur Vandenberg, 11.5 per cent; Alf Landon, 8.2 per cent; 
Herbert Hoover, 5.1 per cent; Henry cabot Lodge, 11.6 per cent; 
Senator Gerald P. Nye, L!.l per cent; and others, 4.8 per cent, 
receiving lesser amounts of popular support.67 
In the Gallup Poll, also published in February, a cross 
section of Republican voters were asked to name the indiv:tdual 
they would like to see as the party's candidate in 1940. The 
results showed De\'-ley leading with· 27 per cent, folloi'led ~Y 
Vandenberg with 21 per cent, Borah with L! per cent, Hoover with 
4 per cent, and LaGuardia w:t th ll per cent.. The poll also 
indicated that nearly one~half of the RepLtbJ.icans interviewed 
had no definite choice at that time.68 
· In both of the February surveys, one sampling all voters 
and the other concentrating on just the Republicans, the lead-
ing presidential contender for the G.O.P. was New York City's 
District Attorney, Thomas De\>Jey. A possible explanation for 
his lead at this early stage in the fight for the nomination 
was the national recognition he had received as a result of his 
11 crime-busting 11 activities :1.n cleaning up Ne\'l York City. After 
1939. 
67 11The Fortune Survey: XVIII, 11 F_9~~une, 19:68, February, 
68N~w York_ 'rimes, Febru.ary 17, 1939, p. 14. 
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the resignation of Judge Martin T. Manton, several New Yorlc 
Republican leaders, including Representative Joseph W. Marttn, 
Jr., declared that Dewey had surged to the front in the l"ace 
for the G.O.P. nomination.69 
Dewey, preferring not to announce his candidacy, stated 
that he was not a candidate for public office and formally 
repudiated the "Dewey 1940 Popular Committee to Nominate IJ.'homa s 
E. Dewey for President of the United States on the Republican 
Ticket, 11 a group fOl"med to boom him for the p:t•esidency o 70 
Another New Yorker mentioned in the February polls, 
r-1ayor LaGuardia, a 1so took himself out of the 19~·0 px•esidentia 1 
race when, at a press conference, he declared that he would not 
even get a ticket to the gallery of either convention.71 
'l•he !i.tY!. York !!.~!!~~ reported that Vandenberg's close 
friends had asserted that the Senator had taken himself out of 
the 1940 presidential race because of the opposition to his 
candidacy by the Landon faction and other powerful elements 
within the Republican party. His friends believed that 
Vandenberg had gradu~lly withdrawn as developments took place 
which appeared to be to his disadvantage, such as Dewey's rise 
in the public opinion polls. The papel' also l'eported that lf 
69New York TJme~, January 31, 1939, p. g. 
70~e~ J~~~ Time~, January 20, 1939, p. 3. 
7l~ Yo.!k Tl.me~, February 21, 1939, p. 5. 
Vandenberg were eliminated as a candidate, Dewey's boom would 
attain greater strength. Many Republican Senators, according 
to the article, had conceded that Dewey wss the front running 
candidate, but felt that he would have to define his position 
on major national questions before he would gain the party's 
endorsement.72 
With or without the support of the G.o.~. professionals, 
Dev1ey continued to gain support among Republ1.can voters. In 
the March Gallup Poll, Dewey received 50 per cent of the vote, 
while the majority of the other p~esidential aspirants lost 
ground. In the poll Vandenberg received 15 per cent, Taft 
13 pe:r.• cent, Hoover 5 per cent, Landon 4 per cent, Lodge 2 per 
cent, and Borah 2 per cent. The poll pointed out that the 
. De\'Iey gains came after the suo ce ssful prosecution of New York 
Tammany leader James J. Hines. 73 
In April, Dewey again disavowed his candidacy, repeat-
ing that he was only concerned with his present position of 
District Attorney. Politicians known to favor Dewey's candida-
cy refused .to comment on the statement, preferring to believe 
that Dewey opposed being the object of an abortive boom.74 
F'ormer President Herbert Hoover, in a speech before neHs-
72!'1 ew ~ TJ.:.~~ .. ~' Februa1~y 28, 1939, p. 2. 
73~~~~~, March 2"(, 1939, p. 13. 
7 1~~e~ ~!s. :£imes, April 22, 1939, p. 4. 
i ____ _ 
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paper editors from Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, also 
stated that he was not a candidate for the 1940 nomination. 
45 
In the speech Hoover declared that Republican prospects for 
victory in the election appeared to be very bright as a result 
of the failure of the New Deal domestic policy to instill con-
fidence among the nation's businessmen.75 
While Dewey and Hoover were disclaiming their candida-
cies, the Gallup Poll reported that in a hypothetical race 
between Taft and Roosevelt, a cross section of voters from both 
parties rated the race even, with each ''candidate" receiv~ng 
50 per cent of the vote of those expressing an op1nion.76 The 
results i.ndicated that Dewey was not the only Republican 
presidential possibility with publ:tc support. 
In mid-May Governor Luren D. Dickinson of Michigan issued 
a press statement which declared that he and other Republicans 
in the state had begun a campaign to draft·vandenberg for the 
Republican nomlnation. Dickinson added that the efforts were 
being carried out without Vandenberg's knowledge or consent.77 
Soon after Governor Dickinson's announcement the New 
york Ti~~ reported that a group of G.O.P. elder statesmen 
had started a movement to control the balance of power at the 
--------
75!i_~ X2E.k Times, May 21, 1939, III, p. 5. 
76~ ~~ T~yle~, May 31, 1939, p. 8. 
77~~~ york !~m~-' May 19, 1939, p. 12. 
46 
convention and turn it against Dewey. The group reportedly 
wanted a candidate who was familiar with economic issues and 
trends; and, while they believed Dewey to be a dynamic person-
ality, they felt that he had not demonstrated such a capacity. 
The article also stated that the nomination would not be denied 
Dewey were he to show himself to be seasoned and versed in 
public questions.78 
Raymond Moley, writing in Newsweek, also declared that 
the Republican party needed a candidate with less glamor and 
more experience and that the tactics used against the cor-
ruption in New York City would not be suitable for a national 
campaign. According to Maley, The G.O.P. candidate had to be 
one with a deep understanding of the problems of business, 
labor, and agriculture; and he beli.eved that Dewey \'las not 
that man.79 
Thus Dewey, by virtue of being the front running 
candidate, became the target of his rivals. Even though he had 
repeatedly denied his candidacy, his position in the polls had 
prompted his rivals to combine strategy to deflate his boom. 
The anti-Dewey forces planned to run favorite son candidates in 
the primaries and to attempt to get states to send uninstructed 
delegations to the convention, thereby insuring themselves 
78New Yor~ !it~~' May 20, 1939, p. 6. 
79Raymond Moley, "Perspective: De\vey," Newsweek, lft: 48, 
July 17, 1939. ---------
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control over the convention.80 
The anti-Dewey movement did not deter othel~ presidential lc 
aspirants from entering the race for the nomination. In June, 
Kenneth vJ. D. Douglas issued a press statement that a movement 
had been started to secure the nomination for Henry Cabot 
~:------------'L_o_d-'--'ge. The group planned to establish Lodg"-'e=--_:_f::_'o:_:r::_-_:P=-=.r::_e::_.~s~=-· d-'-'-e~· n..:..:_:_·t ______ _ 
clubs throughout IVlassachusetts to win favor·i te son support for 
their candidate.Bl 
In early August, Taft publicly announced his candidacy 
and presented his program. The candidate stated that Roosevelt 
would be the weakest candidate the Democrats could name because 
the basic issue in the campaign would be ~he reversal of New 
Deal polici~s involving continued deficits and excessive 
business regulation; but he cautioned the nat16n to expect no 
"overnight" miracles from the Republican party in their attempt 
to balance the budget. Taft also declared that the adm:l.nistra-· 
tion's farm program was unsatisfactory and that the restriction 
on production had to be abandoned; however, he did not indicate 
alternative solutions. He fux•ther stated that the National 
Labor Relations Act should be amended to separate the pro-
secuting and judicial functions of the National Labor Relations 
Board, a change needed to halt the prejudice directed against 
employers and the American Federation of Labor. Concerning 
--------
8~~ yor~ }imes, May 20, 1939, p. 6. 
81New Y9Ek !J~~~~ June 15, 1939, p. 6. 
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social security, Taft recommended a coordinated program which 
would "make sense," providing for a reasonable non-contributory 
pension granted by the states with Feder-al a1.d supplemented by 
an optional pension plan, to which employer and employee would 
contribute. On foreign affairs the candidate declared himself 
in favor of keeping out of European affairs; however, he did 
state th~t he favored the repeal of the arms embargo because 
he could not see how selling to all nations on a cash and 
carry basis had anything to do with neutrality.82 
Taft's managers announced that they had made no plans 
to seek delegates from any other state than Ohio, although they 
reported that the candidate had heard favorable comments on his 
candidacy from G.O.P. leaders in various sections of the nation • 
. Taft men were reported to have planned to campaign for delegates 
in the Middle West and the Far West.83 
Republican leaders in New York reported to the Ne~ JoE~ 
T:l.mes that .Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts and Ohio Governor 
John w. Bricker were the two leading dark horses in the field 
of candidates. According to the sources, the country's busi-
ness interests, formerly holding great influence in the G.O.P., 
were reported to be not wholly satisfied with any of the lead-
ing candidates--Dewey, Vandenberg, and Taft--and planned to 
82!'Le!!. Yo.tif. Ti.ll}~, .August 4, 1939, pp. 1, !~~ 
831~·, p. !~. 
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keep the convention open so as to consider the candidate best 
suited to run against the Democratic nominee. 84 
Governor Bricker had been frequently mentioned as a 
possible G.O.P. presidential candidate; but if he had had any 




Tart announced his candidacy. Brickel", reportedly.J steQQed 
~--------------
aside ror the state's Senator, declaring that he would not 
attempt to secure the Ohio favorite son spot in the primary. 
He had no comment to make on Taft's de clara t:l.on of cand:l.dacy. 85 
His chances were also somewhat lessened by an attack 
launched o·y Senator Claude Pepper before a Young Democ:~.:•ats 
meeting ii~ Pittsburgh. In a speech delivered to this group 
Pepper declared that Taft, Vandenberg, and Dewey had been 
appraised b,y the duPont group and had been found to be unaccept-
able as candidates. Pepper reported that Vandenberg had been 
impolite t.o Pi.erre duPont during the Nye Munitions Inve stiga-
tions and$ therefore, had been eliminated from the race for 
the nomination; that Dewey bad been judged unacceptable because 
of his liberalism; and that Taft had been d:l.scardr:;d because of 
his bull-beaded and self-righteous attitude. According to 
Pepper•, the duPont group wanted a man whom they could control, 
and that ~IDtan was Govern01, Brlcker.86 
81t~·e\'J. Y~ ~~ August 20, 1939, p. 30. 
-u~~lJ~\'JYor:Is. ,T_j.me.~, August 4, 1939, p. ~ .• 
86''W,a shington Notes: r<ir. duPont Presents' II f'he Ne_~ 
Republic, 100:130, Septembei' 6, 1939. 
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Dewey and Bricker were not the only presidential 
possibilities receiving criticism and political "pot-shots." 
. . 
Oswald Garrison Villard, writing in ~Nation, stated that it 
was almost effrontery for Taft to run for the presidency when 
he had been in public life for so short a time. He further 
declared that Taft's dull speeches would not arouse the interest 
or enthusiasm of the people; but Dewey, on the other hand, 
would be a brilliant campaigner, if nominated. Villard cUd 
temper his praise of Dewey with the statement that there 
existed no evidence that the candidate knew what was going on 
in the world.87 
Concurrent with the announcement of 'I'aft 1 s candidacy 
came the report out of New York that Dewey had established a 
"brain trust" of the type set up by Roosevelt prior to the 
1932 campaign. The report \'Jas denied by De\o;ey 1 s friends, 
declaring that a research bureau had been organized to find 
facts to aid the candidate, not a "brain trust" group to impose 
their ideas·on him.88 
The August Gallup Poll showed a gain for Vandenberg and 
relatively little change in the popularity of the other 
candidates. In the survey Dewey received 45 per cent, 
Vandenberg 25 per cent, Taft 14 per cent, Hoover 6 per cent, 
87oswald Garrison Villard, 11 IssL1es and Men," The Nation, 
149:197, August 19, 1939. 
SSNew !ork Times, August 5, 1939, p. 3. 
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Landon 3 per cent, Borah 2 per ceot, Bricker 2 per cent, and 
others 3 per cent. A significant fact pointed out in the poll 
was that 44 per cent of those Republicans sampled had not yet 
made up their minds on the candidate they would prefer for 
194o. 89 
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tinuation of the trend established in the August poll. Dewey 
had fallen to 39 per cent, while Vandenberg gained to 27 per 
cent and.Taft to 17 per cent. Others receiving votes were 
Hoover with 5 per cent, Landon 4 per cent, Borah 3 pel .. cent, 
Lindbergh 1 per cent, Bricker 1 per cent, and others with 3 
per cento Charles Lindbergh made the poll on the basis of a 
speech in which he advocated strict United States aloofness 
from the European conflict.9° The outbreak of the European 
war had started to affect the popularity of the candidates 
and potential candidates. 
The war had triggered a sudden increase in Roosevelt's 
popularity with both the Democratic rank and file and the nation 
as a whole. This reversal of the President's popularity could 
have resulted from the Democrats' desire for an experienced 
leader during the international crisis. Cal .. rying this reason-· 
ing one step further, it is logical to assume that the rank 
89~ew York Times, August 13, 1939, p. 3. 
9°New York Tim~~~ October 13, 1939, p. 14. 
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and file of the Republican party also turned to the experienced 
leaders within their party, which could partially explain 
Vandenberg's sudden rise in the polls, as well as Dewey's 
sudden drop. 
Taft viewed the war as beneficial to the G.O.P. because 
he believed that the overwhelming majority of the American 
people were determined to keep the nation out of war and that 
they could not trust the Democratic party to do so. He stated 
that the Republican party was bound to become the peace party 
in 1940.91 
Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr., of New York, took a 
more drastic isolationist stand on the war; in a nationwide 
radio address, he declared that he would become an active can-
. didate for the nom:i.nation if the G.O.P. attempted to "soft pedal" 
the importance of keeping the United States out of the war. He 
stated that his decision would depend on the views of the can-
didates and the wishes of the people. Fish reported that thus 
far in the campaign, the candidates had failed to present the 
issue as paramount and unless they did so soon, he would take 
the issue directly to the people in the primary contests.92 
Frank Gannett, a Rochester, New York, publisher and 
chairman of the National Committee to Uphold the Constitutional 
91N~ Yor~ Time~, October 13, 1939, p. 12. 
92New X£!•k fi~~es, November 28, 1939, p. 18. 
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Government, leaked the report that he had been giving con-
sideration to his possible candidacy. He declared that he was ~ 
being pressured into taking the step, although he had never 
been ambitious for political office.93 
In November, with the election a year away, Turner 
Catledge, writing in the New York Times, reported in his 
assessment of the Republican campaigns that Dewey, Taft, and 
Vandenberg possessed campaign organizations working in the 
field to gather support for their candidates. He stated that 
Taft's organization, headed by David Ingalls ·(for mel .. .Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy) and John H. Hollister (Congressman from 
Cincinnati), was thus far the most active. Taft men had spread 
throughout the country to gather convention support, using a 
more traditional ?pproach than any of the other candidates. 
Catledge stated that Dewey's supporters had also moved out into 
the field to gather delegate strength and had established a 
letter-writing campaign to line up pre-convention support. It 
was also reported that Dewey planned to give a series of 
speeches to answer the questions as to his stand on the domestic 
and foreign affairs issues of the day. Catledge also reported 
that a cloak of mystery surrounded Vandenberg's activities and 
intentions. .An organization for the candidate had been estab-
lished; however, little had been accomplished outside Michigan, 
93Ibid. 
and Vandenberg himself had been casual toward questions as to 
his candidacy. The secondary candidates, according to 
catledge, were Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts; Governors 
John Bricker, Arthur H. James, Leverett Saltonstall 
(Massachusetts), and George D. Aiken (Vermont); Senator H. 
Styles Bridges (New Hampshire); Representatives Bruce Barton, 
James W. Wadsworth, and Joseph Martin--all from New York; 
former President Hoover; and former Governor and presidential 
nominee Landon.94 
While some political observers were analyzing the field 
of candidates or assessing the political implications of the 
war, a poll of fifty vlashington correspondents conducted in 
December revealed that in their judgment, the Democratic 
party would win in 1940. In April, a poll of the same group 
had resulted in the prediction that the G.O.P. would win.95 
These and other signs of the changing polittcal scene 
did not slow down the campaigns, nor did it dissuade others 
from entering the race. In early December, Frank Gannett 
formally announced his candidacy and presented a seven-point 
program on which he would run: keep the nation out of war; 
barricade all paths of dictatorship in the country by repeal-
ing the President's blank check powers and by restoring 
1940 
94Turner cat ledge' "Election Results Raise Republicans I 
Hopes, 1:1 New York_ Times, November 12, 1939, IV, p. 7. 
95Edltorial in New Xork ~' December 2, 1939, P.· 16. 
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constitutional balance; restore national confidence by worthy 
policies and government by law, not by bureaucrats; restore 
industrial peace by rewriting labor laws to protect the rights 
of both workers and employers; fumigate the relief administra-
tion and place control with the communities; abandon the 
exploded spend~lend policy; and wipe out conditions which 
encourage dictatorships by restoring prosperity.96 
Representative Fish, whose foreign policy concepts were 
close to Gannett's, also jumped on the campaign trail in 
December. Speaking in Illinois and Wisconsin, Fish again· 
threatened to enter the campaign if the existing candidates 
continued to neglect what he believed was the most important 
issue: keeping out of the war. He declared that he had 
received telegrams from World War Veterans offering to set up 
Fish-for-President clubs on his behalr.97 
Dark horse possibility Governor Bricker also appeared to 
be launching a campaign, for in a speech before Nm-1 York G. 0. P. 
leaders he stated that the administration's relief program had 
become a polit:t.cal racket by the practice of padding the pay-
rolls in election years and demanded the replacement of the 
existing system with one administered locally and financed 
jointly by local, state, and Federal participation.98 It had 
--
96New York J'im€!..§_, December 10, 1939, p. 2. 
97New Yor~ Times, December' 13, 1939, p. 22. 
98New ~ Times, December 17, 1939, p. 1. 
been reported that a gentlemen's agreement between Taft and 
Bricker put Ohio's delegation behind Taft. The delegation, 
which was .figured to be headed by Bricker, reportedly \'lOUld 
continue to support Taft as long as he had a chance to win; 
a deadlock, it was further reported, Bricker's supporters 
would go to work to line up the delegation for the Governor. 
Although Bricker's close friends denied his candidacy, it was 
rumored that he had important business support which could 
swing delegations his way in a deadlocked convention. Joseph 
Pew of Pennsylvania· and Kenneth Simpson, National Committee-
man from New York--both prominent political leaders in their 
states--\'lere reported to have considered Bricker as a possj_ble 
candidate .99 
As of December the two leading candidates for the G,O,P. 
nomlnation \'lere Dewey and Taft. Time compared their political 
struggle to the fabled race between the tortoise and the 
hare. In the article Taft was pictured as being prissy, 
solemn~ and ponderous; Dewey was characterized as being a more 
dynamic candidate. The magazine also pointed to a number of 
blunders committed in the Taft campaign during this early stage 
of the political battle: in Iowa, Taft had denounced the corn 
loans on the very day the Department of Agriculture had 
released $70~000,000 in corn loans to the state; in Kansas City, 
99VIiarl,er; Moscow, "Ohio Relief Issue Vita 1 to Bricker," 




he had crossed a year-old A.F. of L. picket line for no 
apparent reason; and in Texas, he had permitted himself to be 
photographed as a hunter, dressed in a. business suit and a 
starched collar, holding a dead turkey,lOO 
The magazine also reported that Dewey's campaign had 
started to mak~ headway during December, but that the party 
leaders had reportedly been considering him for the second 
spot on the ticket, not the first. The Time delegate analysis 
gave Dewey only New York's ninety-two convention delegates, 
one-fourth of which were not certain, while giving Taft three 
hundred. 101 
As the candidates and the country at large prepared for 
the election year activities, the question uppermost in the 
minds of all was the resolution of the third term·question. 
Turner Catledge adequately summed up the problem facing the 
Republican party when he reported that the G.O.P. was facing 
one of the greatest political paradoxes of recent domestic 
history. Realistic members of the party had agreed that F.D.R. 
would be the strongest candidate the Democrats could run in 
1940; yet, they also realized, just as strongly, that his 
renomination would give them the best issue they could possibly 
have. Roosevelt's declaration of his intentions would, accord-
--------
100"Hare and Tortoise," Time, 34:13, December 18, 1939. 
lOlrbid., p. 14. 
ing to catledge, crystallize the situation in the Republican 
party almost as much as in the Democl"'atic. If the Democrats 
-
renominated Roosevelt, the man with qualities most likely to 
attract votes from the President would rise toward the top of 
the G.O.P. presidential heap. If a Democrat other than F.D.R. 
were nominated, then a candidate with different qualifications 
might be sought. Therefore, the third term question was an 
extremely important one for the Republicans; however, the 
situation was such that the party could not wait until the 
President resolved the mystery, the candidates were in the 
field to gather support.l02 
' In his assessment of the Republican campaigns as of 
Decembel .. , catl,edge stated that the morale of the party was as 
high as at any time since the outbreak of the war; before 
September, the party's hopes had soared into a virtual con~· 
viction that they would win in 1940, but the war had S\llitched 
the major issue from New Deal domestic policies to the 
.President as an international figure and to his foreign policy. 
The three major candidates, by concentrating on the administra-
tion's domestic failures, had not, according to catledge, pro-
vided Roosevelt with a streamlined vehicle on which his official 
dependents expected him to ride over the third term tradition. 
Dewey's speeches and statements indicting the New Deal had 
102Turner catledge, "G.O.P. Race Affected by Roosevelt 
Si.lence," ~!ork_ T:!~~~' December 24, 1939, IV, p. 7. 
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been designed to impress on Republican leaders that he \'ITas the ,---
people's choice. Taft's campaign, concentrating on the issues t· 
of the administration's fiscal and spending policies and the 
New Deal bureaucracy, had given the candidate the largest 
bloc of pledged delegates. Taft's managers had even gone into 
the South to secure delegate votes. Vandenberg's campaign was 
still confined to Michigan, although the Senator had reportedly 
written letters to friends in other states asking them to look 
out for his interests. Catledge stated that Vandenberg's 
definite views for an isolationist wartime poiicy for the 
nation placed the candidate at odds with some of the leading 
f:i.gures of the party .103 As the candj.dates continued thelr 
campaigns into 1940, the war issue figured to affect all the 
.candidates involved in the race. 
l03Ib:i.d _. 
CHAPTER III 
THE PRE-CONVENTION ACTIVITIES 
The outbreak of the European war complicated the polit-
ical situation to such a degree that few professionals would 
hazard a guess as to what the nation could expect in .the cruc:l.al 
that polit:l.cal sages could have predicted that Roosevelt would 
remain silent on his third term decision through the primar:l.es 
and emerge in complete control of his party, or that Dewey 
·would come out of the primary contests as the leading G.O.P. 
candidate, or even that Taft would rely on his political con-
tacts with state and local leaders instead of challenging 
Dewey in the primaries; but it is doubtful that anyone coL\ld 
·have predicted the effect the violent change in the course of 
the war woL\ld have on the national political scene. In April 
and May of 1940, the Nazi "blitzkrieg" was released on Northern 
-
Europe; and the repercussions following this aggression 
·resulted in mass insecurity, a condition which elevated 
Roosevelt's chances for a third term and caused Republicans to 
reassess their candidates in light of the altered international 
situation. 
I. THE REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGNS 
During the first five months of 1940, the candidacies of 
!~ 
--
all G.O.P. aspirants, except Dewey and Taft, died quietly as 
the two front running candidates amassed delegate strength, 
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with Taft gaining his through conversations with political 
leaders and Dewey gaining his in the primaries. Two signifi-
cant developments of the period, aside fr•om the intensifica-
tion of the international crisis, were the creation of a 
"Stop-Dewey" group and the sudden rise of ~/endell Willkie 
as a presidential contender. · 
The Pre-primary Period: January--February 
In January, 1940, Time reported that Vandenberg was 
honestly disinterested in the nomination and that it would take 
a miracle for either Hoover or Willkie to capture the prize .1 
It was the general consensus that the nominee would be either 
~f the two front runners, each representing a segment of the 
party--Taft drawing his support from the conservatives and 
Dewey ostensibly representing the liberal wing of the party. 
The Gallup Poll of January reported that Dewey had sub-
stantially increased his lead as the favorite candidate of 
those who intended to vote Republicanj however, the poll also 
indica ted that 37 pel" cent had not made up their minds as to 
whom they would like to see nominated. In the survey Dewey 





with 16 per cent, Taft with 11 per cent, Hoover with 5 per 
cent, and James, Lodge, Bricker, Borah, and Landon with 1 per 
cent. All other candidates received only 3 per cent. 2 
In January, while Dewey, Taft, and Gannett were hitting 
the campaign trail, Vandenberg and Bricker issued statements 
which seemed to take them out of the race. Senator Nye of 
North Dak.ota declared to the pl,ess that he would not run for 
the nomination and urged Republicans to back Vandenberg. The 
Michigan Senator stated that he would be willing to serve as 
the G.O.P. candidate, but that he had no personal aspirations 
for the position and that he would not personally participate 
in any pre-convention campaign for delegates.3 
Governor Bricker de~lared that the campaign headquarters 
established in Chicago in his behalf was unauthorized and not 
approved. He also stated that he was not thinking of the 
presidency and denied the suggestion that the Ohio delegation 
would support his candidacy if it appeared that Taft could not 
win the nomination.4 
Gannett, an ardent campaigner, concentrated his campaign 
on domestic issues. He had been a one-time friend of the 
President \'lhen the latter was governor, but had become a bitter 
2New York --- Times, January 7, 1940, p. 14. 
3~ Y~ Times, Janua1,y 10, 1940, p. 1. 




critic of the New Deal, especially after Roosevelt's Supreme 
Court packing attempt. 5 In January, the Rochester• publisher 
assailed the New Deal and most of its works and charged that 
the New Dealers had ruined the "American System." He also 
promised to effect measures (which he did not define) which 
would bring about recovery and ease unemployment. Gannett 
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declared .that the nation's form of government and liberties 
would be menaced until the New Deal theorists were replaced by 
individuals who believed in private enterprise and knew how to 
make it work. 6 
It was reported that Gannett had the. unqualified support 
of Representative James. w. Wads1vorth of New York, as well as 
the tacit backing of Republican leaders in the rural counties 
.of Central and Western New York State. His backers predicted 
that their candidate would receive first ballot support from 
at least thirty of New York's ninety-two delegates and fifty 
votes from other states.? 
While Gannett's campaign centered around domestic issues, 
Taft was t~king a close look at the administration's foreign 
policy. In Milwaukee, Taft raised the question as to whether 
Roosevelt had accepted the view that the United States must 
5 11 Gannett for Gannett J II rrim.§_, 35:22 J January 22, 1940. 
6John r.. Underhill, "Gannett Launches Presidential Race." 
New yor~ Ti~, January 17, 191+0, p. 1. 
,.( 
Ibid., pp. 1,15. 
stay out of war~ except a war of defense. The Ohio Senator 
denounced the argument that the United States would be over-
whelmed by Germany and Russia if France and England were 
defeated. He also warned his listeners of the arbitrary 
powers which would be given to the President in the event of 
war. In answer to Roosevelt's pleas for non-partisanship~ 
Taft declared that the appeal itself was partisan because it 
had attempted to put the G.O.P. in the position of being 
partisan whenever they criticized New Deal policies.8 
In late January~ Dewey took his campaign north to New 
England. In the tour the candidate avoided Nev-1 Hampshire 
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because of Senator Bridge's regional control~ Vermont because 
of its relative remoteness~ and Connecticut because of its 
proximity to New York. The idea of this brief campaign trip 
was to allow the people to see and hear him and to give the 
Republican leaders in the region a chance •to meet the candidate. 
It was reported that while he did not receive any great 
spontaneous ovations~ he did receive far more than a courteous 
and cordial welcome. It was furthel' reported that none of the 
politicians meeting Dewey avowed himself to be sold on the 
candidate as a result of the tour. Devtey went back to New 
York to prepare a long campaign trip to the Pacific Northwest.9 
8~e~. Xoyk T~~~~ January 20, 1940~ p. 20. 
9Lauriston Bulla1•d, "Dewey Liked in New England, but 




The purpose of Dewey's February trip to the Northwest 
was to catch up with Taft in delegate strength. To achieve 
this goal the candidate traveled 7,500 miles in eleven and 
one-half days, made forty-eight platform speeches and ten 
formal addresses, held eleven large press conferences, and 
attended ten receptions; but as his managers readily admitted, 
the people turned out in great numbers to hear the racket-
buster, not the oratory of the presidential candidate.lO On 
his wa:J to Portland, where he planned to deliver a Lincoln 
Day address, Dewey conferred with par•ty leaders and gave 
speeches in Chicago, Butte, Helena, and Spokane; on the return 
trip the campaign was brought to Ogden, Salt Lake City, Boise, 
Cheyenne, an~ Omaha. 11 
During this western tour Dewey centered his campaign 
around the New Deal's failure to put the unemployed back to 
work, declaring that the energy of American enterprise could 
create more jobs and relieve the unemployment problem and that 
the Ne~·J Deal's failure to utilize th1.s energy had resulted in 
an attitude of defeatism.l2 In Portland, Dewey charged the 
New Deal with an erosion of capital, which had depleted the 
country's productivity by seven billion dollars, causing 
---------
lOnup the Mountain,"~~ 35:15-16, February 26, 191~0. 
llNe~ York Times, February 4, 1940, p. 3. 
12uup the Mountain," Time, 35:16, February 26, 1940. 
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continuance of unemployment and dividing the nation.l3 On his 
return from the tour Dewey stated that he had found widespread, 
ser:lous interest in the immediate political future of the 
country; and he commended the strong, intelligent, and 
courageous men and women who were vigorously preparing to lead 
the party to victory.l4 
During February, Senator Taft also stressed domestic 
issues as he campaigned in Florida, North Carolina, and 
Pennsylvania. In Florida the candidate warned his listeners 
that unless the New Deal were defeated, the inevitable result 
~wuld be increased government regulation and the gradual 
absorption of all industry into a collectivized state. He also 
criticizt~d the Sec uri ties Exchange Commission for going beyond 
its or1.ginal purpose of protecting investor's against fraud, 
the National Labor Relations Board for the influence of "left 
wing enthusiasts," the administration of relief, the Nevi Deal's 
tai program, the Federal encroachment into business with the 
Tennessee V:alley Authority, and the Wages-Hours Law for its 
stifling of small businesses. Taft advocated amendments to 
the W.ages-Hou.rs Law to prevent oppression j amendments to ha 1 t 
the Securities Exchange Commission from 1.ts attempts to pass 
judment on the wisdom of investmentsj creation of a tax policy 
-------
13NeY!_ York ~me~.' February 13, 1940, p. 1.. 
14Ne~ Yo1•k Times, . February 20, 1940, p. 12. 
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to encourage investment instead of discouraging it; legisla-
tion to protect the farmer against foreign imports; and 
abandonment of the reciprocal trade tr•ea~ies .15 
In Greensboro, North carolina, Taft declared that the 
nation must choose between Lincoln's republic or New Deal 
dictatorship. 16 Again, in his Pennsylvania campaign, Taft 
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stated that the nation needed constructive policies to replace 
the "destructive" ones of the New Deal, especially in the areas 
of business, agriculture, labor relations, national budget, 
relief, public health, and national defense. 17 He advocated 
the cutting of government expenses to balance the budget; con-
tinuing such humanitarian projects as relief, old age pensions, 
unemployment insurance, and medical ai.d to the poor, but revis-
ing the administration so that it would be intelligent, econom-
ical, and fair; preparing adequately for defense, but keeping 
out of war; and abandoning the limiting of agricultural produc-
tion, but keeping a reasonable subsidy for soil conservation.l8 
Senator Vandenberg, ·while still refusing to conduct a 
pre-convention campaign, met with farm, labor, and party 
leaders in St. Paul, Minnesota, to win support for his candi-
15New York --- rrimes, February 4, 1940, p. 4. 
16New York Times, February 13, 1940, p. 1. 
17New YorkTimes, February 19, 1940, p. 1. 
18rbid., pp. 1,3. 
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dacy. It was reported that he would have support from 
vlisconsin 1 Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Missouri, Utah, 
Wyoming, Idaho, Washington, Oregon, North and South Dakota, 
and Iowa--199 delegate votes--on the early ballots. It was 
' 
also reported that a victory over Dewey in the Wisconsin 
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primary was essential to Vandenberg's candidacy. His experi-
ence in t.he Senate was figured to weigh heavily in the pri-
mary election; however, it was generally believed that it 
would be a close race. 19 
The three leaders in the fight for the nomination did 
not have absolute cont1•o1 of the political limelight during 
February. Early in the month, General Hugh s. Johnson, in 
a speech before the Automotive Trade Association, advanced 
New York Representative Bruce Barton as the likeliest dark 
horse candidate and declared that Roosevelt could be re-elected 
in 1940 with only a loss of six states instead of two if the 
Republican par·ty did not have something better to offer than 
they had at that time.2° 
In L~ncoln Day speeches across the country the New Deal 
was roasted on the political grill. In Omaha, Hoover declared 
that the nation's number one problem, unemployment, could not 
be solved until the country turned·away from "statism" and 
l9Ja me s A. Hagerty, "Vandenberg Looks to the Northv;e st, 11 
New York f.i~~~~ February 12, 1940, p. 18. 
2°~ew Y<?_!_ls_ Times, February 7, 191to, p. 14. 
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unshackled free enterprise.21 In New York, Hamilton told his 
audience that the people of the United States were tired of 
"drifting". and looked to the Republican par•ty for a return of 
Lincoln-Americanism. 22 In Grand Rapids, Pennsylvania's 
Governor James criticized the New Deal for failing to find a 
cure for unemployment after a seven-y~e~a~r~e~f~f~o~r~t~a~n~d~f~o~r __________________ __ 
~dvancing war as the only solution. 23 Governor Harold Stassen 
of Minnesota, also speaking in Grand Rapids, called for legis-
lation to cut out the overlapping and duplicating of functions 
within the Federal government. He also urged Federal legisla-
tion to provide for• a "cooling off" period in industrial dis-
putes and criticized the National Labor Relations Board for 
combining the functions of rules maker, investigator, prosecu-
tor, and judge.24 
The February Gallup Poll showed that Dewey still held 
the lead among RepubJ.ican presidential candidates, but that 
his lead had diminished somewhat. In the survey Dewey received 
56 per cent, a loss of four percentage points from January, 
followed by Vandenberg and Taft with 17 per cent each, Hoover 
with 3 per cent, Gannett with 1 per cent, and others with 6 
21N~ York :f'_!..ll'!~~ February 13, 191+0~ p. 1. 
22Ibid. 
23James A. Hagerty, "James Addresses Vandenberg Rally," 
New. ~k ~~~ February 13, 1940, p. 4. 
24rbid. 
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per cent. James, Lodge, Bricker, J~ndon, and Borah had been 
knocked off the poll. The poll also indicated that a majority 
of G.O.P, voters throughout the nation had expressed themselves 
in favor of a more liberal standard bearer--more liberal. than 
Landon--for 1940; 59 per cent wanted a more liberal candidate, 
while 17 per cent wanted a more conservative candidate, and 
24 per cent wanted one neither more liberal nor more conserva-
tive ,25 
In mid-February, the Republican National Committee 
.announced that the Republican convention would be held in· 
Philadelphia on June 21~, thus endh1g a problem which had been 
in existence fc.r severa 1 months. In November, 1939, Roosevelt 
had suggested that both parties hold their conventions a month 
and a half later than usual to save both parties money and to 
spare the country the boredom which usually accompanied such 
. 
fanfare. The announcement had been answer~d by Hamilton to 
the effect that the President had arrogated a great deal of 
authority when he undertook to direct when the G.O.P. should 
hold its convention,26 In December, the Republican National 
Committee had gone on record favoring the middle of June as 
the convention date, irrespective of when the Democrats met. 
Waiting until the Democrats announced their date would work to 
25~ Yo~ T~~ February 11, 1940, p. 9. 
26~. ~ Ti~s, November 29, 1939, p. 1. 
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the disadvantage of the G.O,P, because the opposition could 
run on the record of the New Deal, while the Republicans would 
have to have a longer campaign to organize the part~ to oppose 
such a campaign.27 In Januar~, the Republican National 
Committee decided to meet in Washington, D.C.- to choose the 
time and place of the convention; sentiment within tb~ 
Committee was against waiting until the Democrats had fixed 
their date.28 
In his announcement of the convention date Hamilton 
challenged the Democrats to renominate Roosevelt so that the 
country would have a clean-cut issue, the New Deal. He also 
stated that the demoralized and embittered Democratic party 
could not present a united front against the Republicans in 
1940. It \vas reported that man~ members of the National 
Committee assumed that F.D.R. would be renominated by the 
Democrats.29 
As a result of the pre-primary campaigns, most G.O.P. 
professionals believed that the party's choice for 191W v1ould 
be either Dewey or Taft; and the~ looked to the primaries for 
an indication of the trend of public opinion, the choice of 
the rank and file. 
---:;:.._ _ _ 
27!J~~ X9r.~ T!mes, December 7, 1939, p. 25. 
28Ne\'I X~ Times, Januar~ 11, 19lW, p, 20. 
29~ew Yo~ Time~, Februar~ 17, 191+0, p. 1. 
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The Primarl Months: March--May 
Dewey's percentage in the polls had fluctuated from 50 
per cent in 1939 to 60 per cent in early· 1940 to 56 per cent 
by the primaries. His remarkable showing in these contests 
was destined to trigger another such rise~ for it was apparent 
~~--------~that Dewe~ the only Republican candidate to take the 
primaries seriously. Dewey was to face Vandenberg·in 
\'lisconsin and Nebraska~ and be had been challenged by Gannett 
in the New York primary; but these were the only races in 
which the leading candidates would face one another.30 Taft 
was figured to enter the Ohio race~ but bis~entrance into 
other contests had not been announced. In late February~ his 
managers stated that Taft would not enter the New Jersey 
·primary because his Washington duties would prevent him from 
conducting a campaign in that state. Taft's managers did 
indicate that there was a chance the Senator would enter the 
West Virginia primary.31 
Turner Catledge, writing in the Ne~ 19£~ ~~ 
depreciated the value of the primaries as a barometer of 
delegate strength. To support his contention~ Catledge 
revealed that hardly more than one-third of the states, 
representing only one-half of the nation's population, held-
30Turner Catledge, "Presidential Primaries a Doubtful 
Barometer~" Ne~ Yo!'k Times, February 18, 19LfO, IV~ p. 7. 
31New XE,r~ f'im~, February 24, 191+0, p. 2. 
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primary contests and that since New York's delegates vJere 
chosen without having to announce their preferencesJ the 
percentage of population represented in the primaries amounted 
to only forty per cent. Catledge also stated that the prima-
ries were indecisive because of the apparent unwillingness of 
the leading candidates to face one another in the contests.32 
The question as to the actual value of the primaries 
was one which could only be answered after the contests of 
political strength had been fought and the results analyzed. 
James A. Hagerty, writing in the Nev1 York ~:!_mes, 
reported in an early analysis of the campaign in Illinois that 
Dewey was regarded as certain to win over any other candidate 
or candidates entering the primary against him. Dewey's man-
agers believed that a victory in Illinois would greatly 
increase their candidate's prestige throughout the country 
and would bring him the backing of party leaders who had remained 
cool to his candidacy. Hagerty declared that if either Taft 
or Vandenberg entered the primary, Dewey could lead either by 
two or three to one; if both entered, Dewey would have a 
greater vote than the combined vote of both.33 
Arthur Krock reported in his early analysis of the 
Wisconsin primary that the fate of Dewey's and Vandenberg's 
32Turner Catledge, "President::i.al Primaries a Doubtful 
Barometer_," Ne~! York 'l'im~, February 18, 191W, IV, p. 7. 
33James A. Hagerty, "Dewey Men· Count on Illinois Vote," 
New York !~.l!!..e~.' February 1, 1940, p. 13. 
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candidacies could be decided in the April 2 primary. In 
assessing Vandenberg's chances, Krock stated that the Senator 
had supported certain social and economic New Deal measures of 
the type which had appealed to the Wisconsin voting majority 
for many years. Krock also pointed out that the isolationist 
doctrine, associated with Vandenberg, was popular in the stateo, 
In the assessment of Dewey's chances Krock stated that wh:l.le 
the New York District Attorney was not well known in Wisconsin, 
he had initiated a more frontal attack on the New Deal than 
had Vandenberg. It was also reported that Dewey's foreign 
policy views had not been presented in as g~eat detail as bad 
his views on domestic matters. If Vandenberg were to win in 
Wisconsin, according to Krock, Dewey's chances fo1• the nomi-
nation could be severely impaired; however, were the reverse 
to happen, Dewey would be far ahead of the field of candidates~ 
Vandenberg's managers reportedly were counting on support from 
the state's Progressive party; however, it was revealed that 
the Progressives would vote in the Democratic primary if a 
third term slate were entered. If such a move occurred, 
Dewey's chances for victory would be materially better because 
his supporters in the state were the "old-line Republicans," 
the traditional enemies of the Progressives.34 
34Arthur F.rock, 11 In the Nat :ton: The Possibilities of 
the Wisconsin Primaries," Nevi York Times, February 8, 1940, 
p. 22. - -- ---
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During the month of February 1 Dewey's publicity easily 
overshowed Taft's. The former's tour to New England and to 
the Pacific Northwest and the political analyses of the 
Illinois and Wisconsin primary campaigns brought him almost 
daily headline space. In March 1 however 1 the situation was 
reversed; Taft's speeches in Virginia 1 Kentucky 3 and 
Pennsylvania were among the leading political stories of the 
month. In Virginia, Taft placed the 11 anti-war party'' label on 
the G.O.P. and declared that if Roosevelt were re-elected, he 
would not bet the country could stay out of the war.35 In 
Kentucky, Taft took advantage of published reports that the 
President had cited Farley's religion (Catholic) as a possible 
handicap to the Democratic National Committee Chairman's 
~residential candidacy by denouncing religious bigotry and 
declaring that such ideas sought to destroy the inalienable 
rights guaranteed to every American citizen.36 In Philadelphia 1 
Taft warned that four more years of the New Deal would lead to 
a government of men, not people, which would control every step 
of the nation's economic and political and individual life. 
He also stated that a planned economy was socialism and 
that socialism could not be carried out by deliberative legis-
lative bodies. 37 
35Ne~ YorkTimes., March 17, 1940, p. 4. 
36Turner Catledge, 11Taft Denounces Rel:tgious Bigot~y," 
~~ Y£Fk Ti~, March 23, 1940, p. 2. 
37 New York Times, March 26, 1940, p. 9. 
Whil€ Taft was campaigning in the East, Dewey made a 
trip to Chicago to confer with party leaders from Illinois 
and Wisconsin. Plans were worked out for"the candidate's 
campaigns in the two states; the campaigning WOLl.ld consist 
mai.nly of rear platform speeches from trains .38 
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Dewey hit the headlines in late March when the leaders 
of the La Follette Progressives repudiated the "Progressive 
Republican Club of vlisconsin. 11 The Progressives charged that 
the misleading wording was a cunning deception, an attempt to 
lea~ the people of Wisconsin into believing that the Progres-
sives had cast their support to Dewey. When the news broke, 
Vandenberg '.s supporters reportedly redoubled their efforts in 
the state and made an open appeal for the support of the 
Progres-sives. 39 
In the New Hampshire primary, the first such contest of 
1940, Senator Bridges led the field of eight running for the 
four plac·e.s as delegates-at-large. Of the eight delegates 
elected, one had pledged himself for Dewey,40 and the other 
seven, although unp1edged, had expressed leanings toward 
Bridges as a favorite son candidate. 41 
38New York Times, March 8, 1940, p. 11. 
39Turner Catledge, "Dewey Men Draw \Hsconsi..n Rebuke," 
New York Times, March 28, 1940, p. 16. 
ltO.James A. Hagerty, "Roosevelt Slate Carries Primary in 
New Hampshire," New YoE.!5_ Times, r<Iarch 13, 1940, p. 18. 
41N-ew York Times, Mar•ch 14, 1940, p. 18. 
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The March Gallup Poll of Republican voters again placed 
Dewey as the front runner; however, the trend which had begun 
in February continued to manifest itself in the March poll: 
Dewey dropped from 56 per cent to 53 per cent, and Vandenberg 
gained from 17 per cent to 19 per cent; Taft again received 
17 per cent. Others receiving votes in the poll were Hoover 
with 5 per cent, Gannett and James with 1 per cent, and others 
with 4 per cent. The poll also indicated that the number of 
undecided voters had increased from 36 per cent in February 
to 40 per cent in March. In a survey of twelve Mid-West states _,. 
(Wiscons:tn, Nebraska, Iowa, Minnesota, Kansas, Mtssom"i, North 
and South Dakota, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, anc1 Ohio) the 
poll asked G.O.P. voters to choose between Dewey and Vandenberg. 
The results showed Dewey leading with 45 per cent; Vandenberg 
received 33 per cent; and 22 per cent were undecided. The poll 
predicted that the vote in the Mid-West primaries would be 
close. 1~2 
The April 2 Wisconsin primary was eagerly anticipated 
by Republicans all over the country. It was generally be11.eved 
that the election would eliminate either Dewey or Vandenberg 
should one lose to the other by a decisive margin, while a 
close vote could eliminate both. Robert La Follette, the 
leader of the State's Progressives, was believed to be more likely 
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to support Vandenberg's candidacy than Dewey's. In the prim-
ary campaign Dewey traveled through the state and conducted a 
very vigorous campaign, while Vandenberg made no personal 
appearance in the state and left the campaigning to his 
supporters. ~-3 As a result of his intense efforts, Dewey won 
an cinexpected and startling victory by sweeping the state's 
twenty-four delegates. Vandenberg's candidacy was believed to 
be a dead issue after this defeat~ and Dewey's candidacy began 
to draw more attention.44 
Although Vandenberg had made no effort to campaign.for 
the nomination, many Republi.cans had picked him to sweep 
through the primaries and attain suff:tcient delegate strength 
to become the leading compromise candidate. In an attempt to 
analyze the defeat, f\1ilton s. Mayer, writing in~ Natio.E_, 
explained that in foreign affairs Vandenberg had been diffi-
cult to pin down because he had vacillated'from an interna-
tionalist in the World War period to an isolationist in 1940, 
and in domestic affairs he had stood squarely on both sides 
of every issue for the preceding ten years.45 
Senator Taft, when asked for his reaction to the results 
of the primary, declared that nothing would surprise him in 
43"Wisconsin Primar1es, 11 Time, 35:1.8, April 1, 191w. 
4 1 ~ 11 Dewey Gets Go:t.ng, 11 'Tim~, 35:19, Api'il 8, 1940. 
45Milton s. Mayer, "Men Who Would Be President: VI. Try 
to Find Vandenberg," The. ~ation, 150:587-88, May 11, 1940. 
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Wisconsin ana added that he would.have more votes on the first 
ballot than any other candidate.46 Arthur Krock pointed to 
Dewey's victory as proof of the candidate's vote-getting power 
and predicted that his success would bring him a challenge 
from his rivals for the nomination.47 Krock also reported 
that Dewey's Wisconsin campaign had implied a belief in the 
extreme principles of isolationism and that the candidate had 
seemed to vie with Vandenberg for occupying the innermost 
corner of the isolationist reservation.~ 8 James A. Hagerty 
stated that Dewey's two-day personal campaign in the state had 
been an important factor in his victory. He also reported 
that Vandenberg had declined to comment on the results of the 
primary; ho,tlever, it was revealed that he had been surprised 
by the resulta,49 that he had expected, at.worst, an even break 
in the election.50 
The New York primary election \'1as also held on April 2, 
and the big question in the contest was the number of 
46New York Times, April li, 1940, p. J.L!. 
4 . 
7.Arthur Krock, "In the Nation: Mr. Dewey Goes to the 
Head of the Clas.s," New York Times, April lJ, 19110, p. 22. 
48Arthur Krocl<:, "Draft-Roosevelt Plan Meets a Double 
Check," Hew York~imes, April 7, 191~0, IV, p. 3. 
lt 9charles R. Michae 1, "Washington Sees Dewey's Chances 
Enhanced by Vote," New York Times, April 4, 1940, p. 1. 
50James . A. Hagerty, "De\-;ey Seizes Lead in Race, 11 New 
York Times, April 7, 1940, IV, p. 6. 
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delegates Gannett \'lould be able to capture from Dewey. 
Newsweek reported that Dewey's diligent campaigning had again 
paid off; he had captured eighty-two of the ninety-two dele-
gates.51 Since the New York delegates were not bound to 
declare themselves for any candidate, the number allotted to 
any presidential aspirant would necessarily have to be an 
estimation. Between the April primary and the June conven-
tion the speculation over the number of New York delegates who 
would vote for Dewey would run high. 
The next important primaries which captured the 
nation's attention took place in Illinois and Nebraska on April 
g. After the April 2 Wisconsin primary, Senators Charles L. 
l\lcNal'Y of Oregon and Arthur Clapper of Kansas sent mesEwges to 
Nebraska Republican leaders endorsing Vandenberg as a champion 
of agriculture; however, the two Senators disclaimed any partic-
ipation in the primary campaign, but stated· that they had been 
asked by the state's G.O.P. leaders for Vandenberg's voting 
record on agricultural measures. The Michigan Senator's 
supporters in the state declared the race to be even; however, 
they admitted that Dewey's Wisconsin primary victory and the 
candidate's personal visits in the state represented handicaps 
to the Senator's chances.52 
51"Primary Season Puts Roosevelt and Dewey Off to Good 
Start," Newsweek, 15:15, April 15, 1940. 







In the Nebraska p1•imary, Dewey again emerged victorious :-
over Vandenberg, this time by a margin of nearly 28,000 votes 
(99,905 to 72,108). Not only did the results give Dewey the 
state's :fourteen delegate votes, but it aJ.so marked the first 
time since 1930 that the state's Republican primary vote top-
ped the Democratic.53 
In Illinois, Dewey ran unopposed on the Republican 
ballot, receiving ninety per cent of the vote. He also out-
ran the Roosevelt slate four to three throughout rural 
Illinois, which seemed to indicate that the G.O.P. strength 
in the state had grown considerably since 1936. Even though 
he received ninety per cent of the vote, the state's fifty-
eight delegates were just "advised" to support him at the 
convention.54 
A:rter the Dewey victories in Nebraska and Illinois 
Senator rrtcNary and Senator Hiram Johnson of Califol~nia stated 
that Dewey would be the party's nominee;55 however, it was 
reported that the party professionals still relegated him to 
the second spot on the ticket.56 
Not content to r~st on his successes, Dewey embarked on 
---"---· 
53ttcampaign: G.O.P. Trend," Time, 35:15, April 22, 1940. 
51~Ibid. 
55New York Times, April 11, l91W, p. 17 • 
. 56'1The Republicans," Time, 35:18, April 8, 191~0. 
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a campaign tr:i.p which would take him through the vlestern and 
Rocky Mountain States. In Oklahoma City, in answer to a 
question as to the opinion the national administration should 
take in regard to the European war, Dewey declared that the 
country would be safer in the hands of the Republicans. In 
.Amar.illo, Dewey attacked the administration's failure to solve 
the unemployment problem, the New Deal .taxation policies, the 
growing power of the Federal government's regulatory agencies, 
and the growth of the national debt. Concerning the latter 
issue, the candidate declared, "Blessed are the young foJ.• they 
shall inherit the national debt."57 
As the Dewey campaign swung through California, the 
candidate continued to stress domestic issues. To 20,000 in 
the Holly\iood BO\·'ll he declared that the bes·t way to keep out of 
wal" w.as to give our primary attention to the na t1.on 's domestic 
' affairs and to refrain from attempting to intervene in the dis-
pos::ttion of the affairs of the rest of the world. Dewey did, 
however, state that the nation needed to develop an adequate 
national defense system. He also pledged the G.O.P. to up-
hold and continue a permanent program of social security.58 
On the trip from San Francisco to Denver, Dewey conferred 
57 James c. Hagerty, "Dewey Twits Taft on Maryland Race," 
Ne_::!:_ ¥ork Times, April 19, 1940, p. 17. 
58James c. Hagerty, "Nevada LeadE)rs Talk vdth Dewey," 
Ne~ York Time~' April 22, · 1940, p. 7. 
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with Republican leaders from Nevada, Wyoming, Utah, and 
Colorado, in addition to giving several back platform speeches 
along the route.59 In Colorado, the candidate was suddenly 
struck with an "intestinal ailment," and the campaign train 
headed eastward. With the end of the tour James C. Hagerty, 
covering the Dewey campa:l.gn for the ~ York Times, reported 
that the large turnouts in Indiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, 
.New Mexico, cali.fornia, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, and Colorado 
indica ted that many Republican leaders and a large section of 
the rank and file of the party regarded Dewey as almost a 
"sure bet" to win the nomination. Hagerty stated that whi.le 
Dewey and hls managers had estimated their delegate strength 
to be anywhere from 400 to 501, 358 could be claimed without 
much aispute. 60 
A week later, in early May, De\'-ley was in Kansas con-
ferring with Landon ana making campaign speeches. In Wichita, 
the candidate assailed the doctrine that government was the 
source of all "blessings" and declared that there existed a 
need for "individual int~rgrity.rr61 
Dewey's primary victories and his campaign tours 
59 James G. Hagerty, "Dewey Cheered on Way to Denver, 11 
Ne~ York~, April 23, 1940, p. 12. 
60James C. Hagerty, "De\'ley 'rour Brings 1 Bandwagon' Hints, 11 
New York ~' April 28, 1940, p. 2. 
61James C. Hagerty, "Dewey Asks Guard on Federal Power," 
New York Times, May L!, 1940, p. 18. 
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to the West gave him a virtual monopoly on April's political 
news; however, other politically significant events did occur. 
In mid-April the Republican Nat:tonal Committee announced that 
Governor Harold Stassen had been selected as the keynoter for 
the convention. At the selection meeting Dr •. Glenn Frank 
reportedly had been eliminated from consideration for the post 
because the Old Guard regarded him as too pro-New Deal. Others 
nominated v-1ere Governor Ralph Carr of Colorado, Governor Harlan 
Bushfi.eld of South Dakota, and Wendell Willkie, President of 
Commonwealth and Southern. Willkie had been suggested by. 
Kenneth Simpson, but t'he latter withdrew the suggestion when 
1 t was po:l.nted out that \'Jillkie figured as a possible candidate 
·and should, therefore, not be considered for the post. The 
meeting also produced several rules which would govern the 
convention activity, among which were the limiting of the 
nominating and seconding speeches and the banning of bands for 
use in demonstrations within the convention hal1.62 
Taft's headquarters announced in mid-April that the 
Senator \'lOUld campa1gn in West Virgini.a, Vermont, New Jersey, 
and Ohio during April and May, thus ind:t.cating that in Taft's 
mind the race was still wide open.63 It was also reported 
that Taft was cons:l.dering entering the r.'Iay 6 l'ilaryland primary 
62charles R. Michael, "Republicans Make Stassen Keynoter," 
New York Times, April 17, 1940, p. i. 
6~_e_~ Yor~ Tlmes, .Apri.l 13, 1940, p. 8. 
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and that if he did so, it would be contrary to the advice 
which he had received concerning the move. His managers 
reportedly wanted the candidate to continue making short cam-
paign trips and avoid the primaries, leaving the collection of 
delegates to his managers, who would continue to gather first 
and second ballot votes from the party leaders in the various 
states. 64 
A rather curious situation occurred in the April West 
Virginia primary. Taft had campaigned in the state and had 
.decided to enter the state's primary if another contender did. 
Dewey also decided to enter the primary, but only in the event 
another aspirant filed. Both candidates sent the filing papers 
to the state's National Committeeman, Walter Hallanan, on the 
condition not to file unless someone else did. The deadline 
for filing passed, and Hallanan still had both sets of papers, 
each set to be filed only if the other were filed first.65 
In Florida, another strange situation arose when that 
state chose two delegations, one "uninstructed," but pro-Dewey, 
and the other "uninstructed," but anti-Dewey. The Republi-
can state convention met in April and elected a slate of twelve; 
however, the anti-Dewey forces stated that the state's National 
Committeernan, J. Leonard Repogle had used "steam-roller" 
64Turner Catledge, "Taft Weighs Entry in Maryland Race," 
New y_~r.~ 'l':lmes, April 18, 191~0, p. 17. 
65Ibid. 
tactics in passing over Gannett and Taft supporters and 
choosing pro-Dewey men to represent the Florida G.O.P. In a 
rump gathering the dissenters chose their own slate, 
of which Gannett expected ten to twelve supporters and Taft 
four. It was also reported that both Vandenberg and Landon 
had friends on the rump delegation.66 
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It the situation in Florida could be considered a move-
· ment to slow down Dewey's race for the nomination, it was not 
the only one. His leadership in the polls and victories in 
the primaries made him a target for Republicans and Democrats 
a like. vli thin the Republican party there were many p:t•ofess:tona.].s, 
a majority of whom were in the conservative wing of the party, 
who did not want Dewey and who actively sought to stop him • 
. The arguments advanced by these conservatives were that Dewey 
might not stand up in the post-convention campaign and that 
even if he should win, a leader with his youth and inexperience 
during the critical international situation might not be good 
for either the party or the country. The "Stop-Dewey" group 
reportedly rigured that both Taft and Dewey would go into the 
convention with about 300 votes each, leaving about 300 to 
favorite sons and "uninstructed" delegations. The g-roup hoped 
to use this latter bloc of uncommitted delegates to stop Dewey's 
bid for the nomination and to put in whom they wished, using 
66Russell B. Porter, "Anti-De\'ley Slate Chosen in Fl.orida," 
Ne~ .¥~ T:lm'!:._~, April 30, 1940, p. 11. 
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the vice-presidency in trade to swing the necessary delegates. 
There was a distinct possibility that the group would groom a 
_dark horse for the nomination, but who it would be was pure 
speculation.67 
In late April, it was repOl~ted that the "Stop-Dewey" 
forces had been thinking of drafting Justice H.oberts for the 
nomination in the event of a deadlocked convention. The group, 
the report con~inued, had been able to build up only one dark 
horse, Wendell Willkie. Although the Commonwealth and Southern 
_President had widespread support among businessmen and the 
upper income groups, many within the "Stop-Dewey" movement 
doubted that they could get an ex-Democrat and utilities exec-
utive the nomination or get him elected in November should he 
get the nomination. The report also indicated that the members 
of the movement also doubted that Taft would be able to stop 
Dewey, and so the search for a compromise ~andidate continued. 68 
The other group taking political aim on Dewey's candidacy 
were those Democrats seeking to draft Roosevelt for a third 
term. They had not hesitated to criticize those Democrats 
who had sought public support because the drafters wanted no 
one to be presented as an alternative to F.D.R. Dewey's 
apparent popularity and successes in the primaries prompted 
67Turner Catledge, "Can Dewey Be Stopped? Is Enigma of 
Campaign," New York Times, April 28, 19lfO, IV, p. 7. 




the group to attack and ridicule Dewey's candidacy. As early 
as February they had attempted to reduce his popularity by 
stressing the candidate's youth and inexperience. (Harold 
Ickes had declared that Dev1ey had thrown his diaper into the 
ring.) However., the whole rna tter was t;emporarD.y dropped 
when DeweJ's campaign managers pointed out that he was the 
same age as Roosevelt when the latter ran for the vice-presi-
dency in 1920.69 
As the month of April came to an end, it appeared that 
Taft and Dewey were about equal in delegate strength., with 
Dewey still holding a strong lead in the polls. A serious 
question not conclusively anm'iered during the month was the 
fate of Vandenberg's candidacy--was he actually out of the 
running? Before the primaries George V. Denny, Jr., of radio's 
"American Town Meeting of the Air," had conducted a poll of the 
nation's newspaper editors. Denny had reasoned that these 
men could correctly ascertain the cu.t'rents of public opinion 
within their geographical areas, and he used the information 
obtained from the poll to compose a picture of the nation's 
political climate. The editors were asked to indicate whom the 
Republicans would nom:l.na te and whom they should nominate. In 
answer to the first question, the editors gave Dewey the lead 
with 37.08 per cent, followed by Taft with 25.42 per cent, 
--------
69Hamilton Basso, "Hats in the Ring: I. Young M.t·. De'<'ley," 
Th..§:.. New !_lepublic, 102:203, February 12, 191-W. 
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Vandenberg with 24.58 per cent, Gannett with 1.67 per cent, 
and Hoover with .63 per cent. In response to the second 
question--whom the G.O.P. should nominate--the editors gave 
Vandenberg 44.79 per cent, Dewey 18.75 per cent, Taft 16.88 
per cent, Hoover 8.13 per cent, Gannett 4.58 per cent, 
BJ:•icker, 3.96 per cent, Martin 3.54 per cent., Willkie 1.88 per 
cent., Ba~ton 1.67 per cent, and Landon 1.46 per cent.7° 
If the results of this survey could be applied to a 
group representing a cross section of all Republicans instead 
of just to a relatively small group of editors, it could 
indicate that Vandenberg's candidacy had great public support; 
however, such an assumption is without foundation because such 
a survey \vas not made during April. The March poll showed 
.Dewey far ahead in public support, with Vandenberg holding 
down second place. The r~ay poll revealed that the Senator 
had dropped to third place, trailing both Dewey and Taft. 
Even so, some political analysts continued to predict that 
Vandenberg was not to be counted out of the race. John T. 
Flynn, writing in The New !3_~ubliq_, stated that he believed 
the central issue in the campaign would be free enterprise; 
and that issue, according to Flynn, would eliminate Dewey 
because the party leaders did not know where he stood on the 
issue and also Taft because he had been labeled a reactionary 
70GeOl'fle v. Denny' Jr.' "What r s Your Opinion? II Current 
!:!_is__ tor~, 51: 4b-1~8, April, 1940. 
by Republican leaders in the Middle West. Flynn stated that 
the issue of free enterprise would benefit Vandenberg's 
chances for the nomination and would bo~ster Justice Roberts 
and Governors James and Brickel' as dark horse candidates.71 
Democratic National Committee Chairman~ James A. Farley, 
declared in early May that Vandenberg was the man to beat in 
the G.O.P. race.72 
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With over a month and one-half remainj.ng before the 
convention anything could happen; the entir~ complexion of the 
race could change at any time because, according to the March 
Gallup Poll, 40 pel" cent of the Republican ·yoters were still 
undec:tded. (The f.1ay Gallup Poll indicated that 32 per cent of 
G.O.P. voters had not yet made up their minds as to the 
.party's candidate.)73 
Republican concern over the choice of a nominee rose 
when the April Gallup Poll reve~led that if the election were 
held at that time, the Democrats would lead 54 per cent to 46 
per cent and that the two parties were more closely matched 
than they had been in twenty-four years. The poll gave the 
G.O.P. the six New England States and the Democrats the 
71John T. Flynn, "Other People's Money: The Republican 
Campaign Huddle, 11 The ~ Repu~_!_ic, 102:472, April 8, 191~0. 
72~Ul ton S. f.layer, "Men 'tfho Would Be President: VI. Try 
to Find Vandenberg, 11 !-'.h~. ~' 150:589, May 11, 1940. 
73Ne~ Yor~ ~ime:?_, May 31, 1940, p. 38. (Inf_r_~, p •. 92.) 
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twenty-four states below the Mason-Dixon Line and west of the 
Rockies; the remaining eighteen states, according to the 
~urvey, were evehly divided. The states leaning Republican 
were Maine, South Dakota, Vermont, Kansas, New Hampshire" 
North Dakota, Illinois, and Wisconsin; those leaning Republi-
can, but borderline cases, were New Jersey, Iowa, Rhode Island, 
Michigan, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, arid 
Nebraska. Those states indicated as leaning Democratic were 
South Carolina, Mississippi, Texas, Georgia, Louisiana, West 
Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, Flor:.tda, North Carolina, Utah, 
Tennessee, Oklahoma, Arizona, Montana, Maryland, Kentucky, 
V:l.r·glnia, Caltfornia, Missouri, New Mexico, Washington, and 
Colorado. The Democratic borderline states were Delaware, 
Oregon, Indiana, Idaho, New York, Wyoming, and Minnesota. 
The totals, if the results of the election were the above, 
woul,d be 317 electoral votes f0l1 the Democrats and 2lll for 
the Republicans. 7~· 
Extremely interesting were the percentages for the 
borderline states. In New York, Minnesota, and Wyoming the 
De moor a ts led by only two percentage poj.nts--51 per cent to 1~9 
per cent; in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Connecticut, and Nebraska the 
Repub1:tcan lead was the same. In Indiana and Idaho the 
Democ1'a tic lead was 52 per cent to 48 per cent. In Oregon the 
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Democratic lead was 53 per cent to 47 per cent; in Michigan 
and Massachusetts the Republican lead was the same.75 It did !~ 
not take a political expert to analyze the situation; the 
course of the war, the choice of the candidates, or some other 
significant event could change the political picture overnight. 
With a predicted close election such criteria as the political 
sensibilities of the various geographical sections and the 
sectional strengths of the eandidates would become increasingly 
more important. As the campaign moved into its final stage, 
events were occurring which \'lould alter the existing trend; a 
drastic change in the course of the European war would detract 
from Dewey's delegate strength and evelate ·the chances of both 
~aft and Willkie. 
In early May, Dewey was still the front running G.O.P. 
candidate, even though many party leaders still opposed him. 
The mid-May Gallup Poll, sampling a cross section of Republ:t.can 
voters, gave Dewey 62 per cent, an increase probably resulting 
from his primary victories and his campaigns to the West. In 
the survey Taft received 14 per cent, passing Vandenberg, who 
received only 13 per cent. Others with votes were Willkie 
with 5 per cent, Hoover with 2 per cent, Gannett and Bridges 
with 1 per cent, and others with 2 per cent. Two significant 
points in the poll were the fall of Vandenberg after his 
75rbid. 
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defeats in the primaries and the surprising rise of Wendell 
Willkie, the utilities executive. In March Willkie had 
received less than 1 per cent in the poll, but by the end of 
April his vote had increased to 3 per cent,76 Willkie's pop-
ularity was growing, but he was still far behind Dewey. 
The "Stop-Dewey" forces had failed to halt .the., 
popular swing to Dewey with their two-prOnged attack on the 
candidate's youth and inexperience; however, in May they \'iere 
able to bring a new argument into the attack. They began to 
stress the foreign policy stands Dewey had taken during his 
primary campaigns. They pointed out that he had not been con-
sistent in his foreign policy statements during these campaigns 
and emphasized the fact that in the face of an international 
crisis it was important to have a candidate· who was consistent. 
Dewey's opponents reported that his stand in January had been 
close to that of the President, but that in the Wisconsin cam-
pa:tgn in r~larch his foreign policy statements had taken on an 
isolationist tone. They stated that by May Dewey was declar-
ing that aid to Britain would bring the nation into the 
European \·Jar. 77 
This indictment of Dewey did not seem to have much effect, 
at least in Idaho and f.1aryland, because in early May he picked 
76!:!_~~ York ~~." Flay 31, 1940, .p. 4. 
77"campaign: Trend, II rrime, 35:21, May 20, 1940. 
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up Idaho's eight delegate votes and Maryland's sixteen. The 
former were obtained as a result of instructions given by the 
state convention;78 the latter were granted the candidate as 
a result of his eight to one victory over an "uninstructed" 
slate in the state's primary.79 
The new attack by the "Stop-Dev.Iey" g1•oup showed that at 
least some Republicans realized the impol."'tance of the foreign 
policy issue. A Gallup poll published in early May attempted 
to sample all voters on the question of whether the United 
States should aid the Allies. The results showed that the 
voters of each party, by a two to one margin, favored a candi-
date who was willing to give all help to Britain and France, in 
the event they needed it, short of actually.going to ·war.80 
If this survey accurately meastwed public opinion on this 
important issue, then an isolationist could, conceivably, have 
a very difficult time in the November election defeating a 
candidate who favored such aid. The three leading Republican 
candidates had expressed outright or modified isolationist 
stands on the war and on aid to the Allies. During the month 
of May, Dewey and Vandenberg remained silent on the issue; Taft, 
on the other hand, seemed to move contrary to public opinion by 
78New York T=!:_~-~~ May 7, 1940, p. 14. 
79~~ York Time~, May 8, 19lW, p. 19. 
80New York Time~, May 10, 1940, p. 8. 
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placing himself firmly in the isolationist camp. 
Taft started out his r.1ay campaign with a bang by pick-
up Ohio's f'ifty-two convention votes in the state's primary.8l 
He then traveled to Kansas to confer with Lan'don and other 
Republican leaders in the Middle West. In these conferences 
Taft stated that the European war had compelled many to desert 
Dewey's cause for his own because they felt the party needed a 
man of more experience. 82 Taft also stated that he appr•oved 
of Roosevelt's new defense program and agr•eed that the United 
States needed an adequate defense system at once; how-
ever, he declared that even if the Allies lost to Germany, the 
United States would not immediately be faced with the danger 
of attack from that country.83 Even though virtually all the 
Kansas Republican leaders informed the candidate that sympathy 
for the Allies had been growing in the region, Taft cautioned 
the countr:y to keep its mind on domesti.c issues lest the New 
Deal use the European crisis to expand its powers at home.84 
In St. Louis, Taft declared that he favored strict 
financial and military neutrality and cautioned the nation to 
stop pla~ing with the idea that the nation could enter the war 
81~~~- York Times, May 15, 1940, p. 30. 
821'urner Catledge, "Taft's Hopes Rise for Illinois 
Votes," Ne~ York Ti,~, May 18, 1940, p. 34. 
83!few York Times, ~Iay 18, 1940, p. 31~. 
84Turner Catledge, "rr•aft Asks Nation to Turn from War," 
Ne\'l !ork Timel;l, t•1ay 19, 1940, p. 4. 
and concentrate on a genuine program of defense. He again 
took a position against aid to the Allies in the face of infor-
mation he had received which indicated that in eight Middle 
Western states sympathy for the Allies had grown since the 
latest German offensive in April. Taking a more definite stand, 
Taft stated that if the United States were justified in spending 
billions for the All~es and supporting their navies, then it 
would be cowardice not to support. them also with men.85 
Taft's managers labeled the Middle West tour a success 
and predicted that their candidate was now the leading con-
tender for the nomination.86 
Gannett, campaigning in the South, predicted that his 
strength at the convention would surprise everyone and that no 
candidate would secure the nomination on the first ballot. He 
ilso stated that he would have a good chance for the nomination 
in the later balloting.87 c. Nelson Sparks, Gannett's campaign 
manager, declared that his candidate would receive delegate 
votes from Utah, Arizona, Georgia, Arkansas, and Alabama and 
would pick up votes from other delegations after the first 
ballot.88 
85Turner Catledge, "Strict Neutrality Demanded by Taft," 
New Yorl~ :£1~~, May 21, 19lfQ, p. 16. 
86Turner Catledge, "Taft Is Confident as His Tour Ends," 
New Jork Times, fiJa·y 22, 191W, p. 18. 
87New York Times, r'lay 10, 1940, p. 18. 
88New York Times, May 20, 1940, p. 18. 
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From the declaration of wa:r• on September 3, 1939, until 
May 8, 1940, the date of the German breakthrough into Holland 
and Belgium, there was practically no military action occur-
ring on the Western Front; and many labeled the c.onfl ict as 
"the phony war." In April, the Germans seized Norway and 
Denmark; in May, the Lowlands \'lere attacked without provoca-
tion. This t~~n of events increased public sympathy for aid 
to the Allies, as evidenced in the polls and verified by state 
political leaders. The passing of "the phony war" had a pro-
found effect on the Republican fight for the nomination. 
Turner Catledge, in assessing the G.O.P. campaigns 
after the new German offensive, reported that the race was 
still wide open. Dewey was presented as the strongest "pop-
ular choic,e," however, it was revealed that Taft's chances had 
been improving in relation to both Dewey's and Vandenber•g 's. 
Catledge stated that the latter's rigid stand for complete 
"insulation" of the United States from European affairs was of 
questionable value under the circumstances. Catledge also 
reported that Willkie's stock had risen precipitously in cer-
tain regions; but the great question, still unanswered, was 
whether the Willkie forces could translate the public support 
into delegate votes at such a late date. It was revealed 
that the Republican pre-convention campaign had been slowed up 
by the feeling that there was not much sense worrying about 




as it had$ Roosevelt would be re-elected. Catledge's summa-
tion of the situation indicated that Dewey's popularity had 
declined as a result of concern over his youth and inexperi-
ence and that Taft's had risen because of his cool, stable 
approach to the problems of the day. Willkie 's chances to get 
the nomination in the event of a deadlock were reported as 
being remote .. 89 
The end of May Gallup Poll verified the fact that Dewey 
was losing strength to both Taft and Willkie. In the survey, 
sampling a cross section of Republican voters, Dewey still led 
with 56 per cent, followed by Taft with 16 per cent, Vandenberg 
with 12 per cent, Willkie with 10 per cent, Hoover with 2 per 
cent, Gann-ett and James with 1 per cent, and others w:Lth 2 pt:Jr 
cent. Most amazing was Willkie's increase trom 3 per cent in 
earl~ May to 5 per cent in mid-May to 10 per cent in late May. 
The poll reported that \<lillkie 's strength was largely confined 
in the East, although his boom appeared to be grow1ng.90 
During the month of June, the focal point of Republican 
activity centered in Philadelphia, even though there wer~ still 
several weeks of campaigning left. As the delegates and the 
candidates converged on the city, the four most discussed 
topics were the delegate strengths of the candidates, the 
---·--
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course of the European war and the fate of France and Britain, 1 
the rise of Wendell Willkie as a serious contender for the 
nomination, and the President's third term decision. By June, 
it was apparent that the events in Europe had greatly increased 
Roosevelt's popularity and had elevated him to the position of 
undisputed leadership of his party. It was equally apparent 
that the President's ultimate decision on the third term would 
have considerable influence on the G.O,P. nomination. 
II. THE POPULARITY OF THE PRESIDENT 
During the period January through May, 1940, Roosevelt 
maintatned his silence on the th:i.rd term dec:i.sion, surv:i.ving 
a continuous barrage of questioning from reporters and 
theorizing from political vlriters. The international crisis 
had elevated F.D.R. 's popularity among both Democratic voters 
and the electorate of the nation as a whole during the final 
months of 1939, and in 1940 the deterioration of the European 
situation resulted in fm'ther support for a third term for 
the President. The New Dealers entered his name in eleven 
primary contests; however, Roosevelt, refusing to commit him-
self, neither expressed himself for or against the movement--
the Democratic party and the nation as a whole were kept in 
the dark as to the President's intentions. By June, the con-
vention month for the G.O.P., the polls had indicated that the 
nation preferred a Democratic president in 1940, that a major-
-------·---------------
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ity of the electorate expected F.D.R. to run for a third term 
and believed that he would win, and that the opposition to the i 
third term had become a minority opinion. This powerful posi-
tion attained by the President resulted from two developments 
occurring during the primary months: fJr s t, the President, as 
a result of the campaigns of the New Dealers, swept through the 
contests and obtained sufficient pledged delegate strength to 
be re-nominated on the flrst ballot; and second, the German 
advances into Norway, Denmark, and the Lowlands during April 
and Ivlay--the end of the so-called "phony war"--removed the 
effective opposition to the third term. By June, F.D.R. was 
in a position to control the Democratic nomination by either 
accepting it or by naming his successor. 
The Pre-PrJ._mary Period: January--Februa!'l, 
During the last months of 1939, the popularity of the 
President rose sharply. The ~evi Republic reported that :B' .D.R. 
had become the overwhelming choice of the Democrats, possessing 
over seven times the support of Garner and three times the 
support of all the Democratic aspirants combined. The magazine 
also declared that Roosevelt could secure a third term without 
a single Republican vote and could even lose all the votes 
pledged to Garner, Hull, McNutt, and all other Democratic 
presidential possibilities.91 The pre-primary polls also 
9l"The President People ·,rant, 11 ~!:!~Republic_, 102:9, 
January 1, 1940. 
.indicated that F.D.R. commanded a substantial lead wihin his 
own party. In January, the Gallup Poll revealed that in a 
nationwide survey of Democrats with opinions, 78 per cent 
showed a preference for Roosevelt, while 13 per cent were 
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for Garner, 4 per cent for McNutt, 2 per cent for Hull, 1 per 
cent; for l\1urphy and Farley, and 1 per cent for others. The 
poll also asserted that a majority of voters, of all parties, 
still opposed the third term.92 
In October, 1939, Secretary of .Agriculture Wallace 
'· had made the front pages of the nation's newspapers when ne 
declared that Roosevelt's experience and training made it 
essential that he seek a third term during. the intel.,national 
crisis. The statement had evoked some irritation from the 
White House, arid the Press Secretary, Stephen Early, publicly 
rebuked vla lla ce for the untimely remark. In early January, 
1940, Wallace and .Attorney--General Jackson· made the same appeal 
before Jackson Day dinner audiences. \-Jhen Early was asked if 
the two would be criticized for their statements, the answer 
given was, "Of cou't'se not." Early, ·when subjected to further· 
questioning as to why the situation had changed, refused to 
comment. Roosevelt also declined to comment on the two state-
ments, stating that he had not read them.93 
92Nev; York Time.§_, January 3, 1-940, p. 2. 





Throughout January and February reporters continued 
their attempts to "trap" F.D.R. into revealing his plans. In I 
late January, he turned aside requests for comment on John L. 
Lewis' prediction of an "ignominious defeat" for the President 
were he to seek a third term by asking the reporters to give 
him one good reason why he should answer a question of that 
kind. Another reporter asked the President whether he had told 
Senator Donahey of Ohio that there would be no need for him to 
run as a favorite son for ·the Democratic nomination. Roosevelt 
stated that he had merely told the Senator the previous spring 
that he had hoped that Donahey would run again for the 
Senate.94 
Several days later Roosevelt had to dodge three more 
.veiled inquiries. One reporter asked the President what name 
he planned to apply to the next year's March--of-Dimes dances in 
celebration of his birthday anniversary (ten days after his 
second term expired); the President laughed and declared that 
the questioner must have stayed up all night thinking up 
the question. Another reporter took a more direct approach by 
asking Roosevelt if he would comment on a newspaper dispatch 
which stated that he would seek a third term and that Farley 
would retire to a lucrative business post; F.D.R. answered · 
that it was a fine, new question.95 
94New Yor~ Times,· January 27, J.91J.O, p. 11. 
95New York ~imes, February 1, 1940, p. 13. 
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In early February, Roosevelt gave his first unsmiling 
reaction to the inquiries on his future plans with the state-
ment that the country was probably tired of all the third term 
speculation and that further• efforts to draw him out on the 
subject were silly and henceforth would be considered out of 
order.96 
During this pre-primary period, Roosevelt's silence did 
not deter his rise in the public opinion polls, nor did it 
appear to hinder his chances for re-election were he to decide 
to run. In February, the Gallup Poll indicated that 52 per 
cent of those sampled in a cross section survey of the voting 
population in all states believed that Roosevelt would seek a 
third term and that 60 per· cent belleved he would be re-elected. 
- ' ., .. , 
Before the outbreak of the European war only 48 per cent were 
of the opinion he would run in 1940, and only 45 per cent 
thought that he would be re-elected. A partisan breakdown of 
opinion showed that 57 per cent of the Democrats with opinions 
expected a third term race, while 47 per cent of the G.O,P. 
were of that opinion,97 
Dr. George Gallup, addressing the Advertising Club in 
Baltimore, stated that the key to the third term was the course 
of events in Europe. He remarked that Roosevelt"s popularity 
96Ne\~ York:_ Times, February 6, J.91W, p. 1. 
9?~e\v Jol~k Ti~.' February 18, 1940, p. 2. 
' 
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had risen sharply since the advent of war and that if the 
attention of the American public were to return to domestic 
problems, the sentiment c~mld revert to what it had been before 
the war.98 This was to be quite an "if" because two months 
after this statement, Germany would begin her march to con-
quer the world; and the headlines carrying the war dispatches 
to the people of the United States would focus attention on the 
foreign situation and keep it there for years to come. 
·In early February, the Democratic N~tional Committee met 
and selected Chicago as the site for their 1940 convention. It 
\'las reported that ninety per cent of the leaders present at the 
meeting either favored Ol" were not opposed to a third term; 
however, a resolution to draft Roosevelt was not cUscussed or 
adopted.99 
.Arthur Krock declared that Roosevelt's silence indicated 
that the President had shown a willingness to let the third 
term proJect be used for political purposes. He also stated 
that Garner, Farley, Wh~eler, and McNutt resented the evasive 
method \'lhich denied them the1.r fair chance before the voting 
public and that if Roosevelt r.vere to run, Garner would probably 
be the onl:y Democrat with the courage to carry on the contest 
for the nomination. Krock repor'ted that the Nev1 Dealers had 
98tJe"'!_ York Times, February l~, 191W, p. 22. 
99char1es R. t'lichael, "Democrats Select Chicago, Post-
pone Choice of a Date," ~Iew York Tlm~, February 6, 191W, p. J.. 
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entered Roosevelt slates in the Illinois and Wisconsin prim-
ries, evidence that they had accepted F.D.R. 's silence. as a 
consent for a draft.l00 
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In late February, it was reported that the New Dealers 
were elated by the fact that the deadline for withdrawing from 
the Illinois pr 1 mary had c ome~an_d~p_a_s_s_e_d_w_LtJ:io_ut_any_vLor_d_fr_o_m.~---=== 
the President. The failure to withdraw was generally accepted 
in Washington as practically a green light for the movement 
seeking to draft Roosevelt. The New Dealers planned to stop 
Garner's candidacy in New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Illinois; 
and they would seek to stop Wheeler in Oregon and California. 
The draft movement also figured to broaden "the plan so that 
the President could choose the nominee if he should decline 
to run.lOl 
During the primary months, Roosevelt continued his 
refusal to discuss the third term decision .or to promote the 
candidacy of any other Democrat; he became the only possible 
Democratic candidate. 
The Pr.im!3r:y_ Months: March--May 
Du:r'ing the months of March, April, and May, the New 
Dealers campaigned to give Roosevelt the nomination on the first 
ballot, if he should want it. In February, the polls had shown that 
lOOArthur Krock, "Democrats' Dilemma Deepens as Days 
Pass," :!':!!::.~York T~m~, Februm•y 11, 1940, IV, p. 3. 
lOliJ.,urner Catledge, "New Dealers Hold ~~ay Now Clear to· 
3rd 'l,erm Draft," New York Times, February 26, 1940, p. 1. 
,,----------------- --
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the nation's voters believed that the President would attempt 
to secure a· third tei•m and that he would be successful; h0\'1-
ever, the March Gallup Poll revealed that a majority of voters 
in all states still opposed a third term. In tracing F.D.R.'s 
rise in popularity the poll reported that in August, 1939, 
Roosevelt had received 56.6 per cent of the nation's support; 
however, the percentage had increased to 61~.9 per cent after 
the outbl .. eak of the European war. His percentage had dropped 
someWhat after the initial shock of the war had 1-10rn off (62.7 
per cent in November, 1939); by Febl~uary of 1911.0 his support 
had again moved back up to 64 per cent. The pro-third term 
sentiment, it was reported, had followed a similar trend: 40 
per cent in August, 1939; 48 per cent in September; 43 per 
cent in November; and 46 per cent in Februa-ry, 191W .1°2 
In another March Gallup Poll it was revealed that the 
Democratic party, in a nationwide poll of all voters, led the 
Republican party in popularity by 55 per cent to ~-5 per cent, 
with one voter in six still undecided. The survey still placed 
New England in the G.O.P. camp by a wide margin; the South and 
the West were again allotted to the Democrats. The poll showed 
the East and West Central States still about even, with the 
Republicans still holding on to the former by a 51 per cent--
49 per cent margin and the Democrats holding on to the latter 
l02New York Times, :r.1arch 1, 1940, p. llt. 
;-- -- -- -----
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by the same percentage. The Mid-Atlantic States were put into 
the Democratic column by a 53 per cent--47 per cent margin.l03 
Out of the maze of statistics on6 fact stood out quite 
clearly: the President controlled his party, and the party was 
favored to win in 1940. The only dissension appeared to be 
-
' 
Jr-~~~~~t~h~~e~=opposition of the voters to the third term. Regardless 
·~~------------~==== 
ot whether Roosev~lt had made up his mind to run or whether 
the "Draft-Roosevelt" group had planned and worked independ-
ently of the White House, F.D.R. '~ name had been entered in 
eleven primary contests with the avowed purpose of ascertain-
ing the strength of the resistance to the ccncept of a third 
term. 
In mid-March, it was reported that the President had 
·let it be known that he desired delegate strength in order to 
be prepared to nominate himself or dictate his successor and 
the platform; however, the report was not confirmed.l04 
In the New Hampshire primary, Garner and Farley went 
down to defeat as the Roosevelt slate swept the state's twelve 
delegates; however, the Republicans polled twice as many votes 
as the Democrats. 105 The G.O.P. votes plus those given to 
103New York Times, March 3, 191~0, p. 4. 
101-l-charles R. Michael, "Roosevelt Is Reported Seeking 
Delegates So as to Hold Control," Nevt York Times, ~Iarch 12, 
1 . -------19~0, p. 17. 
105"Prirnary Season Puts Roosevelt and Dewey Off to.Good 
Start,'' ~.ews\vee k, 15:15, April 15, 1940. · 
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Farley and Garner indicated that there existed a good deal of 
sentiment against the third term in that state. Turner 
Catledge reported that Farle~ and Garner polled about one-
fourth of the Democratic vote and that those votes had to be 
accepted as anti~third term votes. He also stated that Garner's 
campaign managers had been elated over the results and had 
begun to.work hard in Wisconsin, Illinois, California, and 
Oregon.l06 
After the New Hampshire primary, the Gallup Poll 
released a survey which showed that as of ~id-March, 47 per 
cent of all voters favored a third term, art increase of 1 per 
cent over the previous month.107 
In the Wisconsin primary, Roosevelt's slate again 
·defeated Garner, but not by the five or six to one predicted 
by the F.D.R.'s supporters; in fact, Garner's capture of 30 per 
cent of the primary vote represented a blow to the third term 
drafters. Arthur Krock declared that if the Republican vote 
were added to the percentage of the Democratic vote received 
by Garner and applied to the nation as a whole, Roosevelt 
would be defeated were he to attempt a third term contest.l08 
106Turner Catledge, "Early Pl'imar:i.es Serve as Guide ·to 
'40 'Trends," New_ York :I;imes, ~1arch 17, ·19ltO, IV, p. 7. 
lO'lNe\~ york Time~, J.VIarch 13, J.9lta, p. 15. 
108Arthur Krock, "Draft-Roosevelt Plan Meets a Double 
Check, " ~~ Yor ~ Times_, Apr i 1 7, IV, p • 3 • 
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The Illinois primary, held one week after Wisconsin's, 
did not alter the trend. The drafters had predicted a six-
teen to one margin for F.D.R., but the results showed only 
a six to one margin. The Dewey vote, when added to Garner's, 
represented a fifty-fifty split in opinion over the third 
term. 109 
In the Nebraska primary, Roosevelt ran unopposed on 
the Democratic ticket; howev~r, D~wey and Vandenberg's vote 
topped the President's, representing the first time in ten 
years the Republican primary vote had surpassed that of the 
Democratic.llO 
In April, F.D.R. broke his silence to blast the G.O.P. 
and it~ presidential candidates. In the address the President 
declared that the three issues advanced by the Republican can-
didates had been first, that the administration was leading the 
. 
nation into the war; second, that the New Deal measures could 
be handled more efficiently by the G.O.P.; and third, that the 
Republican party could provide jobs for all, maintain relief 
rolls at adequate levels, meet national defense requirements, 
reduce taxes, and reduce the cost of government by repealing 
the "horrid 11 re striations on private business. To the fix•st 
issue, concerning the war, Roosevelt told his audience that 





they knew better than that; to the second, he recalled the 
scandals occurrit)g under Republican administrations; and to the 
third~ he declared that he did not have to comment. Although 
he gave no hint as to his future plans, he did warn the Demo-
cratic party that they could win in November only by nominating 
a liberal pair of candidates and a for\'lard-looking platform. 111 
Dewey's victories in the primaries and standing in 
the public opinion polls perhaps brought about the President's 
attack. Arthur Krock revealed that there exj.sted strong impli-
cations that the Senate would investigate the use of campaign 
funds in Dewey's behalf during the primaries and that the New 
Dealers had begun a new tactic by declaring that Roosevelt had 
to run if Dewey were chosen as the Republican nominee. Krock 
also repor•ted that grapevine messages from the White House 
stated both that F.D.R. would not run and that he would.112 
In the f.-lay primaries, the struggle between the "Draft-
Roosevelt" group and the anti-third term Democrats continued. 
Roosevelt's slate swept the California primary; and the third 
term foes~ led by Senator Millard E. Tydings, clinched 
Maryland. By mid-r1Iay, the President had amassed a convention 
majority of pledged and semi-pledged delegates.l13 There was 
lllFelix Belair, Jr., "Roosevelt Scores Dei'Tey's Criti-
c:tsm of Foreign Pol icy," Ne111 York Time~' April 21, 191.~0, p. 1. 
' 
112Arthur Krock, 11 fv1any Signs Ncrw Point to a Roosevelt 
'Draft'," Nev>l YorkTi~, Apri12l, 19l.f0, IV, p. 3. 
113~r.e_::: Yor~ Time~, May 22~, 1940, p. 16. 
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no longer any contest between the two opposing forces within 
the Democratic party; and the probabl~ reason for this situa-
tion was·the German offensive which began during the April-May 
primary period. 
The June Gallup Poll reported that since the Nazi inva-
sion of the Lowlands and France in mid-May, the pro-third term 
sentiment had risen sharply; it had reached a majority for the 
first time. Before the invasion, 47 per cent of the nation's 
voters had favored a third term; two weeks after the change in 
the course of the war the percentage had increased to 57 per 
cent. The poll showed that the increase had resulted from 
s~li tches in the Democratic party; 8 per cent of the Republicans 
sampled favored a third term, while 91 per cent of the Demo-
9rats had cast support for the President.114 
The primary elections, which had increased Dewey's 
chances for the nomination and had prompted a split within the 
Democratic party, needed to be re--evaluated in light of the 
international crisis. The Gerrr.an offensive had united the 
Democratic party behind Roosevelt; the President had the con-
vention votes to nominate himself or name his successor, with 
either choice resulting in a Democratic victory. Still, the 
drastic change of events did not dissuade Roosevelt from his 
policy of silence; speculati.on over his future plans continued 
114New York Tim~, June 5, 1940, p, 18. 
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to occupy the minds of the political leaders of both parties. 
The sudden change in the international situation was 
also to have a dramatic reaction in the Republican race for 
the nomination. The German offensive forced Republican 
leaders to re-appraise the stock of the potential nominees. 
The foreign policy stands of the leading contenders--Dewey, 
Taft, and. Vandenberg--pointed to a very perplexing problem: 
could an isolationist candidate defeat F.D.R. or any other 
internationalist candidate during the Cl"isis? The problem 
was further complicated by the fact that Dewey and Taft 
possessed nearly equal delegate strength, which raised the 
possibility of a deadlocked convention and the choice of a 
compromise or dark horse candidate. Out of this distressing 
situation ·a dark horse was to enter the race, overtake the 
two leading candidates on the far turn, and win the nomination 
going away in the home stretch. This dark horse was Wendell 
Willkie. 
, CHAPTER IV 
THE RISE OF WENDELL L. WILLKIE 
Throughout 1939, as the natiori's political parties and 
their candidates vied with one another for public recognition 
and acceptance, Wendell Willkie achieved national popularity 
as an outstanding critic of the New Deal; however, he was not 
a political candidate, but i spok~sman from the ranks of 
American business who was attacking the administration's 
domestic policies. From January to April, 19~·0, Wj.llkie was 
still not a candidate, although he had become a more popular 
critic; for his articles and speeches had attracted a good deal 
of attention. In April, a nationwide movement to secure the 
nomination for Willkie was started; however, it was being con-
ducted without his consent, and he refused to campaign for the 
. 
nomination. By May, Willkie had become an announced candidate; 
and the movement, which was only one month old, had picked up 
considerable momentum. As the boom grew, Willkie's popularity, 
as measured in the polls, increased correspondingly. By June, 
he had become the most-discussed candidate in the race. 
I. BEFORE 1940 
Willkie's debut on to the political stage took place 
during the first years of the New Deal. Willkie, a Democrat, 
took issue with the Roosevelt ideology and became a critic of 
114 
the administration's attitude and policies toward business. 
During the controversy over the concept, purpose, and legality 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority, Will~ie, President of 
Commonwealth and Southern Company--the nation's largest pro-
ducer of electricity--argued that it was wrong for the Federal 
government to establish public power plants for the benefit of 
a few people when all America had to foot the bill. In his 
fight with the New Deal \1illkie had championed the cause of 
private enterprise over government-owned power plants; and, as 
a result of his efforts, he achieved recognition as a leading 
critic of the New Deal. 
In the fight which ensued, Willkie fought the govern-
ment on every possible issue; and, in a losing cause, he still 
managed to obtain his price for the company's holdings located 
within the Tennessee Valley Authority's jurisdictional area. 
This victory boosted him into the limelight as a stout 
defender of private enterprise, as well as an effective cam-
paigner against the administration. 
In 1938, columnist Jennings Perry reported to his readers 
that Willkie should run for the presidency;l and his statement 
marked the beginning of what was to become a movement of 
amateur politicians to put Willkie in the White House. 
In February, 1939, Th~ Saturday ·Even1.nJ'?. gost carried an 
2Joseph Barnes, Willkie: The Events He Was a Part of--
The Ideas He Fou~!_ For~-p:-!57. ---· - ·- - -- ~--
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article by Alva Johnston which described Willkie's fight with 
the New Deal over public power; however, the article gave no 
hint of his possible poli tica 1 future. 2 · 
In May of the same year, David Lav-1rence discussed 
Willkie•s chances as a Republican presidential possibility, 
drawing from the utilities executive the statement that be had 
no political ambitions, but that be was not indifferent to the 
suggestion.3 
In June, 1939, \'lillkie's article "Brace Up America" 
appeared in Tb~ Atlantic Montb_11L.· I11 the article Willkie 
·expressed his views on the status of the American economy and 
criticized the Nev1 Deal's failure to cope \'lith the nation's 
economic problems. He declared that in order to solve these 
.problems, American industry had to be expanded; the govern-
ment, according to Willkie, could not retard industry with 
strict regulation and taxation and expect economic recovery in 
return. W:l.llkie also presented an indictment of the New Deal 
theory that a government could spend its way into prosperity, 
stating that such an economic theory had two evil consequences: 
an unbaJ.anced budget and the creation of a deficit spending 
policy with higher taxes. He stated that government spending 
drove private capital out of :l.ndustry, thereby inhibiting 
2 lb i d • ' p • 15 8 • 
3.fl?J:2 .• ' p. 157 • 
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industrial expansion and contributing significantly to the 
continuance of unemployment •. ltJillkie also declared that the 
government harassment of industry also jeopardized the posi-
tion of labor; for the small profits of industry stopped any 
chance for higher wages, which would result from industrial 
expansion. He also called for a revision of the nation's tax 
structure to encourage the investment of domestic capital into 
the nation's industries instead of into tax-exempt securities, 
as the existing tax structures had been channeling investment; 
new enterprises could absorb the country's idle money and ·idle 
men.4 
In the same month another of Willkie's articles, "Idle 
Money, Idle Men," appeared in The ~aturdail., Ev_£~ Post. 
Willkie again stated his program for economic recovery, 
declaring that industrial expansion would create jobs, solve 
the unemployment problem, and bolster the entire economy. 
Again he stressed the importance of revising the nation's tax 
laws to stimulate investment in the country's industrial 
future.5 
In late July, 1939, Willkie received additional recog-
nition by having his picture appear on the cover of Ti~; how-
4v.Jendell Willkie, "Brace Up, A mer :I.e a," The Atlantic 
MonthJ]I_, 163:749-56, June, 1939. --~ 
5Irving Stone, They Also Ran: ~~ St9~~ of !~he Men Who 
~ Defe_a ted [_<E.:, tr~ f:=-re ~J.cfe~.c.i/ -;-p. :;--r:-:;. 
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ever, the rna ga zine reported that his cand:l.da cy was "mildly 
fantastic. 11 6 
Arthur Krock, a long-t:l.me Willkie booster, stated that 
nothing would come of the suggestions that Willkie could be a 
prime dark horse candidate, despite his national fame and 
qua J.ifica tions. According to Krock, the fact that \'Jillkie had 
been a Democrat would not necessarily disqualify him; but the 
fact that party leaders reportedly did not want a business-
man as a candidate would. He also stated that Willkie 
possessed no organization or delegate strength, two essentials 
needed to secure the nomination. Krock declal"'ed that Willkie 
had gained a victory over Roosevelt and the. Tennessee Valley 
Author-ity by refusing to keep st:1.ll, to lie down and tremble, 
by presenting a devastating set of facts which had influenced 
both public opinion and Congress; and, because of this, if 
Willkie were to become the G.O.P. nominee,·the President would 
attempt to stop him. According to the columnist, this situa-
tion represented a strong argument against nominating Willkie 
in the eyes of many Republicans. Another of Willkie's political 
liabilities stressed in the article was the utilities execu-
tive's low opinion of professional politicians; he did not 
think much of their capacity or character. These politicians 
would not nominate a man who knew their shortcomings and would 





receive support from Wall Street, a political liability in the 
aftermath of the Depression.? 
The possibility of Willkie's candidacy was again raised 
in November, 1939. In a speech before the Bond Club in 
New Yo~k City, General Hugh S. Johnson described Vandenberg 
and Taft as good, average politicians and stated that 
Dewey would face some difficulty in selling himself beyond 
the Alleghanies, where he was little known. In the question 
and ans\'ler period which follO\'led the speech t.Tohnson declm•ed 
that Willkie would be a very strong candidate.B The statement 
drew from Willkie the following quip: "In view of the speed 
with which the Federal Government is taking over my business, 
shortly I'll probably have to be looking around for a new job. 
General Johnson's is the best offal' I've had thus far. "9 
Arthur Krock reported in late November that a group of 
businessmen and private citizens had been discussing the 
possibility of putting Willkie up for the nomination, but that 
the talk had indicated nothing but a fine disregard of the 
realities of politics in that the potential candidate would 
need a national organization, a large amount of financial 
support, and assistance from powerful political leaders. 
?Arthur Krock, "In the Nation: Something the Republicans 
Probably \von 't Do," New York Times, .August 16, 1939, p, 22. 
·~e.!!_ ~~ Times, November 22, 1939, p. 13. 
9rbid. 
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Krock stated that Willkie possessed none of these essential 
requirements.l0 
With the approach of the election year, Willkie was still 
a spokesman for business and not a candidate. In December, in 
a speech before the Congress of American Industry, he warned 
his audience against the power of the government commissions 
and the dangers of excessive Federal control over the economic 
life of the nation. Willkie declared that an increase in 
individual opportuni.ty would x•estore the functioning of free 
enterprise and that unemployment, the major economic problem, 
would be solved by American business if the government would 
get "off their backs."11 
II. THE WILLKIE MOVEMEWr-,..JANUARY~r·1AY, 1940 
Throughout the first four months of 1940, \\fillkie was 
not an announced c~ndidate; but in May, he dropped the business-
man-critic attack on the New Deal to become an active candidate 
for the nomination, Although the boom did not get started 
until after the major primary contests, i.t gained amazing 
str•ength during the month of May; in March Hillkie had not been 
mentioned as a candidate in the polls, but by May he was in 
fourth place with 10 per cent of the vote in the Gallup Poll. 
-------
lOArthur Krock, "In the Nation: Mr. McNutt and His Old 
Frat Brother, M:r. Wi.llkie," ~ York Time_~.' November 29, 1939, 
p. 22. 
llNew Yor1~. Times, December 9, 1939, p. 1. 
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During the first two months of 1940, Willkie continued 
to present his economic program through speeches to civic, 
social, and business groups. In January; he declared that 
whenever a government assumed autocratic control over industry, 
it must, in order to maintain that control, gradually suppress 
freedom and civil liberties and that those who advocated more 
and more Federal power were the same people who maintained that 
the great pioneering days of America were finished. He stated 
that the apparent philosophy of an absolute government was a 
defeatist philosophy, with the government controlling a11.12 
In Fe b1.,uary, he asserted that he had opposed the domination of 
the people by big business as he now opposed the domination by 
big government.l3 
Willkie reported that he had received thousands of 
letters from individuals urging him to run for the presidency. 
He added that he did not believe the nomination would be given 
to him, but if it were offered without any strings attached, he 
would have to accept. Still, Willkie did not announce his can-
didacy; in fact, he stated that he could not go out and seek 
delegates and make two-sided statements because he valued his 
independence.14 
---
12New York Times, January 30, 1940, p. l~. 
13Nev-7 York Times, February 17, 19!f0, p. 7. 
14!_-Jew York ~imes, January 31, 1940, p. 5. 
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' Arthur Krock, discussing Willkie's statement, declared 
that a candidate must, or g,enerally did, surrender some of his r 
independence when running for office in order to build up con-
vention votes and that most candidates made two-sided speeches. 
Krock surmised that since Willkie could not surrender some 
independence and make two-sided statements, he could not 
seek delegates. The columnist reasoned that a long deadlock 
could produce a candidacy such as Willkie's, but the possi~ 
bility of that occurrence was slim because politicians dis-
liked candidates without "strings."15 
In April, Willkie again declared that he was not a can-
didate ~nd that he had not the slightest delusion about being 
nominated; however, he again stated that in order to preserve 
his intellectual well-being, he would accept the nomination if 
it were bffered. Also presented in the speech was his 
reiteration of his solution to the nation~s economic problems: 
curbing the authority of the various boards and commissions 
created by the Nevi Deal, modifying the tax laws to encourage 
and stimulate investment, and changing the attitude of govern-
ment toward business. 16 
In another April speech, Willkie declared that the 
current economic ills facing the country were primarily the 
15Arthur K't'ock, "In the Nation: The Care and Feeding of 
Very Dark Horses," Nev'l X~ Tim~, February 1, 1940, p. 20. 
16~~~ York Time~, April 5, 1940, p. 1. 
fault of government, not the system itself. By making it 
impossible for American business to obtain the capital it 
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needed for enterprises, the government had created a s1.tuation · 
whereby the nation's businesses could not pl~ovide jobs for the 
unemployed, new expanding industries, nor new products for the 
consumers. Willkie charged that the New Deal took the term 
"businessman," which the country had honored for more than a 
century, and turned it into an epithet. 17 
Willk:I.e's early criticism brought him publicity; the 
publicity brought requests from interested groups for.speeches 
and elaboratloJ."l on his principles, ideals, and arguments; the 
speeches brought Willkie increased publicity--this was the 
actual start of the Willkie boom. 
Bj' early :April, it appeared that \{illkie 's critic ism of 
the New Deal had been hitting the mark~ for it was reported 
that the Federal government had begun an investigation of 
Willkie's business activities and that certain government 
officials had declared that they we1,e out to "get" him. 
Roosevelt, when questioned about the ~lleged threats, stated 
18 that nobody took things like that seriously. 
Investigation or not, Willkie continued his attack. In 
April, hls article "VIe the People" appeared in 11'ortune; ancl in 
-------
l .. fNew York Times, April 6, 191~0, p. 1. 
1~e~ York Time~, April 6, 1940, p. 1. 
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the article he declared that the United States should not be 
a laboratory for social experimentation and condemned the New 
Deal for failing to solve the economic problems facing the 
nation since 1932. 19 The arguments presented in this article 
were not new; they were the same points of criticism Willkie 
had been emphasing since his struggle against Roosevelt and 
the New Deal began; however, the effect of the message 
was significant. Accompanying the article in Fortune was an 
endoresement of Willkie by the Luce editorial board, an 
indication that his message had made a few converts. 20 After 
the publication of "We the People" Willk:te ·r·eceived 2000 
requests for speeches. 21 
Perhaps the single most important individual in the 
.Willkie movement, aside from the man himself, was Oren Root, 
Jr., the grandnepher,v of Elihu Root and an attorney associated 
with the New York firm of Davis, Park, Wardwell Gardiner and 
Reed. Without consulting Willkie (Root had not even met him), 
Root mailed out a li.ttle more than a thousand "declarations" 
throughout.the country in order to get signatures in support 
of Willkie's candidacy. Root stated that the idea was his own 
and that he had financed the printing of the forms because he 
19stone, op. 21t., p. 351. 
2°Barnes, Opo £1!o' p. 161. 
21rbid. 
believed that there was a great demand among thinking people 
ror the nomination and election of Willkie as President. 22 
Root aJ.so reproduced copies of "We the People" and mailed them 
with the "declarations" to inform the addressees of the argu-,· 
ments and principles of his candidate.23 
Less than a week after he had sent out the "declarations" 
Root reported that they had been well received and that the 
printer·s had received orders for 20,000 more forms. Root also 
revealed that Willkie had contacted him and had explained that 
he ne:tther approved or disapproved of Root's activities and 
that he would not part:l.cipate in any organized effort to get 
the nomination.24 
Late in April, Root reported that he had rented an office 
on Madison Avenue to administer• the Willkie dr•ive and had 
received r·equests for 35,000 11 declarations. 11 He also stated 
that contributions had enabled him to opetl the headquarters and 
that Willkie had told him that he was more interested in getting 
popular support for certain ideas thah in obtaining support for 
personal advancement. It was also reported that the "Stop-
Dewey'' forces had been discussing the possibility of putting 
a halt to Dewey's aspirations by throwing their support to 
22Nm<~ Yor~ Time~, April 11, 191~0, p. 20. 
23stone, OP.· cit., p. 352. 
24 




Willkie, if they failed to stop him with Taft or Vandenberg. 25 
The Willkie movement continued to gain momentum through 
the month of April, demonstrated by the fact that the Root 
headquarters had received 200,000 signed "declarations" by the 
end of the month. Root stated that he planned to show them 
to the delegates to inform them of the widespread support for 
Willlcie. 26 
Arthur Krock, continuing to provide the Willkie support-
ers with helpful hints in candidate building, declared that the 
movement was still only a wish and a hope, not a reality. He 
reasoned that in order to be a candidate Willkie would need a 
small reservoir of delegates in his pocket when the convention 
opened and that since Willkie had no pledged delegate strength 
and had made no attempt to gain support, his slim chance to 
capture the nomination had grown smaller. Krock reported that 
the Willkie men would have some difficulty convincing G.O.P 
leaders that Willkie was the best candidate in light of his 
announced support of the reciproca 1 trade treaties (Only five 
Republican members of Congress had voted to extend them.) and 
aid to the Allies. Krock suggested that Willkie's supporters, 
in order to secure delegate votes for their candidate, set up 
a political organization in his home state of Indiana.27 
25New Y~ Times, April 22, 1940, p. 7. 
26Nei'I York !Lim.~~" April 30, 1940, p. 12. 
27Arthur Krock, "In the Nation: A Dilemma Evoked by Our 
Political System," New York Times, April 16, 1940, p. 22. 
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The lack of delegate votes did represent a handicap 
to Willkie's chances; the movement appeared to be concentrating 
on winning nationwide public support instead of delegates. 
Root's headquarters, aside from distributing "declarations," 
also started handing out buttons an<;] urging citizens to form 
"Willkie-For-President" clubs. Root distributed 25,000 cam-
paign but.tons as an experiment, and soon the Will.kie Clubs 
were dispensing over 80,000 buttons a day. In response to 
Root's suggestion that interested citizens establish local 
clubs to work for Willkie 's candidacy, thou.sands of political 
amateurs began contributing their time, mon~y, and energies 
to the cause. 28 The Willkie boom was a reality, even though 
it was promoted by groups from the organized public and not 
political leaders and delegates. 
In addition to his magazine articles and speeches, 
Willkie was afforded the opportunity of presenting his program 
to several million people when he appeared on an April broad~ 
cast of the radio show "Information Please." The panel of pro-
fessional wits would have been delighted to slaughter Willkie 
before the large radio audience; however, he turned the tables 
and stole the show.29 After his appearance and the start of 
his boom, Willkie moved up in the polls, but the professional 
28stone, op. cit., p. 352. 
29Bar•nes, .212..· cit., pp. 161-62. 
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politicians still did not give him a second thought.30 
During the month of May, the Willkie boom slowly gained 
momentum. His advance in the polls had been gradual, but it 
represented a clear indication of his rising popularity. 
Arter Root had begun his initial program to unite 
Willkie sentiment throughout the country, other important 
figures jumped on the bandwagon. Russell Davenport resigned 
his position as managing editor of Fortune to work for Willkie's 
nomination by organizing Willkie clubs. John Cowles, publisher 
of the Minnesota Publisher; Gardner Cowles, Jr., publ:tsher of 
Look and the Des Moines Register ~Tribune; Henry Luce; and 
Ogden Reid of the New ~ Hera~q T~ibun~ were other publishers 
who supported the Willkie movement. Other converts included 
John W. Hanes, a former New Deal office hoider; Henry 
Breckenricje, Assistant Secretary of War under Wilson; Samuel 
F. Pryor~ Republican National Committeeman from Connecticut; 
and Fred Smith, a prominent public relations specialist.31 
While Willkie's active supporters were engaged in pro-
moting his candidacy, he remained aloof from the activities. 
Willkie had stated that he would not seek de1egates nor 
actively campaign for the nomination; hov1ever, during the 
month of May he made several speeches in which he expressed 
·---·--
30Malcolm Moos, 212~ Re.E.'-lbl~~c_§lns: A £!.i~toril._ gf Their 
Par~, p. 410. 
31 ' Barnes, ££· 91~·, pp. 162-63. 
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his views on both domestic and foreign policy. In a speech 
before the American Newspaper Publishers Association Willkie 
stated that he opposed the New Deal's domestic policy and 
believed, as did millions, that Roosevelt had done a pretty 
good job in the adminstration of the nation's foreign policy. 
He expressed apprehension that since many of those who opposed 
the New Deal thought it would be a wise political move to be 
against all its policies, the voters might be forced to make a 
choice between two half-rotten apples in November. Willkie 
also presented a clear stand on aid to the Allies when he 
declared that possibly the most effective way of keeping the 
country out of the war would be by helping the democracies 
in every way possible, within the limits of international law, 
because if the totalitarian powers won, the odds could be 
substantial that the United States would have to meet them in 
armed conflict.32 
!n m:l.d-May, Willkie was invited to Minnesota to confer 
with Governor Stassen and state Republican Leaders. In a 
speech del:i.vered during his stay he characterized the New Deal 
period as a "decade of decade~ce," charging that free enterprise 
had been abandoned and a highly centralized government ~tibsti­
tuted in its place, a government which controlled the enterprises 
of the people by non-elected commissioners. Willkie called for 
32~ew Xork T~~' May 5, 1940, p. 3. 
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a freely publicized foreign policy and tu~ged extension of 
every aid short of war to the democracies of Europe.33 
Continuing his Mid-West speaking ·tour, Willkie declared 




paign to destroy the people's confidence in their enterprises 
-n--~~~~-·and-ho_p_e_of_tbe_f_u_t_ur_e_un_d_e_r_a_s_ystem of free en·terprise .34 
-~~~---------------~==== 
In Des Moines, he asserted that the New Deal's blundering 
domestic policy had "hamstrung" industry and left it without 
sufficient skilled labor or plant equipment to build defenses 
the President now wanted. Willkie also warned Republicans not 
to attempt to wipe out the existing farm program until it had 
a better one to offer.35 
In New Jersey, he charged that the New Deal had created 
. chaos in government and industry and lacked the ability and 
confidence to carry out the task of coordinating the nation's 
national resources in the drive to strenghten national defenses. 
In this political speech Willkie also dealt with his utilities 
connection, which had been presented as a handicap to his can-
didacy, by.declaring that he was very proud to be in the 
utilities business; he asked his audience to ·recall when in the 
nation's history had American businessmen been barred from 
33New York Times, May 12, 1940, p. 3. 
34New York Times, May 16, 191~0, p. 48. 
35James C. Hagerty, "Willkie Pictures Defense Hand.icap, 11 
~ Yor~ Times, May 18, 1940, p. 9. 
130 
running or holding office.36 Willkie may have stated that he 
was not a candidate, but he began to sound as if he were. 
In late May, Willkie warned that if the totalitarian 
countries won the war, they would control world trade on their 
own terms and the only way the United States could trade would 
be to set up a similar type of government here, thus abrogating 
at least some of the traditional American liberties. He also 
asserted that anyone who believed that the results of the 
European war would be of no consequence to him would be blind, 
foolish, and silly. The only way to avoid war, according to 
Willkie, was to build up OW1 strength.37 
Willkie's energetic supporters and the ''candidate's" 
speeches had gotten the boom off to a good start. A Gallup 
Poll survey published early in May indicated that Willkie's 
stock had increased during the short period the boom had been 
in existence. The poll showed Willkie in·fourth place, moving 
ahead of Hoover, Landon, Gannett, Bridges, and Martin; however, 
the poll also indicated that he had a long way to go to catch 
Dewey, Vandenberg, and Taft.38 
By mid-May, Root declared that the popular support for 
Willkie was increasing rapidly; he asserted that it was an 
36New ~·k f.~~es, May 21, 1940, p. 17. 
37New York :£imes, May 22, 1940, p. 16. 




independent, spontaneous movement and that there was no stop-
. ping it. Root also reported that Willkie Clubs had been estab-
lished in twenty-three cities.39 Root's enthusiasm was somewhat 
confirmed by James c. Hagerty,_ who reported that if the conven-
tion were· deadlocked, Willkie 's supporters believed they would 
gain delegate strength from Massachusetts, Connecticut, Indiana, 
Rhode Island, New Jersey, Iowa, Minnesota, and Missouri. He 
also stated that Willkie had scored heavily in the Mid-West 
with his statements on both the foreign situation and the 
farm problem.-40 
Confirmation of Willkie's growing strength came in the 
New Jersey primary, held in late May. The utilities executive's 
supportez•s haa conducted a spontaneous, eleventh-hour write-in 
campaign, and the results sho\'ied that vlillkie had surprising 
strength in the state. The write-in vote was figured to be of 
both practical and psychological value to his candidacy.41 
The end of May Gallup Poll showed that Willkie was sti.ll 
in fourth place, but that he had increased his percentage 
matet"lally. In the March poll he had received less than 1 per 
cent, and by April he had only 1 per cent; however, by early 
May he had moved ahead to 3 per cent. As the boom expanded 
39N~ York Times, May 16, 1940, p. 48. · 
40 James C. Hagerty, "Willkie Shedding 'Dark Horse' Role," 
New York Tim~-~' May 19, 1940, p. 2~. 
41New York Time~, May 23, 19L10, p. 21. 
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and as the candidate began his Mid-West speaking tour, his 
percentage be:g.an to climb. By Mid-May, Willkie had 5 per cent; : 
by the end of May, this had increased to 10 per cent. 42 
Indic.ative of the expansion of the boom was the report 
in the first \'leek of June that five hundred Willkie Clubs had 
been established, growing at the rate of twelve per day, and 
that a volunteer "Women's Committee for Willkie" had been 
organized and was sending out 5,000 letters a day in behalf 
of their eandidate.43 
In the face of this overwhelming evidence that Willkie 
commanded a large and growing public following, political 
analysts cDntinued to point out to the Amer~can people the 
reasons why he could not possibly gain the nomination. 
McAlister Coleman, writing in The Nation, reported that it was 
unfortunate that Willkie had been so closely associated with 
the holdin;g companies because "old-fashj_oned American liberal-
ism \'JOuld have had in him a doughty champion.rr44 Raymond Moley, 
writing in Newsweelc, stated that the G.O.P. professionals would 
refuse to support Willkie's candidacy because he was not a 
political administrator, a dispenser of jobs and favors to the 
42New ~ ~m~, May 31, 1940, p. 38. 
43"vlillkie Boom Is Republican Sensation as Philadelphia 
Convention Nears," Li£~, 8:25, June 24, 1940. 
411Mc.Alister Coleman, "Men Who \'lould Be President: IV. 
Wendell \iillkie's Hat Is on His Head," The Nation, 150:1}72, 
.April 13, 1940. ~-
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loyal party workers. 45 ~ Christian penturil_ recognized the ._..; __ 
widespread interest in Willkie's candidacy, but indicated that· !. 
the American people would not turn Roosevelt out of office for 
a public utilities man who had agreed. with F.D.R. 's foreign 
policy and disagreed with his domestic policy.46 William Allen 
White, reporting in The ~ ~epublic, asserted that there were 
handicaps to Willkie's nomination: first, he had been a regular 
Democrat until 1935; second, he had been too candid and decent 
during the growth of his boom; and third, he had alienated the 
isolationist wing of the G.O.P. by supporting Roosevelt's 
foreign policy and Hull's reciprocal trade treaties. 47 
The political experts within the Democratic party 
apparently held similar opinions of Willkie's chances. Ickes 
revealed that F.D.R. had stated that he did not believe that 
Willkie had much of a chance to get the nomination; Ickes also 
recorded that Farley had considered Willkfe the strongest can-
48 didate the Republicans could name. 
Willkie 1 who had been a spokesman for business in 1939, 
45Raymond Moley, "Perspective: Willkie--A Study in Irony," 
Newsw~~' 15:72 1 May 20, 1940. 
46 11The Phenomenon of Wendell Willkie," The Chri.stian 
~tur:l, 57:725, June 5, 1940. - -·. ---
47vlilliam Allen White, "Wendell Wiilkie," The New 
Republic, 102:818, June 17, 1940. ------
48Harold Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. f?kes, 
Vol 1II 1 The Lowerin[ ClOUds, 1~:39-19~1,-p.-201. 
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emerged during the Spring of 1940 as a candidate. As the pre-
convention campaign moved into the final weeks, Willkie 
became the main topic of conversation. No one actually knew 
how much support he held, nor did anyone know if his dramatic 
rise in the polls would alter the existing situation. Dewey 
was reasonable to assume that one of the two would be chosen 




TVffiNTY-THREE .DAYS IN JUNE: WILLKIE AGAINST THE FIELD 
As the pre-convention campaigns went into their final 
days, the political situation became more and more muddled, 
at least for the G.O.P. For the Democrats it was certain that 
Roosevelt bad full control of the destiny of the party; however, 
no one knew exactly what that destiny would be, possibly not 
even the President. In the Republican rade Dewey, Taft, and 
Willkie continued their respective campaigns; however, the 
leading candidate, Dewey, seemed to be losing strength to 
Willkie, who appeared to be heading toward the convention on 
the crest of a nationwide boom. To further complicate matter•s 
for the G.O.P. strategists, and the delegates as \'lell, v-1as the 
growing significance of the foreign policy issue in light of 
the deterioration of the international situation, Roosevelt's 
appointment of two Republican interventionists to the Cabinet, 
and the respective stands the various G.O.P. candidates were 
taking on the issue. Opinion as to who should receive the 
nomln3tion was far from being crystallized; neither the rank 
and file nor the professional politicians seemed satisfied 
with the existing situation. 
I. THE BOOM THAT GREH 
The momentum of the Willkie boom carried the candidate 
into the month of June as the most active Republican candidate. 
Dewey and Taft, possessing vast delegate strength by compari-
son, continued to confer with delegates and political leaders 
throughout the nation; however, Willkie conducted a strong 
personal campaign in the West and another in New England and 
reportedly gained considerable support. It was also rumored 
that a "Stop-\villkie 11 ·movement had begun. 
Although much attention had been given to the Willkie 
boom, the practical politicians of the party could not help 
but relegate Willkie to a dark horse category because he 
possessed little delegate strength, the votes bestowing the 
nomination. The three leading candidates had amassed a con-
siderable number of such votes, bot'h pledged and promised, by 
June. With 992 delegates chosen as of June 1, Dewey led the 
field with 150 pledged votes. Others possissing pledged 
support were Taft, with fifty-six; Vandenberg, with thirty-
eight; Hanford Ma cNider, with two; Senator Capper, v-li th eight-
een; and Senator McNary, with ten. The remaining delegates 
were not pledged; these "uninstructed" delegates numbered over 
700. 1 A majority of the latter delegates had promised, both 
publicly and privately, to support various candidates; however, 
the actual delegate strength of each of the contenders was 
unknovm. Dewey was estimated to have slightly less than 300 
first ballot votes, although his managers had predicted 450 on 






the first ballot; Taft's strength was estimated to be 275J but 
his managers had not made specific predictions, declaring only 
that Taft would win the nomination. 2 As the campaign entered 
its final wSeks, it was little wonder that the professionals 
believed that ei~ber Dewey or Taft would win the nomination. 
Willkie 1 finally acting as if he were a candidateJ 
took his prog1•am to the West during the first weeks of June. 
In Denver, he declared that unless the wheels of industry 
were started, the cost of the defense program would come out 
of the standard of living of the ordinary person; it would be 
paid by the poor instead of the rich. He also stated that the 
removal of Roosevelt was the only way the United States could 
present a united front against the threats of totalitarian 
powers and added that he \'rould "love to go to the people against 
that fellow. "3 One point \Villkie stressed time and time again 
on this tour was that since the overwhelming sentiment through-
out the nation favored aid, short of war, to the Allies, the 
party must not adopt an isolationist foreign policy plank. He 
predicted that if the G.O.P. presented a united front with a 
platform with a "realistic outlook" on the European situation 
and leveled the principal attack on the domestic policy of the 
2J·ames A. Haf.erty, "F:!.rst-Vote Choice of DevJey Is Found 
Unlikely in Survey,' ~~York Time~J June 3, 1940, p. 1. 
3New York Time..E_J June 1 1 191~0. p. 7. 
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.New Deal and its ~proven in6ompetence" to build an adequate 
defense system, the party \'JOUld win in November. 4 
The success of the boom, including the enthusiastic 
reception of Willkie's program and speeches, prompted Root to 
predict that if the nomination were not won by the second 
ballot, the delegates would give the nomination to Willkie. 
Root declared that he was confident that the delegates would 
feel "the subconscious desire of the American people. rr5 
.Additional evidence that the boom had grown during 
the first weeks of June came from Russell Davenport, who 
reported that Willkie-For-President clubs had been established 
throughout the nation and numbered almost 500. He also 
revealed that 350,000 buttons had been distributed in June and 
.that 150,000 copies of a pamphlet listing Willkie's principles 
had been distributed by his headquarters. 6 
During early June, Taft, continuing his methodical 
delegate collecting, took his campaign to Tenn~ssee, Georgia, 
and Alabama. During this tour he continued to criticize the 
administration for its failure to prepa1.,e the country's 
defense system. On the same issue he declared that the United 
States had to take in its belt by cutting expenditures and 
4New York Times, June 9, 1940, p. 3. 
5New York Times, June 4, 19!~0, p. 18. 
6New York ~fmes, June 12, 1940, p. 23. 
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revising tax structures in order to pay for the rising defense 
costs. Taft also declared that Roosevelt should renounce· the 
third term because he had failed to prepare the nation for 
attack by foreign powers.7 
Dewey's forces were also active during this period. In 
early June, Dewey's Philadelphia headquarters were opened in 
the Hotel Walton, and the candidate's managers announced that 
Dewey would conduct a personal campaign in Vermont, Rhode 
Island and Massachusetts before the convention opened. 8 
With the pre-convention campaign rapidly coming to a 
close, it appeared that the Taft and Dewey campaigns had 
slowed down considerably from their earlier pace, while that of 
the newcomer, Willkie, appeared to be speeding up. The Mid-
June Gallup Poll indicated that the latter's boom had indeed 
been growing. The results of the.survey of Republican voters 
showed Dewey still leading, with 52 per c~nt, but Willkie 
advancing into second place with 17 per cent, Hoover 2 
per cent, Landon and Gannett 1 per cent, and others 2 per cent. 
The survey indicated that Willkie's rise had been at Dewey's 
expense, wl.th Taft's and Vandenberg's totals remaining rather 
steady. After labeling the Willkie boom as phenomenal, the 
7Ne\'I Yor:~ ~imes, June 8, 19!W, p. 16. 
~ew yor~ Ti~es, June 15, 1940, p. 34. 
140 
poll remarked that it was a dramatic challenge to the validity 
of the old political theory that voters tend to climb on the 
bandwagon of the candidate shown to be in the lead. 9 
Soon after the publication of this poll, Willkie 
announced that Representative Charles A. Halleck or Indiana 
would place his name in nomination and that Representative 
Bruce Barton of New York would deliver one of the seconding 
sp.eeches. The candidate also predicted that the nomination 
would be made on the sixth or seventh ballot and that he would 
have approximately seventy first ballot votes. 10 After making 
this announcement, Willkie left for a three-day campaign tour 
in NeN England. 
In Boston, Willkie again preserited his arguments in 
favor of aid to the Allies and again assailed the New Deal's 
defense program. When asked if he would lead the country into 
war if elected, Willkie declared that no president should take 
the nation into war unless and until the people demanded such 
action; in a democracy, he maintained, it was the right of the 
people to decide upon war. 11 It was reported that Willkie was 
well received in the region and had gained valuable support. 
In Rhode Island, Governor Vanderbilt formally endorsed Willkie 
9New York Time~' June 12, 1940, p. 23. 
10~ York Times, June 13, 1940, p. 10. 
11New Jor~ Ti~, June 15, 1940, P· 11. 
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at a Republican rally, and the latter was assured that he 
would receive six of the state's eight votes. In Connecticut, 
Willkie was informed that the state's sixteen votes would be 
his no later than the second ballot; and in Massachusetts, 
Republican leaders indicated that he would get twenty-two of 
the state's thirty-four votes early in the balloting. It was 
also reported that if Bridges withdrew from the race, Willkie 
could receive support from Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. 12 
Dewey, also speaking in New England, made no claims con-
cerning his support in the region. In a Vermont speech he also 
criticized the administration for its lack of preparedness and 
declared that the first step which needed to be taken was to 
remove the national defense system from political control and 
to replace incompetent cabinet officers with qualified men. 
Dewey implored the people to take "realistic" steps to protect 
the nation instead of leaving the job to Roosevelt and his 
"crew of fuzzy-minded theorists." Commenting on the inter-
national situation he remarked that Marshal Petain's offer of 
surrender was the saddest statement that he had ever reaa.l3 
Before Dewey had departed on his New England tour, his 
managers announced that Willkie was the man they had to beat 
for the nomination. Dewey's strategists had planned a campaign 
12New York Times, June 17, 1940, p. 17. 
13James C. Hagerty, "De\lley Demands Strong War Steps, 11 
New York !imes, June 18, 1940, p. 27. 
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to convince the delegates that their candidate would get more 
votes than any other candidate, especially more than Willkie, 
who they declared would be hurt by his corporate and banlcing 
connections. The Dewey forces had also stated that letters 
stressing Dewey's vote-gett'ing power and indicating the 
results of a Qrivate QOll, showing Dewey far ahead of the 
field would be sent to the delegates. 14 
Further evidence that the other candidates were con-
cerned over the Willkie boom was the report that an effort had 
been started to block Willkie's attempt fo~ the nomination. It 
was also reported that G.O.P. leaders from·Oklahoma, Texas, 
Missouri, and other farm states opposed his candidacy and in a 
deadlock might combine to give the nomination to Dewey or Taft 
. to stop Willkie. The opposition reportedly stemmed from the 
fact that Willkie was an ex-Democrat and an utilities executive, 
two drawbacks which would be emphasized if he continued to gain 
strength.l5 
In the face of growing opposition the Willkie boom con-
tinued to expand. Root revealed in mid-June that an estimated 
4,500,000 Americans had. signed petitions calling for Willkie's 
nomination. The boom received another boost on June 20, when 
the Scripps-Howard papers came out for Willkie's nomination, 
14New York Times, June 17, 1940, p. 17. 
15James A. Hagerty, "Effort Is Started to Block V.Iillkie," 
New York Times, June 20, 1940, p. 20. 
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declaring that he stood out like an oak in a thicket and that 
he was the only Republican candidate with whom the party could 
win.l6 
II. THE PRESIDENTIAL BOMBSP~LL--THE PLAN THAT FAILED? 
Several days before the opening of the Republican con-
vention Roosevelt exploded a political bombshell with the 
anriouncement that Colonel Henry L. Stimson and Colonel Frank 
Knox had been appointed Secretary of \var and Secretary of the 
Navy, respectively. The announcement aroused a great deal of 
exc:t.tement in the Republj_can party because .both men were G.O.P. 
'leaders with avowed interventionist beliefs with regard to the 
existing international crisis. The President declared that he 
.had made the appointments in the interest of national defense, 
and he indicated that there existed overwhelming support 
throughout the nation for aid to the Allies. Both of the 
appointees had been identified by the press as sympathizers 
with Roosevelt's pro-Ally foreign policy stando G.O.P. leaders 
• 
condemned tbe appointments; ho·wever, the significance 
of the maneuver rested with the Presidential motivation: were 
the appointments actually made in the interests of national 
defense,_or did they represent the President's attempt to induce 
the G.O.P. to adopt a strict isolationist platform and to nomi- · 
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nate a candidate adhering to that foreign policy stand? The 
Stimson-Knox appointments, regardless of their intent, did 
produce a violent reaction within the G.O.P. 
One of the first reactions was a new round of question-
ing on the third term decision because Landon and previously 
stated that no Republican should enter the cabinet until F.D.R. 
foreswore any third term aspirations. Reporters were unable to 
pursue the subject further because White House Press Secretary 
Early refused to comment on the question. 17 
The importance of the appointments rested with the · · · 
effect they would have on the G.O.P. convention, which was to 
begin on June 24. '!~he repercussions among. those assembling in 
Philadelphia were great. Aside from virtually reading Knox and 
Stimson out of the party, Republican leaders and delegates 
denounced the appointments as "petty politics," a move toward 
dictatorship, and preparation toward placing the nation into 
the European war. It was reported that it was almost certain 
that the Reptlblican platform 'tJOUld go mnch further in declaring 
for a policy of non-intervention and that those who supported 
all possible aid to the Allies were concerned lest the move 
toward isolattonism ended their chance for such a plank. Many 
Republican leaders believed that Roosevelt had given the G.O.P. 
the cue to become strictly a "peace party." It was also 
17Felix Belair, Jr., "capital Surprised," N~ York. T!_~~' 
June 21, 1940, p. 1. 
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reported that since Willkie had been closely identified as an 
interventionist, the party was not likely to nominate him 
and that the candidacies of Taft and Dewey would probably be 
enhanced by the furor following the announcement.18 
Isolationists in the platform committee took the posi-
tion that it was virtually mandatory that the conventj.on adopt 
a non-interventionist plank; they began to work in that direc-
tion.19 
The comments issued by Republican leaders pointed out 
the fact that opinion of the appointments varied--they had not 
been universally condemned--and that several G.O.P. leaders 
used the controversy as a propanganda vehicle directed to the 
rank and file of both parties, as well as to the delegates 
assembling at the convention: Mac Nider declared that he was 
sorr~ to hear of Knox and Stimson's departure from the G.O.P. 
to the war party; former Senator David Reed of Pennsylvania 
stated that he wished Roosevelt had filled all the other posi-
tions with Republicans and then resigned himself; Halleck 
asserted that the appointments made ~iillkie the logical candi-
date; former Senator Walter E. Edge of New Jersey stated that 
the President got a couple of good men to strengthen his 
Cabinet; and David Ingalls stated that since they had not 
18James A. Hagerty, "Stimson and Knox Dismvned by 
Party," ~e..:~ York Times, June .21, 1940, p. 1. 
19rbld. 
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consulted any Republican leaders before accepting the posi-
tions, they could no longer be considered Republicans. 20 
The candidates, and potential candidates, were more 
careful in their comments. Hoover declared that the appoint-
ments were of no par•ticuiar importance to the race for .the 
nomination or to the election. Dewey stated that the appoint-
ments held the gravest implications for the nation's 
future, for the taking of two interventionists into the 
Cabinet could only be interpreted as a direct step toward war; 
and, according to Dewey, Roosevelt took the step in order to 
.. 
protect himself from the political consequences of failing to 
prepare the nation's defenses. 21 Taft declared that the 
appointments improved the Cabinet .. and surmised that Knox and 
. Stimson had been apparently selected because of their inter-
ventionist sympathies.22 In answer to a question on the Knox-
Stimson acceptances .. Hillkie remarked that each conscientious 
individual had to determine such things according to the 
dictates of his own conscience. 23 Upon being informed of the 
appointments Bridges stated that he was incapable of comment; 
however, McNary stated that the appointees should make able 
executives. 24 
20Ibid. 
21New ~ Times, 
22rbid. 
24Ibid. 





The President's bombshell had the immediate reaction in 
a resurgence of isolationism; the platform makers were deter-
mined to make the G.O.P. the "peace party" in 1940. This 
resurgence, if it remained the dominant philosophy, would 
practically eliminate Willkie as a candidate, or at least stop 
his boom; however, the day after the announcement of the 
Cabinet changes it was reported that Republican sentiment 
favoring aid to the Allies had re.bounded and that the Willkie 
boom had gathered nev1 strength. 25 It was also reported that 
500 members of the Willkie-For-President clubs had arrived in 
Philadelphia to convince the delegates that Wendell Willkie 
was the only logical choice for the nomination and that the 
delegates had been deluged by thousands of telegrams, letters, 
and postal cards urging them a vote for lHillkie. The growing 
strength of the boom was evident even to those Republican 
. 
leaders who opposed his candidacy; they agpeed that he had 
great "secondary strength," especially in New England, Ohio, 
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Indiana, 
Minnesota, Colorado, Michigan, and even some in the South. 26 
If the purpose of the President's appointments had been 
to ha 1 t the vJilllc:i.e boom, it failed; hm•rever J if the purpose 
had been to persuade the Republicans to entrench themselves 
25New York Times, June 22, 191~0, p. 1 
26 James A Hagerty, "Confusion Is Fading," New Jork 
June 22, 1940, pp. 1,20. · 
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firmly in the isolationist camp, a position seemingly contrary 
to public opinion, it appeared to have been partially success-
ful. It was reported that the individuals within the platform 
committees favoring aid to the Allies were meeting rather stiff 
resistance from groups planning to draft a definite declaration 
against any American intervention in the European war. The sub-
committe~ on national defense and foreign policy had postponed 
consideration of these two important planks; however, it was 
apparent that the showdown between the two groups would have to 
occur sometime before the convention started.27 
At the height of the controversy surrounding the appoint-
ments th~ final Gallup Poll of Republican candidate popularity 
was published, indicating several important developments. The 
.survey of G.O.P. voters shoHed that Dewey, while still in the 
lead, had again lost ground to ltlillkie. Of those Republicans 
with opinions, 47 per cent favored Dewey, while 29 per cent now 
supported Willkie. Taft and Vandenberg received only 8 per 
cent, a substantial decrease in popular support; and Hoover 
gained to 6 per cent. The poll also reported that 34 per cent 
of G.O.P. voters had not yet made up the:l.r minds on the candi-
dates; if this were true, then the race was far from settled.28 
As the Vlillkle boom moved into the last days of the ·pre-
---------
27Turner Catledge, "War Planks Shift on Cabinet Change," 
New Yor~ Tim~~' June 21, 1940, p. 17. 
28Nevi York 'I'imes, June 21, 19lJ.O, p. 17. 
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convention maneuvering, enthusiasm for the utilities execu-
tive increased amoung the rank and file of the party and began 
to infiltrate the ranks of the delegations; the boom would 
soon challenge the politics of the convention. 
III. CONVENTION EVE 
The arrival of the candidates in Philadelphia marked an 
ihcrease in political activity, both outwardly and behind the 
scenes. While the c~ndidates gave speeches, held press con-
ferences, and made predictions, their supporters practice·d the 
art of persuasion. 
American political conventions have~ throughout their 
history, carried the stigma of "dirty politics" and political 
"deals"--conventions of little people controlled by professional 
politicians, the kingmakers of the parties. As the Republican 
. 
leaders, candidates, and delegates advance~ on Philadelphia, 
no one actually knew what was going to happen. Rumors of plots, 
deals, svdtches, and combinations filled the conversations, but 
there appeared to be no machine organization, group, or king-
maker pulling the strings or making the decisions. In report-
ing the absence of leaders or groups of leade:r's, the Nevi Yor~ 
Times predicted a hotly ~ontested fight both for the nomination 
and the foreign policy plank of the platform. 29 There was to 
29James A •. Hagerty, "Convention Unbossed," New York 
Times, June 23, 1940, p. 1. -- ---
1-0 
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be a battle for the nomination, and it began in earnest when 
Dewey, Willkie~ and Taft arrived on June 22. 
As the three candidates arrived, they were met by their 
enthusiastic supporters and members of the press. All three 
stated that they were in the race to stay, that they were not 
engaged in any trades, and that they had no interest in any 
job but the presidency.3° 
In his press conference Dewey declared that he favored 
sending "surplus" rna teria ls to the Allies and disapproved of 
"exporting" warships since the United States only had one-half 
of what they needed. On the Stimson-Knox appointments Dev-tey 
now stated he would, if he could, vote for the confirmation of 
the appointments; he declared that the Republican party was big 
enough for all viev-ts. Commenting on the Willkie boom, Dewey 
expressed admiration for the technical skill by which the boom 
was started and perpetuated and asserted that he doubted that 
the popular support had expressed itself into delegate votese3l 
It was reported that Dewey's managers claimed from 
400 to 450 first ballot votes, although other sources estimated 
his strength to be about 350, and admitted that Dewey's chances 
would be lessened if the balloting went beyond the third.32 It 
3°warren Moscow, "Crowds Welcome 'Big Three' of Race," 
New York Times, June 23, 19!~0, p. 2. 
31 Ibid. 
32James A Hagerty, "Convention Unbossed," !:lew York 
Times, June 23, 19!~0, p. 1. 
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was also reported that Dewey's chances were jeopardized by two 
serious handicaps: he had begun his campaign very early and had 
committed himself to a foreign policy w~ich had been defensible 
i~ 1939, but one which had become less so and less popular as 
the European war progressed; and he had, by announcing his candi-
dacy too early, made himself a target for coalition rivals.33 
Regardless of his handicaps, Dewey was still the front runner, 
both in popularity and in delegate strength, and generally 
regarded as the man to beat. 
Taft arrived late in the evening, too late to make the 
headlines along with De\'Iey and Willkie; how.ever, it was 
reported that Taft had made no formal declaration of his 
strength, though it was beiieved that he had approximately 300 
first ballot votes. It was also reported that Taft's chance 
for the nomination would come if and when he moved ahead of 
Dewey on an early ballot; if Taft then failed, the dark horse 
candidates would have a chance. It was revealed that Dewey's 
and Taft's managers realized the situation, but had formed no 
combination or deal to prevent Willkie or any other dark horse 
from securing the top spot on the ticket _3!1 
Willkie's arrival was characterized by tremendous demon-
33nenis W. Brogan, The Era of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A 
Chronicle of th~ New Deal and Globil War_, p. 293. 
34James A. Hagerty, "Convention Unbossed," New York 




strations of public support. He was mobbed by supporters upon 
his arrival at the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel, and his remarks 
were loudly applauded. It was reported-that Willkie expected 
no more than fifty to seventy first ballot votes; however, it 
was generally believed that he held a great deal of support in 
reserve, delegates who would come to his side after the early 
ballots •. The delegates figures to switch were mainly from New 
England, the Middle West, and some from the south.35 
After his "press conference" Willkie visited two of the 
four Willkfe headquarters which had been established in the 
convention area. As he walked through the-streets, he was 
attended by a large crowd of his supporters and the curious; 
again he held no formal press conference, but gave his views to 
. reporters and to anyone who asked him. ToW. L. Tooze, chair-
man of the Oregon delegation, Willkie declared that he favored 
the principle of the reciprocal trade treaties because they had 
been first advocated by G.O.P. statesmen, Presidents McKinley 
and Taft. He also declared that he favored all possible aid to 
the Allies. without getting into the war.36 
During this early period there was also some speculation 
over the fate of certain favorite son candidates and the dele-
gate strength they controlled. One such favorite son was 
35rbid. 
36warren Moscow, "Crowds ~'ielcome 'Big Three' of Ra.ce," 
New Y?rk Times, June 23, 1940, p. 2. 
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Governor Arthur James of Pennsylvania, whose delegates were 
controlled by oilman Joseph Pew. Pew reportedly opposed Dewey 
and admire~ Willkie; however, it was·also reported that Pew 
was concerned with Willkie 1 s vote-getting power in view of 
his statements favoring aid to the Allies and the reciprocal 
trade treaties.37 
Another favorite son candidate with a great deal of sup-
port was Vandenberg, who had been mentioned as a presidential 
possibility, but had not campaigned for the nomination. He 
stated in his diary that Willkie had come to him and had asked 
ro'r his support; and, according to the Sena.tor, the tvw parted 
good friends, but made no deal. He also recorded that he had 
been contacted by Dewey and had been offered the second posi-
tion on the ticket for his support of Dewey's candidacy. 
Vandenberg revealed that he had suggested that the two men flip 
for the top place on the ticket and that De\lrey had not 
replied _38 
If the convention became deadlocked, the votes of the 
favorite son delegations could be a determining factor in choos-
ing the nominee. Willkie 1 s supporters moved in on these dele-
gates, as well as the delegates committed to other candidates, 
in or•der to persuade them to switch to \'llllkie. To convince 
them the vlillkie men stressed the candidate 1 s rapidly ri.sing 
37 Charles R. Michael, "James Candidacy called Important'" 
N~ York :!:imes, June 23, 191~0, p. 2. 
38sarnes, 2£· cit., p. 175. 
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percentage in the polls, the establishment of over 700 Willkie 
Clubs and over 200 Willkie-For-President clubs, ana the efforts 
of the 50,000 Volunteer Willkie Workers--all demonstrative of 
their man's great public appea1.39 Another talking point 
developed was that the men of wealth and influence who con-
trolled the finances of the party actually preferred Willkie 
and Hoover over Taft and Dewey and that Willkie had the greater 
appeal of the two, especially with the non-professionals of the 
party. ~0 
Combating this surge for delegates, those seeking to 
stop Willkie's drive for the nomination exhumed the arguments 
used agalnst the candidate when his boom began. They declared 
that Willkie did not have sufficient delegate strength or 
political machine, that he was a big businessman and utilities 
executive, that he was an ex-Democrat, that he was a man with 
Wall Street connections, and that he was in favor of aid to the 
Allies and the reciprocal trade treaties--all of which, they 
·maintained, guaranteed that he would be a poor candidate if 
nomlnated. They also pointed out that the course of the war 
had made the third term attempt virtually certain and that no 
39"campaigns: The Story of \tlendell Willkie, 11 Time, 
36:16, June 24, 1940. · .. ---
40charles Malcolmson, "Rites for the G.O.P.," The £la~_2£, 
150:748, June 22, 1940. 
,-
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businessman could match Roosevelt's appeal and glamour.41 In 
addition, some party professionals reportedly opposed Willkie 
because the amateurs running his campaign did not know or 
recognize them and treated them in an offhanded manner. 42 
Others opposed him because he was not an organization man, but 
a political amateur.43 
Willkie was a political novice, but he had reportedly 
reached several delegations through "non-political" devices. 
His headquarters imported pre tty young so cia lites to ansvfer 
telephones ~nd send messages, while other Willkie supporters 
placed campaign literature into the delegates' laundry pack-
ages.44 Probably nowhere were Willkie's disarmingly non-
professional tactics more effective than in his statements to 
the press and to the delegates whom he met. On his arrival in 
Philadelphia he told reporters, "Ask me any damn thing in the 
world, and I'll answer it. Nothing is off the record."45 
During the tour of his headquarters, Willkie told reporters, 
11 My campaign headquarters are in my hat. Be sure to put it 
4l"campaigns: The Story of Wendell Willkie," Time: 36: 
16, June 24, 1940. 
42"The Sun Also Rises," Tim~, 36:12, July 8, 1940. 
43Jonathan Mitchell, "How They Won with \Hllkie, 11 The 
New ~epublic, 103:49, July 8, 1940. 
44Mary Earhart Dillon, Wendell Willkie: 1~-191~~, p. 153. 
45 . Ibid_. , p • 13 9 • 
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down that I'm having a swell time."46 To those who.asked about 
his being an ex-Democrat and supporter of the New Deal in 1932,. ic 
Willkie declared that if there were one thing he had done, it 
was to fight the New Deal.47 To those who questioned his lack 
of political experience in public office and his business 
association, Willkie replied that he was proud of both his lack 
of political experience and his business background. -8 
The New York Times reported on June 24 that Governor 
Raymond Baldwin of Connecticut had withdrawn from the race, 
pledging the state's sixteen votes to Willkie; and it was also 
r~vealed that a bloc of New York delegates, led by Syracuse's 
Mayor Rolland B. Marvin, had indicated they would support 
Willkie.49 Despite these important gains, Willkie still needed 
a lesson in practical politics. Arthur Krock and Turner 
Catledge came to Philadelphia to cover the convention for their 
newspaper. In the Willkie headquarters they were perplexed 
by its amateurish character and by the fact that Willkie had 
designated no floor leaders, those practical politicians who 
knew convention strategy, how to get votes, and when to release 
support. Krock suggested that Willkie ask Governor Baldwin to 
46"Gentleman from Indiana," Time,36:ll~, July 8, 1940. 
47rbid. 
48"G.O.P. Moves on Philadelphia to Pick the Man and 
Issue," Newsweek, 15:31, June 24, 1940. 
49Nel'-l_ York Times, June 24, 1940, p. 1. 
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assist him in the capacity of floor manager, and Willkie asked r 
if Stassen wer•e available for the posj_ tion. Krock told the 
candidate that Stassen had indicated he-would not engage in any 
convention activity.5° 
In his column Krock revealed that vJillkie had not 
appointed anyone to these important convention positions and 
that it 90uld be too late to do much good because the other 
candidates had liaison men and women in every delegation and 
political floorwalkers in contact with the delegates. Krock 
declared that Willkie's campaign headquarters may have been in 
his hat at one time, but that it was time to set up a strategy 
committee--possibly including Baldwin, Stassen, Pryor, Simpson, 
Marvin, and others who reportedly favored his candidacy.5l 
On June· 23, the day before the convention was to begin, 
it was reported that the first ballot strengths had not changed 
after the week of political wheeling and dealing. Dewey was 
expected to have 350 votes on the ballot, with Taft receiving 
275, Vandenberg eighty, James seventy-two, and others 163. The 
report also forecasted that after the second ballot Dewey would 
lose ground to Taft and Willkie and that after the recess, 
probably following the .third or fourth ballot, the fight would 
be between Taft and Willkie. It was predicted that the Willkie 
50Dillon, op. P1~·, pp. 143-45. 
5l.Arthur Krock, "Willkie 's Forces Seek Strategists_," 




forces would withhold from sixty to seventy votes on the first 
ballot in order to show an increase on each ballot, to give the 
illusion of a boom going up.52 
Iri contrast to this picture of delegates and candidates 
maneuvering and dealing for support and favors was the image 
the convention presented to the public; outwardly, the conven-
tio~ atmosphere differed little from any of its predecessors. 
Samuel F. Pryor, Chairman of the Committee on Arrangements, 
started the festivities by placing a huge metal badge with the 
inscription "Official Mascot, Republican National Convention, 
Philadelphia, June 24 11 on a seventeen-year-old elephant in the 
city's zoo.53 Elephants again made the headlines when a forty-
two-yeal,-old elephant named Tizzie cUed in the Philadelphia 
Zoo; Democratic papers declared they would look for further 
signs of impending Republican doom. Gannett imported three l:tve 
elephants ana marched them through the streets. Taft also dis-
played elephants, although his were of papier-mache. Gannett 
erected fifteen-foot pictures of himself, in color, and set up 
a small theater in his headquarters to show campaign mov:l.es. 
Taft also showed movies; however, both Taft and Gannett found 
few callers for their epics. All the campaign headquarters, 
except Gannett's, formally served callers free liquor, an old 
52 James A. Hagerty, "Gains for Willkie, 11 New York 'J.1ime~, 
June 24, 1940, p. 10. 
53Ne~ York Times, June 8, 1940, p. 16. 
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and trusted campaign technique. There were no peppy ca~paign 
songs; hov1ever, there were several slogans which aroused some 1 
interest: "Trust--in--Taft;" "Do It With Dewey;" "Gannett--
America's Best Bet;" and "Fan With Van," which was imprinted 
on yellow fans.54 
During the month of June the Willkie movement had continued 
to "bleed'' support from the other candidates in spite of the 
lack of delegate strength, the efforts of the "Stop-Willkie" 
forces, and the apparent isolationist trend. In the space of 
twenty-three days Willkie's popular vote had increased from 10 
per cent to 29 per cent in the Gallup Poll's sampling of G.O.P. 
voters; the question as to whether this public support could be 
translated into delegate votes was uppermost in the minds of 
the candidates and their managers as the c6nvention opened. 
54"conventi~n City," Time, 36:15-16, July 8, 191W. 
CHAPTER Vl 
THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION 
The outward optimistic attitude of the delegates, mani-
fested in the slogans, elephants, and other symbols of conven-
tion "madness," was only a partial representation of the dele-
gates' actual feelings because the prevailing sentiment at the 
convention was that it was "the damnedest convention that ever 
was. "1 The 19!W Republican convention suffered from schizo-
phrenia. The delegates, on the one hand, expressed great opti-
mism and enthusiasm about the party's chances for 1940, 
an attitude apparent in the parades, parties, speeches, 
and other activities which characterized Philadelphia as the 
.delegates and candidates prepared for the job at hand. The 
convention atmosphere was two-sided because the delegates also 
exhibited attitudes of anger, hatred, and frustration. 
The attitude of frustration resulted partially from the 
general feeling among the delegat~s that unless the right man 
and platfo~m were chosen, the party would again face defeat at 
the hands of the Democrats. Frustration also developed over 
F.D.R. 's third term decision; he had not announced 
his cand~dacy, nor had he promoted a successor. This, 
coupled ~Ii th the chaotic interna tiona 1 situation, led many 
--·----
111The Sun Also Rises," Time, 36:10, July 8, 1940. -- . 
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Republican leaders to the same conclusion which had been pre-
viously reported by the political pollsters--that F.D.R, if 
he should choose to run in 1940, could sectwe the Democratic 
nomination. The G.O.P. leaders did not· relish the prospect of 
facing the President for a third time, especially during a 
period of international crisis. 
Tpe fact that the President 1 s popularity was still high 
and that the war in Europe had aroused deep feelings of anxiety 
throughout the nation were certainly not conducive to any 
feelings of optimism on the part of the delegates. Both of 
the front running candidates, Devvey and Taft, had expressed 
near or outright isolationist foreign policy stands; and since 
one of the two was expected to gain the nomination, the 1940 
. campaign would presumably be fought on the basis of Republican 
isolationism versus Democratic internationalism. Having the 
isolationist tag hung around their necks was something the 
delegates did not at all relish. 
Throughout the convention activities this split personal-
ity would manifest itself time and time again. Outwardly, the 
atmosphere and proceedings appeared to be those of a normal 
convention; however, behind the scenes the Willkie candidacy 
slowly overpowered the unbossed delegates; thci fear and 
frustration of meeting Roosevelt during the crisis persuaded 
the delegates to contribute to what has been called one of the 
greatest upsets in American political history. 
1-, 
! 
I. THE FIRST DAY 
The convention was called to order at 11:43 A.M. on June 
24, 1940, by National Committee Chairman Hamilton. During the 
afternoon session the convention machinery was established and 
in the evening Governor Stassen delivered the keynote address. 
,c__-----!Ttre-ea-ri y ::re-s-s1.-on-mov~d-w±th-pi..,B-c-1-s-±on-;--s-e-l--e-c-t-ec1-c1elega-t-e-s-v'l-i-t-h------
prepared· motions were recognized by the chairman, and all moves 
were unanimously approved. During this business-like session 
the galleries were quiet. 2 
While these procedural activities were being carried out, 
the candidates and their managers vied with one anothe:t• for 
delegate support. William Allen White reported that twenty-one 
Congressmen from the Northwest had met and denounced vallkie 
for his reciprocal trade views; hO\'iever, \lfhlte. added that the 
movement would not mean much because it was the first Republican· 
convention in forty years in which the leaders had lost control. 
He revealed that the revolt against the bosses was manifest--
Pew reportedly would lose fourteen delegate votes from his 
delegation; and Landon and Martin would face some difficulty 
keeping their delegates in line. White also stated that a poll 
of the delegates revealed that seventy per cent favored aid to 
the Allies, but that the platform committee feared the proposi-
tion and had adopted a meaningless, straddling plank on the 
2 
Ne~ York Tim~, June 25, 1940, p. 16. 
important issue.3 
It was also reported that forty Republican Representa-
tives and some Senators ~ad started a "block-Willkie'' movement 1" __ 
to halt his growing boom and that supporters of the other 
candidates had joined in the move. If the group succeeded in 
would recieve delegate support from sources heitherto not for 
him. Senator McNary declared that the Western States would 
not support Willkie and predicted that when the balloting 
began, his boom would decline as quickly as it had risen.4 
Willkie and his political strategists did not take any 
action on·.the blocking attempts, preferring to evaluate the 
effect of the attack, but continu~d to gather support. The 
candidate told reporters that he had made gains in the South-
west and that he would get seventeen Pennsylvania votes. He 
also announced that Governor Carr of Color.ado would deliver one 
of his seconding speeches and would be a floor leader. In 
addition, it was reported that some Willkie supporters had 
attempted to get Gannett to withdraw from the race to give 
Willkie additional anti-Dewey votes and that Willkie had gained 
support in the New Jersey and Massachusetts delegations.5 
. 3william Allen White, "Republicans Act 'Like Democrats'," 
New York ~:!:_m~~' June 25, 1940, p. 16. 
4 James A. Hagerty, "Convention Opens," r..~w York Tim~~' 
June 25, 1940, pp. 1,16o 
5 Ibid • , p • 16 • 
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During this first day# Dewey's managers declared that 
their candidate would receive 400 votes on the first ballot 
and more on the second. Vandenberg# Willkie, and Taft made no 
predictions, although Taft's vote was figured to be from 275 to 
300. 6 
At 10:00 P.M. Stassen delivered the keynote address in 
which he drew a parallel between the Roosevelt administration 
and the pre-war leadership in England and France and indicated 
there was a necessity of real and not paper preparedness for 
na tiona 1 defense. He denounced the New Deal as ineffecti.ve in 
its attempt to revive industry and reduce unemployment, declar-
ing that a big stick was needed in Washington, not a big noise. 
Concerning the Knox-Stimson appointments, Stassen remarked that 
by going to the Republican party for these men Roosevelt had 
confessed his failure in preparing the nation for defense. 
Stassen received a standing ovation when he declared that no 
one who believed in Communism, Fascism, or Nazism should be 
permitted on the government payroll.7 Stassen defined the 
foreign policy straddle of the platform by declaring that the 
plank was pro-peace, but not pro-Hitler, and indicated that the 
foreign policy plank advocated all possible aid to the Allies, 
short of war. 8 To nip an appeasement charge in the bud, 
6 Ibid., pp. 1,16. 7 Ibid., p. 1. 
B:sarne s, op. cit., p. 181. 
Stassen declared that the Republican party wanted an adequate 
air force, anti-aircraft defense, tanks and anti-tank weapons, 
ample navy and costal defenses, and bases strategically located 
in the hemisphere.9 
Before the address John Cowles and Raymond Clapper had 
worked diligently to obtain Stassen s support for the Willkie 
cause, but the Minnesota Governor had refused to talk to the 
candidate until after he had delivered the keynote address. 
At 1:00 A.M., on June 25, the Cowles brothers, Stassen, and 
Willkie met to discuss the situation. Stassen indicated that 
he would support Willkie if he could be his floor manager, to 
insure that no mistakes would be made. No other deal was made, 
although Stassen did state that he might be around for a return 
favor; Willkie replied that he would be glad to help him.lO 
C. Nelson Sparks, Gannett's campatgn manager, later 
charged that T. W. Lamont had purchased Stassen's support 
through John Cowles; Cowles issued a strong denial of the 
charge. 11 Stassen declared that he had joined the \Hllkie camp 
because of the candidate's strong foreign polic_y stand and his 
strong press support.l2 
9"GOP .Convention Aligns Party for Its Most Vital cam-
paign," Newsweek, 16:28, July 1, 1940. 
1~rnes, op. E~t., p. 182. 
11Ibid.' p. 184. 
12 . 
Dillon, £1?..· cit., pp. 147-1.18. 
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. 
Aside from the keynote address, there were few signifi-
cant events occurring during the first day. Outwardly, the 
convention conducted merely routine business; behind the scenes 
there was little change in the over-all activity as the 
supporters of the various candidates attempted to build up 
delegate strength for their men and to destroy that committed 
or leaning toward his rivals. This activity would continue 
into the second day of the convention, intensifying as the 
Willkie boom grew in strength. 
II. THE SECOND DAY 
On the second day of t11e convention the delegates heard 
an address by former President Herbert Hoover, an address which 
earned him the cheers of the delegates and galleries and revived 
talk of his candidacy. Behind the scenes the managers continued 
to plan and plot as the flood of telegrams and letters demand-
ing Willkie's nomination started to pile up and as it became 
more and more apparent that the convention Has unbossed. 
Early in the day the platform committee re-opened the 
drafting of the foreign policy plank, and the conflict between 
the isolationst and internationalist wings of the party con-
tinued. It was reported that the committee, led by the group 
opposing any interventionist declaration, revrrote the plank to 
assert that the G.O.P. stood for Americanism, preparedness, and 
peace and that the Democrats represented unpreparedness and 
167 
tactics leading to war. 13 This report appeared to be in dis-
agreement with Stassen's comment in his keynote address con-
eerning the character of the plank; there was a great deal of 
confusion over the nature of the party's foreign policy stand. 
The most significant event of the day was Hoover's 
address. The delegates and galleries rose and cheered the 
ex-president as he entered the auditorium and again as he was 
introduced by Joseph Martin, Jr., the Convention Chairman. 
In his address Hoover covered a number of points concerning 
both domestic and foreign policy. In his discussion of the 
former he declared that for the first time in 150 years the 
United States had suffered a decrease in national income and 
wealth and that one-third of the nation's people were still 
frozen to poverty. He stressed the issue that the national 
debt had long since passed the danger point and attacked the 
New Deal's currency policies; however, he received the greatest 
reaction from the audience on the subjects of the third term 
and foreign policy. Hoover advocated that the United States 
should give all possible aid to the nations fighting for free-
dom, providing the United States did not become involved in the 
fighting. Concerning the reciprocal trade issue, he declared 
that such treaties would not be feasible in a world where 
nations needed to become self-sufficient in order to survive. 
13James A. Hagerty, "Hoover Challenge," New York 'rimes, 
J'une 26, 1940, p. 1. -- --- · 
---~------~--
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Hoover declared that the third term attempt not only violated 
American tradition, but also the principle of restraint on the 
centralization of po~er in this nation, and he delivered a 
challenge to the delegates by expressing his willingness to 
again meet Roosevelt in a battle of ballots. Hoover was given 
an ovation at the conclusion of his address, and it appeared 
that he had made his bid for the nomination; however, no one 
knew just how strong his support was at that time. 14 
It was reported that Hoover's address had given new hope 
to his supporters and that a boom for his candidacy had 
started. The grmvth of the Hoover boom reportedly had caused 
the other candidates in the race a good deal of worry; however, 
the Dewey camp indicated that the "lack of enthusiasm" for 
Hoover had greatly increased Dewey's chances for the nomination 
because it was felt in many quarters that Hoover preferred 
Taft to Dewey. Dewey's managers also revealed that they would 
throw their full strength into the first two ballots instead 
of attempting to show a gradual increase on each ballot.l5 
There was a difference of opinion between the reporters cover-
ing the convention and the Dewey campaign man?gers, for each 
side tended to see the popular reaction to Hoover's address in 
a different light. 
----------------
14Ibid., pp. 1,16. 
l5James A. Hagerty, "Hoover Challenge," New York Ti~, 
June 26, 1940, p. 16. 
'-' 
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The most persistent l'1 umor during the second day was that 
Dewey and Taft would join forces to stop the Willkie boom, 
but it was also reported that the merger would be ineffective 
as long as Dewey insisted on gaining the nomination for the 
presidency or nothing. In add:t tion, Dewey declared to the 
press that he could not find where "ltlillkie had made any inroads 
on his p~edged delegates; however, several New York delegates 
revealed that they had received telegrams from financial 
leaders indicating that the G.O.P. could expect ample campaign 
funds if Willkie were the nominee and nothing if Dewey won the 
nomination.l6 
Perhaps the most interesting behind the scenes news of the 
second day was revealed in Vandenberg's press conference. He 
declared that a large segment of the delegates were "shopping 
around" in an attempt to learn the stands of the various candi-
dates on problems relating to foreign affairs. Vandenberg also 
related that his situation had improved within the preceding 
twenty-four hours, but he decllned to offer a prediction of his 
strength.l7 The ''shopping around" report seemingly verified 
earlier reports that the convention was unbossed and unruled; 
in such a situation nothing could be certain. It was toward 
this group of undecided, unbossed delegates that the Willkie 
16charles vl. Hurd, "Candidates View Hoover as Threat," 
New ~Times, June 26, 1940, p. 18. 
17Ibid. 
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supporters directed their efforts. 
Willkie told reporters that he had seen more than 600 
of the 1000 delegates and had gained co~siderable support from 
these personal contacts. He declared that Senator Bridges had 
told him that if he could not get the nomination, he would 
rather see V.Iillkie get it than anyone else .18 Willki.e also 
stated that he had favored the reciprocal trade treaties since 
their inception and that he had made public statements to that 
effect; however, he indicated to the newsmen that the victories 
in Europe had created a new world and conditions never before 
faced by the world and that the treaties were no longer an 
important issue--the United States had to deal with live 
problems, not dead ones, He repeated that he had not changed 
his position on the treaties.l9 
The Willkie boom, aside from picking up delegate support, 
continued to attract prominent politicians. Besides those 
previously indicated--Pryor, Simpson, Barton, Vanderbilt, carr, 
Baldwin, Stassen, and Marvin--Chairman Hamilton, who was not 
supposed to support any candidate, joined the movement. 20 In 
order to familiartze the delegates with the candidate and his 
v~ews, these politicians, Willkie's floor leaders and strategy 
planners, brought up twelve delegates at a time to meet and. 
18rbia. 
19New_ York Times, June 26, 19LIO, p. 18. 
20Dillon, op . .2!!·' p.1ll7. 
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discuss issues with the candidate.21 He answered questions 
straightforwardly; for example, he stated during one of these 
conversations that although he had fought the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, he, if elected, would not attempt to tear it Clown.22 
Those delegates who were shopping around for a candidate to 
support found in Willkie a man who was not afraid to state his 
opinions. Willkie's strategists not only attempted to reach the 
delegates through personal contact with the candidate, but they 
also launched an over-powering propaganda campaign to "assist" 
the undecided delegates in making up their minds. 
During the first two days the delegates were cornered 
by strangers who demanded that they vote for Willkie; were 
sent hometown newspapers which carried advertisements and 
editorials favoring Willkie's candidacy; were subjected to the 
gallery chants of "We Want \'lillkie;" and were deluged with 
telegrams from wives, friends, pastors, banks, and interested 
citizens calling for them to Sltpport Willk.ie .23 The petitions, 
telegrams, postal cards, and letters were addressed to the 
delegates personally; however, the entire procedure of obtain-
ing, sorting, and delivering the endorsements was administered 
by Willkie's supporters.24 
21Ibid., p. 149. 
22 8 Barnes, oR· cit., p. 1 o. 
23 11'J.1he Sun Also Rises, 11 Time, 36:12, July 8, 1940. 
2llBarnes, OP._. cit., pp. 178,185. 
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The delegates, both those who had made up their minds 
and those who were still undecided, were subjected to the 
propanganda barrage. The advertising men working for Willkie 
used their skills to sell Willkie to the delegates. 
III. THE THIRD DAY 
The agenda for the third day contained two major events 
of the convention: the presentation of the platform and the 
nominating speeches. The platform had been uppermost in the 
minds or many delegates because of the confusion over the 
structure of the foreign policy plank and the fight between 
the isolationists and internationalists on the committee draft-
ing the plank. The nominating speeches, demonstrations, and 
seconding speeches were likewise awaited with anticipation; 
for their reception by the delegates would indicate, to some 
degree, the comparative strengths of the candidates. 
While the delegates and the nation awaited these two 
major events, the candidates and their strategists moved to 
maintain their holds on the committed delegates and to capture 
the doubtful votes. Throughout the day, various delegations 
held caucuses to determine stands, analyze events, and plan 
strategy. All through the day the flood of telegrams and 
letters advocating \llillkie 's nomination continued to pour into 
Philadelphia .to be delivered to the delegates concerned. In 
addition, there were many rumors circulating throughout the 
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auditorium that new efforts were being made to halt the Willkie 
boom and that Hoover would spearhead such a move. Feeding the 
rumors was the fact that Taft, Vandenbe~g, Bricker, and James 
had each visited Hoover; but none of the individuals 
·mentioned offered any other reason for the meeting other than 
it had been a social call. Another anti-Willkie force at work 
was Frank Gannett, who declared in a press conference that the 
convention should nominate a Republican for the presidency.25 
It was also reported that no negotiations had been held 
for a Dewey-Taft deal because both candidates believed they 
possessed an excellent chance to capture t~e nomination. 
The report also revealed that neither candidate could 
"deliver" enough delegates to carry out a dea1.26 
The talk of deals and counter-deals was not the only 
manifesta tton of the grO\'ling pressure building up at the con-
vention. The anger and crittcism which greeted the first 
important item of business of the day, the presentation 
of the platform, stimulated a great deal of discussion as.to 
the "proper" candidate to run on the 19~0 Republican Platform. 
'l1he Republic~ Platform 
The platform was received with little applause and much 
25Lawrence E. Davies, "candidates Gird for Final Battle," 
New York Times, June 27, 1940, p. 1. [Italics mine_J . 
26James A. Hagerty, "A Night of Speeches," Net>l York Times, 
June 27, 1940, p. 4. 
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criticism. The party leaders felt that in order to achieve 
victory in the November election the platform had to indicate 
accurately the party's position on the issues of the day. 
There were, however, two factors which made this task 
·impossible: the immense popularity of the New Deal and the 
tense international situation. The committee had to decide 
which, if any, of the New Deal measures the G.O.P. should 
favor retaining and which to condemn. It was to be a very 
difficult task. 
The Resolutions Committee had used as the basis for 
the platform the 35,000-word report by Dr. Glenn Frank, and 
had met in the North Garden of the Bellevue-Stratford 
Hotel a week before the convention began to put the platform 
into final form for presentation to the delegates. They had, 
in addition to preparing an acceptable platform, the toughest 
problem faced by the party in twenty-four·years--the drafting 
of the foreign policy plank. 27 In attempting to work out the 
plank, the committee went into fourteen-hour se ss:i.ons; however, 
the task of attempting to satisfy the isolationist wing of the 
party without offending those who favored aid to the Allies was 
an impossible one. 28 
There were three courses of action open to the committee 
27"campaigns: The Story of Wendell Willkie," Time, 36:18, 
June 24, 1940. --
28"The Trumpets Blow," Time, 36:17, July 1, 1940. 
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in formulating the difficult plank. In the first place, they 
could denounce the President as a warmonger and go into the 
1940 campaign entrenched in the isolationist camp; however, 
this position would have embarrassed those members of the 
party who had endorsed the administration's foreign policy, 
. either wholly or partially. The second course of action was 
to support Roosevelt's position--all measures, short of war, 
to assist the Allies and all measures to promote national 
defense; however, by taking this position the party would have 
to repudiate support from the isolationists and would have 
to forget that a large measure of the reasponsibility for the 
weak state of the national defense system rested with certain 
isolationist Republican Congressmen who had opposed administra-
tion defense measures before the international situation had 
become critical. The last course of action was a compromise 
stand; however, this position would satisfy no one and would 
alienate all factions concerned.29 
The platform as a whole, and the foreign policy plank in 
particular, was received better by the delegates than by the 
press. Perhaps the delegates realized that the nominee which 
they would select on the following day would utilize only those 
planks which he considered useful or desirable in his campaign. 
The delegates, being politically wise, perhaps thought that it 
. 29charles Malcolmson, "Rites for the GOP," f'he Nation, 
150:748, June 22, 19~·0. 
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would not be good politics to criticize publicly all or part 
of the platform when it was presented to the assembled dele-
gates. Another possible explanation for the delegates' calm· 
reaction could have been a desire to get the platform 
accepted, so that the nomination procedure could be 
started; the speeches and the balloting were probably far more 
interesting to the delegates than the re-opening of the 
fight between the isolationist and internationalist factions 
of the party or of the arguments for and against the New Deal 
domestic policies. Had these arguments been voiced, perhaps 
the party would not have been subjected to.the abuse which 
they were to receive. It would be difficult to access the 
damage, if any, this criticism would have on the party's image 
among the electorate.3° 
~reported that the platform presented a foreign 
policy based on a "somersaulting weasel,rr31 and ~sweek told 
its readers that Landon had lost his fight to prevent the party 
from adopting an inelastic keep-out-of-war plank. Concerning 
the platform as a whole, the magazine stated that "seldom has 
a pblitical platform been so watered down with vague general-
lities and evasions."32 The Nat~<?E. declared, "There are more 
3°see APPENDIX C for Summarization of Platform. 
31"1'he Sun Also Rises," Time, 36:12, July 8, 1940. 
32"Voters' Drafting of Willkie Like Shot in the Arm to 
U.S.," Newsweek, 16:15, July 8, 1940. 
.---------- -------~-----
177 
half-truths, juggled figures, and stacked cards in this report 
than we can attempt to set straight in this editorial."33 
Life stated that the platform rehashed all the 1936 criticisms 
of the New Deal, then supported almost all the things the New 
Deal had done, promising vaguely to do them better. The 
foreign policy plank, according to Life, was neither isolation-
1st or interventionist, nor halfway between, but both at the 
sa me time. 34 
Stefan Lorant reported that the G.O.P. had adopted a 
platform which an eminent historian, not named, had called 
"a masterpiece of equivocation, evasion, ambiguity and genera 1-
ization," with a straddling foreign policy plank pledging the 
country to "Americanism, preparedness and peace," and promis-
ing the democratic victims of aggression "such aids as shall 
not be in violation of international law or inconsistent with 
the requirements of our own national defetlse."35 
Donald Bruce Johnson explained the poor reception of the 
platform in terms of the following three observations: first, 
the platform did not represent the true picture of G.O.P. 
opinion throughout the party; second, the American public 
realized that the campaign would be waged over much less broad 
1940. 
33"Frank but Not Candid," The ~ation, 150:326, March 9, 
34"Life on Newsfronts," Life, 9:20, July 8, 1940. 
35stefan Lorant, The Presidency: A Pictorial !'Iist<:>TJL of 
Presidential ~lections from ~aspington to Truman, p. 623. 
---------... - ... - -- ·- ----
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principles than the management of Roosevelt's reform programs; 
and third, the Republican party did not appear to be cognizant 
of the changing political significance of the European war and 
the growing importance of foreign affairs policies.36 
Another explanation concerning the formation of the 
foreign policy plank was reported by Newsweek. According to 
this theory, Roosevelt had sanctioned the use of American 
flyers to pilot planes to Halifax; had outlined a plan to draft 
the nation's youth; had sounded out friendly Congressmen on the 
possibility of declaring war on Germany and Italy; and had 
named Stimson and Knox, two avowed interventionists, to the 
cabinet--all measures designed to force the Republicans to 
draft a platform too isolationist for the country to swallow.37 
The most comprehensive analysis of the platform was that 
of a New Yor~ Times editorial of June 27; it was the only true 
analysis, showing both the assets and liabilities of the plat-
form. The editorial stated that although the current inter-
national situation was moving too rapidly for anyone to 
reasonably expect an explicit and forthright statement of 
foreign policy from either political party, the country had a 
right to expect a less politically minded approach to the 
36nonald Bruce Johnson, The Republican ?arty_ and Wendell 
WilHcie, p. 43. 
37ua 0 P Convention Aligns Party for Its Most Vital 
Campaign., u Newsweek, 16:27, July 1, 1940. 
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problem than the declaration that the Republican party stood 
for Americanism, preparedness, and peace and that the Demo-
cratic party had to bear full responsibility for the country's 
unpreparedness and for the consequent danger of involvement in 
war. The editorial declared that the argument did not stand 
examination, that the G.O.P. was not entitled to claim for 
itself superior virtue in preparedriess in light of the fact 
that a majority of its spokesmen in the Senate had opposed 
measures to provide 6,000 new planes for the Army, an increase 
in the battleship strength of the Navy, and the acquisition by 
both services of strategic war materials. The paper stated 
that the party could not call itself the "peace party" when 
the record showed that its representatives for twenty years 
opposed a system of collective security, the only institution 
that could have saved the peace of the modern world. Concern-
ing the aid to the Allies statement, the editorial expressed 
agreement in principle, but indicated that it was regrettable 
that the platform had not made the distinction between demo-
cratic and totalitarian belligerents clear, and that no mention 
was made of Britain's heroic stand or of the fact that our 
future secu.rity rested in her seapower. Also stressed in the 
editorial was the fact that the domestic sections of the plat-
form had not escaped the effort of the platform committee to 
conciliate every section and avoid or treat with ambiguousness 
the questions on which opinion within the party was divided. 
-----~~-~---··· 
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The Time's summation of the platform indicated that the 
document was more vigorous, sound, and outspoken than there 
seemed reason to hope for, that it made a true and telling 
indictment of many of the Nev.r Deal domestic policies--the 
President's power to manipulate. currency, the repea 1 of the 
Thomas Inflation Amendment and the Silver Purchase Act, the 
reform in the relief program, the revision in the Securities 
Act, the reduction of government competition--that the agri-
culture plank was vague, and that the plank on the tariff 
satisfied G.O.P. die-hards at the least sacrifice of common 
s~nse, leaving the candidate free to follow an enlightened 
policy~ The editorial closed with the statement that the 
party, under a fOl"thright leader standing on tb.e platform, 
could not fairly be -accused of lacking a p~ogram.38 
As the editorial pointed out, there were several out-
standing features of the platform; however, it would have been 
difficult to convince a m~jority of the press or the nation of 
this "enlightened" view. Democrats rid:i.culed the ambiguous-
ness of the platform; Republican conservatives denounced 
the acceptance of the new Deal reform programs; and Republican 
liberals condemned the foreign policy plank. The delegates_, 
popular acceptance, or rejection, of their platform; with the 
38"The Republican Platform," a New York Times Edi toria 1, 




type of candidate needed to carry the party's program to the 
people; and with the confusion ~nd furor surrounding the 
party's foreign policy stand. These concerns were temporarily 
set aside as the convention readied itself for the main event, 
the nomination of the candidate. 
~Nominations Beg n 
The last order of business on the third day was 
the placing of Dewey, Gannett, Taft, and Willk~e's names in 
nomination. The nominating and seconding speeches and the 
demonstrations which followed reflected, to a degree, each 
candidate's popularity with the delegates and galleries. 
John Lord O'Brian entered Dewey's name in nomination, 
but the demonstration which followed was disappointing to 
his supporters. In his speech O'Brian traced .Dewey's career 
as a racket-buster and recounted his vote-getting ability, but 
he and the candidate's managers had been caught flat-footed in 
arrangements for the demonstration. They had not expected 
Dewey's name to be placed in nomination so early, and 
many of his supporters had not reached the auditorium.39 The 
lack of bands in the hall detracted from the usual color of the 
demonstration; however, there was a great deal of shouting and 
cheering, and standards from at least twelve states joined in 
39James A. Hagerty, "A Night of Speeches," New York 
Times, June 27, 1940, p. 1. -------
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the parade.4° 
Gannett's name was placed in nomination by Representa-
tive James W. Wadsworth of New York, who characterized his 
candidate as a successful businessman and a victor in a fight 
with the New Deal. Gannett's demonstration was hampered by 
the lack of any considerable number of delegates, and the 
spectators who attempted to demonstrate were not permitted on 
the floor. 41 
Grove Patterson, edj_;t;or of The Toledo B'lade, delivered 
T~ft's nominating speech, in which he stated that the critical 
international situation demanded a candidate who possessed the 
equipment for leadership and that Taft's ability, education, 
training, and experience qualified him for the nomination. 
The demcinstration which followed was bette~ organized than the 
previous two, but the lack of bands again appeared to take 
some of the enthusiasm out of the parade.42 On signal the 
delegates participating in the demonstration jumped to their 
feet with placards, balloons, and standards; and a cheering 
section began shouting lf\\fe Want Taft." Instead of allowing the 
"pandemonium" die down gradually, Taft's managers cut i.t · off, 
40charles w. Hurd, "Candidates' Nominations Cheered in 
Lively Night Session," New~ f'il!l~' June 27, 1940, p. 2. 
41James A. Hagerty, "A Night of Speeches," New. :xork Times, 
June 27, 1940, pp. 1,4. 
42~., p. 4. 
a move which was very effective.43 
Willkie's name was put in nomination by Representative 
Charles Halleck of-Indiana, who departed from the traditional 
rules of nominating speeches to make a fighting address in 
which he virtually dared the convention to break precedent and 
nominate Willkie.44 The reaction to the speech demonstrated a 
differenpe of opinion over Willkie's candidacy, for there was 
booing from the floor and cheering from the galleries. 45 
Halleck began the speech with the following statement: 
If anyone were to ask me what job in this conven-
tion I'd like best to have I would choose the job I've 
got right now, I'd say I want to place in nomination 
before this great independent body the name of the nex46 President of the United States, Wendell Lewis Willkie. 
In the speech Halleck declared that 1:Jillkie was a man who under-
stood business, labor, and agriculture and that he would never 
make a deal to sell one of them out. To emphasize this point 
Halleck stated that " ••• it will be better to have a public 
utility President than a President who has no public utility."47 
43sidney M. Shalett, "Delegates Get Their Inning as Nomi-
nating Ora.tory and Demonstrations Begin," !i,e~'/ York !_im.~~, June 
27, 1940, p. 3. 
44charles W. Hurd, "Candidates' Nominations Cheered in 
Lively Nig.ht Session,"~ York Times, June 27, 1940, p. 2. 
45"The Sun Also Rises," Time, 36·:13, July 8, 1940. 
46charles A. Halleck, "vJendell \nllkie--A t.J!an Big Enough 
to Be President,n Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol VI, July 15~ 
191W, pp. 586-87. --- --
47 Ibid., p. 587. 
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He put forth Willkie as t6e man to fight the totalitarian 
threat, to preserve the competitive system, to free the 
country from the depression, and to build the greatest defense 
system in the world. Halleck declared that Willkie could win 
and that all America would back him.48 
. Before the delivery of the speech Halleck had wavered, 
and several of Willkie's managers were not sure that he would 
go through with it; Halleck wanted no part of the project if 
Willkie's candidacy proved to be unpopular. He had made no 
. arrangements for the Indiana delegation to lead off the demon-
stration, the customary procedure for the candidate's home 
state.49 The Willkie demonstration did get started, although 
fewer placards and standards were in evidence compared to 
Taft's or Dewey's demonstrations; and the galleries joined in 
with loud choruses of 11 \~e Want Willkie. u50 'l1he demonstration 
was also marked by several fights over control of state 
standards. Mayor Marvin and several other Willkie men in the 
New York delegation fought five Dewey men for control of the 
state's standard; and in the Virginia delegation the state's 
standard first went up, then down. The demonstration lasted 
48!bid., pp. 588-89. 
4gDillon, ££· cit., p. 159. 
50sidney M. Shalett, "Delegates Get The:i.r Inning as 
Nominating Oratory and Demonstrations Begin," £!~~York f'.~·.l!l~E._, 
June 27, 1940, p. 3. 
for twenty minutes and ended when the police moved in to 
break up the fights.51 
The seconding speeches for Willkie's nomination were 
made by Representative Bruce Barton of New York~ Govenor 
Ralph Carr of Colorado~ Governor Raymond Baldwin of 
Connecticut~ and Anne Stuart of Minnesota. The galleries and 
the delegates were quiet~ and it appeared to many observers 
that Taft~ on the basis of his demonstration~ had captured 
the nomination.52 
After the session Colonel R. B. Creager~ a member of 
the Texas delegation and a Taft floor leader~ declared that 
the Committee on Arrangements had packed the g·alleries with 
Willkie supporters. Investigations disclosed that the com-
. mittee headed by Samuel Pryor had issued thousands of special 
admission tickets~ which were good for the June 26 session 
only. Creager claimed that Pryor had issued the tickets; 
however~ the latter could not be reached for comment at the 
time.53 As the time for balloting approached, the campaign-
ing had be.come more intense; the pressure was building. 
IV. THE FOURTH DAY 
On the fourth day of the convention the delegates accom-
5lnrrhe Sun Also Rises, 11 Time, 36:13, July 8, 1940. 
52Ibid. 
53New York Times, June 27, 19J.W, p. 3. 
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plished their major duty, the nomination of the party's 1940 
standard bearer. Through the first three ballots Willkie 
trailed Dewey and Taft, and through the next three ballots 
the situation was reversed as the appeal of the Willkie candi-
dacy continued to grow and win converts from the delegates; on 
the sixth ballot the appeal snowballed and gave Willkie the 
nomination. 
Earl,y on the fourth day Iowa's MacNider was placed in 
nomination by Verne Marshall, editor of ~ Cedar Rapid~ 
Gazette; Michigan's Vandenberg by Representative Roy o. 
Woodruff; !~lew Hampshire's Bridges by Representative Foster 
Stearns; OI•egon 's McNary by W1lliam A Ehwall; Pennsylvania's 
James by Senator James J. Davis; and South Dakota's Bushfield 
by Gladys Pyle, the first woman to deliver·a nominating 
speech.54 The convention adjourned at.2:50 P.M., to reconvene 
at 4:30 P .. M.55 
At 4:50 P.M. the fight began as Alabama cast seven votes 
for De;.'ley and six for Taft. The political experts felt assured 
the~ knew the eventual outcome of the first ballot, and they 
were fairly confident of the second. They reasoned that Dewey 
would receive approximately 377 votes on the first ballot, with 
Taft picking up about 250 and Willkie getting about 100. On the 
54charles vl. Hurd, "Crucial IJ'est for Presidential Candi-
dates Began in Balloting at Night Session," Ne\v York 1'1mes, 
June 28, 1940, p. 3. 
55u~'he Sun Also Rises," Time, 36:13, July 8, 1940. 
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second ballot 1 it was reasoned, Dewey would slip a little;: 
Taft would increase his vote to 300 1 and Willkie would get up 
to 150. The experts, in their predicticns, believed that. 
after the second ballot, it would be anyone's battle.56 The 
first two ballots did proceed according to "plan;" however 1 
the experts soon realized that they had over-estimated Dewey's 
and Taft.'s strength and had under-estimated Willkie 's. 
On the first ballot Dewey received 360 votes, trailed 
by Taft with 189, Willkie with 105, Vandenberg with 76, ~mes 
with 74, Martin with 44 1 Gannett with 35, MacNider with 34, 
Hoover with 17, and McNary with 13. The Taft men were shocked 
at the results; the galleries were delighted~ and they cheered 
every Willkie vote.57 In the balloti~g Willkie had received 
.votes from twenty-four states, including all of Connecticut's 
sixteen, nine from Indiana, and eight from New York.58 
On the second Ballot Dewey dropped to 338; Taft gained 
to 203 1 and Willkie increased to 171. Willkie had picked up 
a few votes from the Pennsylvania delegation and had votes 
scattered in twenty-six delegations, including nine votes from 
Maine, eight from Massachusetts, and thirteen from Missouri. 
Of the other candidates, only Hoover showed an increase. 
56Ibid. 
57Ibid., pp. 13;.,14. 
, 5f\~evr York r.I.'in~~' June 28, 1940, p. 4. 
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Vandenberg dropped to 73 1 Gannett to 30, James to 66, McNary 
to 101 and Martin to 26; MacNider held on to this 34, and 
Hoover gained to 21.59 The convention adjourned at 
6:50 P.M.1 to reconvene at 8:30 P.M.60 
During the recess floor managers worked to strengthen 
their lines and to persuade favorite son supporters and others 
to swith their votes. States held caucuses in hideaways all 
about the auditorium. It was reported that, despite appeals 
from Willkie and Taft men, Kansas had resolved to support 
Dewey on the third ballot and that Pennsylvania had decid.ed to 
stay with James. The Willkie forces reportedly had made a 
great many converts within the New York delegation during the 
recess; however, Taft appeared to be the candidate to beat.61 
On the third ballot Willkie picked up steadily all along 
the line. New Hampshire's delegation was released by Bridges, 
and six delegates went over to Willkie; Massachusetts was 
released by Martin with the same results--t\<Ienty-·eight voted 
for Willkie, and the galleries went wild. New York split, 
and twenty-seven delegates joined the Willkie forces; fifteen 
Pennsylvania delegates left James and took the same route.62 
59rbid. 
60 "The Sun Also Rises," Time, 36:14, July 8, 1940. 
6lTurner ca.tledge, "Republicans Nominate Wendell Willkie 
for the Presidency on the 6th Ballot," Ne\'1 York Time~, June 281 
1940, p. 5. 
62nillon, op. c~., p. 161. 
On the ballot Willkie received votes from thirty-four states 
and picked up, in addition to those mentioned above, Arizona's 
six, Delaware's six, and ten from Maryland. The results 
showed Dewey with 315, Willkie with 259, Taft with 212, 
Vandenberg with 72, James with 59, Hoover with 32, MacNider 
with 28, Gannett with 11, and McNary with 10.63 
·--~~~~----------------------------
The fourth ballot was considered to be crucial because 
it would mark the release of a portion of Dewey's support and 
it would test Willkie's and Taft's second-choice strength. On 
the ballot Taft picked up twenty-seven Illinois votes, while 
Willkie received votes from thirty-six states, including thirty-
five from New York, twenty-three from New Jersey, and fourteen 
from Maryland. The.results showed that both Taft and Willkie 
·had gained at Dewey's expense. Willkie led the balloting with 
306, followed by Taft with 254, Dewey with 250, Vendenberg with 
61, James with 56, Hoover with 31, MacNider with 26, McNary 
with 8, and Gannett with 4--the favorite son support continued 
to break down. 64 
The. fifth ballot was adjudged to be significant in that 
it would indicate willkie's ability to hold his own and win. 
The tension was high; and there was a great deal of pressuring, 
with floor managers collaring delegates and appealing to their 
63New York Times. June 28 1940 p 4 , ' J • • 
6!~Ibid. 
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sense of reason. 65 c. Nelson Sparks, Gannett's campaign man-
ager, revealed later that between the fourth and fifth ballots 
Willkle turned down two offers of support from Taft men, one 
in exchange for a cabinet post and the other for a agreement 
on an individual to run in the number two spot on the ticket. 66 
On this ballot Dewey and the remaining favorite son candidates 
lost heav11,Y to Taft and Willkie, \\Tho both gained 123 votes. 
The results showed Willkie maintaining his lead with 429 votes, 
followed by Taft with 377, James with 59, Dewey with 57, 
Vandenberg with 49, Hoover with 20, McNary with 8, MacNider 
with 3, and Gannett with 1, In the balloting Taft picked up 
z thirteen votes from Iowa, ten from New York, eighteen from 
Oklahoma, $even from South Dakota, all of Kentucky's twenty-
two, all of Louisiana's twelve, and all of Washington's six-
teen. Willkie, possessing votes from thirty-nine states, 
received all of Kansas' eighteen, all of Maine's thirteen, 
seventeen .from Illinois, twenty from Indiana, nine from Oregon, 
nine from South Carolina, and seventy-five from New York. 67 
The switch of forty additional votes to Willkie from New York 
was a blo1·1 to Taft's chances. 68 After the balloting, many 
65 11"1'he Sun Also Rises," !!_mJ:_, 36:14, July 8, 1940. 
66Barnes, op. 21!·, p. 184. 
67New J~r~ Times, June 28, 1940, p. 4. 
68-''Voters 1 Draftlng of WilJ.kie Like Shot .in the Arm to 
U.S:.," ~ei.•rs~k, 16:13, July 8, 1940. 
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political experts expressed the belief that if Joseph Pew had 
released the fifty-one James' votes to Taft to offset the 
New York votes, the v:illkie boom could have been halted; 69 
however, Pew did not switch, and the boom continued. 
During the fifth ballot a rumor that Dewey was coming 
to the convention hall to withdraw in favor of Taft spread 
through the auditorium, causing some delegates to refrain from 
switching to Taft and Willkie. The rumor changed as the sixth 
ballot began, revealing that Dewey would not appear in person, 
but would telephone his announcement.7° These rumors repre-
sented only part of the political maneuvering which took place 
between the fifth and sixth ballots. Governor Bricker tl~ied 
to arrange a recess in order to stem the Willkie boom, but 
Chairman Martin announced that since no majority had been 
attained, the sixth ballot would be taken.71 (According to 
one source, Willkie had asked one thing o~ Martin, and that 
was if the tide was going for him, he would not recess; Martin 
promised and kept his woro.)72 
Before the sixth ballot was taken, Vandenberg's campaign 
manager, Howard C. Lawrence, announced the release of the 
69 . 
Lorant, o~. cit., p. 626. 
70charles W. Hurd, "crucial Test for Presidential candi-
dates Began in Balloting at Night Session," New York ~imes, 
June 28, 1940, p. 3. 
71Lorant, 2£• ~., p. 626. 
72Johnson, .2£· cit_., N., p. 98. Csource withheld.:] 
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Michigan delegation.73 The delegation went into caucus; and 
Stassen went to Leo E. Anderson, the leader of the California 
deleg.atio:n., to have that state poll their delegation to give 
Michigan time to complete the caucus. Hamilton and Pryor 
moved continuously from the floor to the platform to inform 
Stassen as to who was weakening and who might switch.74 During 
this inte.rlude Hamilton was shocked at Willkie 's promising the 
Michigan professionals they could choose the Federal Judgships 
in their state in exchange for their support.75 
As the sixth ballot began, it appeared that Willkie had 
run ·out his spurt; he was barely holding his ovm. He was a 
few votes ahead when the ballot reached Michig-an; Lawrence 
announced that a poll of the delegation had been completed and 
that the state cast one vote for Hoover, two for Taft, and 
thirty-five for Willkie. The Michigan vote put Willkie within 
sixteen of the goal; it was now up to Pennsylvania, but the 
state passed.76 Minutes later, at 1:01 A.M., Washington's 
vote gave ltlillkie the monimation. At that time ex-Senator 
David A. Reed of Pennsylvania seized the microphone and shouted 
that the ,state's seventy-t~tio votes were cast for vlillkie, but 
73·"The Sun Also Rises," Time, 36:14, July:8, 1940. 
74ni1lon, op. cit., p. 164. 
75Ibid., p. 166. 
761'urner Catledge, "Republicans Nominate \'lendell Hillkie 
for the Presidency on the 6th Ballot," New York ,Times, June 28, 
1940 J p. 5. 
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the statement came too late; Willkie had already gone over 
the top and Bricker was already mounting the platform to move 
that the nomination be made unanimous.77 The vote of the 
sixth ballot was never officially totaled because so many 
states shifted at once to Willkie; however, the unofficial 
totals were as follows: Willkie 659; Taft 312; Hoover 9; 
Dewey 8; MacNider 3; and Gannett, Martin, and James 1 each. 7 
The vote was made unanimous at 998 because two delegates were 
absent from the hall, 79 and the announcement of the nomination 
was greeted with a "mighty roar" from the galleries and the 
floor. The convention hall was quiet during the losers' con-
gradulatory speeches and remained so as the galleries and 
. . . 80 
delegates filed out at the end of the session. 
V. THE FIFTH DAY 
During the anticlimactic fifth day· the convention chose 
Senator McNary for the second spot on the ticket, a choice 
which was both hailed and criticized. After the balloting, 
Y.lillkie broke with tradition by appearing before the assembled 
delegates to make a statement. 
77"The Sun Also Rises," Ti~, 36:14, July 8, 1940. 
78~ew York Times, June 28, 1940, p. 4. 
79Turner Catledge, "Republicans Nominate 'tlendell Willkie 
for the Presidency on the 6th Ballot," New York Times, June 28, 
1940, p. 1. ---
8°sidney M. Shalett, "Ballot Shifts Kept Convention 
Tense," New York Ti~, June 28, 1940, p. 2. 
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Be.rore the delegates met to nominate Willkie 's running 
mate, the candidate held a press conference with nearly 300 
newspaper and magazine correspondents and editors at the 
Warwick. During the course of the interview Willkie stated 
that he ltlould resign his position with Commonwealth and 
Southern; that he believed the major issues of the campaign 
would be national unity, rehabilitation of the nation's 
economic system, and buildup of the defense system; that he 
would accept the nomination and would make a hard fight for 
election; that he would go to the White House to confer with 
Roosevelt; that he woL~ld stand on the 1940 Republican party 
platform; that he favored the contributions limitations set 
down in the Hatch Act; that he would not choose his running 
mate, but that the convention would do it; ·that there was no 
basis for the belief that he was an inte~ventionist; and that 
he had f'irst thought of campaigning for the presidency on May 
11, when he accepted the invitation to speak before Republican 
leaders in Minnesota. 81 Willkie appeared to be a candidate 
who \•lould 11bare his soul" before the press; he provided his 
questioners with direct answers to their inquiries. 
When the delegates met to choose the vice-presidential 
candidate., there appeared to be little doubt as to whom the 
delegates wanted for the position; for they nominated Oregonts 
81James A. Hagerty, "Willkie Approves Platform, Opposes 




McNary on the first ballot. It was reported that he had 
decli~ed to seek the nomination at_first, but bad later stated 
that he would accept if the convention wanted him. In the 
balloting McNary received 890 votes to 108 for Dewey Short of 
Missouri, who, after the results were announced, moved to make 
the vote unanimous; McNary bad been drafted. 82 
MqNary, the Senate Minority Leader, was a supporter of 
public power, a westerner, a life-long Republican, and a 
seasoned politician; and many party leaders felt that there 
was no better man in party to help Willkie meet the problems 
he would encounter in Washington. 83 This opinion of McNary as 
Willkie 's running rna te was not unanimous. Many Republi.cans 
pointed out that the Senator had been anti-Willkie during the 
.fight for the presidential nomination; that he was pro-public 
power, while Willkie had been the chief spokesman against 
public power; that McNary had voted against the repeal of the 
arms embargo, while Willkie bad declared himself in favor of 
aid to the Allies; and that McNary had been a consistent and 
vigorous a~vocate of "high protection," while Willkie had 
supported the reciprocal trade treaties. A New York Times 
editorial recounted the feelings of those who opposed McNary 
because of such inconsistencies on the ticket by declaring 
June 
82Turner Catledge, "Senator Drafted," New Yor~ Times, 
29, 1940, p. 1. 
83"Good Soldier," Time, 36:16, July 8, 1940. 
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that the best that could be said about the situation was that 
the office of vice-president was of comparatively little 
importance in policy determination. 84 
After the convention had chosen McNary, the delegates 
and spectators waited to see if their ne'\1/ly selected champion 
would break tradition and appear before them; they were not 
disappointed. Willkie's entrance triggered a "deafening shout" 
and wild cheering, and each assertion in his statement brought 
about another ovation.85 Adding to the color and excitement 
of the occasion was the introduction of what was to become 
Willkie's campaign song. It was written by Ray Ghent and 
Eleanor and Donald J. Smith, and the music was from Walt 
Disney's "Snow \fuite:" 
Heigh-ho, heigh-ho, its back to work we go, 
With Wendell Willkie leading us 
The jobs will grow. 
Heigh-he, heigh-ho, heigh-ho, 
We've all been feeling low, 
But Willkie's hand will save the l~nd, 
Heigh-ho, heigh-ho. 
Heigh-ho, heigh-ho, its back to work we go, 
With Willkie's plan the New Deal sham 
\vlll have to go. 
Heigh-ho, heigh-ho, heigh-ho 
The fact we want to know; 
Wyn has no fear, he'll make. things clear, 
Heigh-ho, heigh-ho. 
84 11 !-'Ir. Ivi'Nary--A Poor Choice," a New York Times Editorial, 
June 29, 1940, p. 14. -- --
85sidney M. Shalett, "Willkie Breaks Party Tradition by 
Personal .Appearance Like Roosevelt's in '32," Nevi Yor~ Time~, 
June 29, 1940, p. 3. 
Heigh-he, heigh-ho, its back to work we go, 
With confidence restored again 
Defense will grow. 
Heigh-ho, heigh-ho, heigh-ho, 
We've all been worried so, 
But Willkie's fight will us unite, 
Heigh-ho, heigh-he. 
Heigh-he, heigh-he, its back to worl<: \"le go, 
The people's voice expressed their choice, 
The vote will show. 
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,c___~~-~~-~-;ire-i-gh -h-o-,---1-re-tgh -h-o-,-hei-gh--ho-,,----------------c----~== 
\~e want the world to know .. 
That Wendell Wil.lkte
8
is the man 
We want. Heigh-ho! 6 
In his statement before the delegates Willkie declared 
that he had not come to diSCI.lSS principles, but to thank .the 
delegates and to express his appreciation. He stated that 
democ~ricy was facing its crucial test and that the United 
States was the last untouched foothold of freedom in the world; 
he pledged to wage a·crusading, aggressive, ancl fighting cam-
paign to bring unity to America--to bring unity to labor and 
capital, to the worker and the farmer, and to all classes--in 
support of the great cause of the preservation of freedom. In 
calling on the delegates to join in the crusade, Willkie made 
an a rna teur 's mistake, the first of many he \'Wuld make before 
the campaign's conclusion in November; he stated, 11 And so, 
you R~publicans, I call upon you to join me, help me. The 
cause is great. · \tle mt1st wi.n. We cannot fail if we stand 
together in one united fight."87 ·It was a thoughtless remark 
8~ew ~Time~, June 29, 19110, p. 4. 
87~ Yor~ 'l'im_~E' June 29, 19L10, p. 3. Crtalics mine_:7 
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and aroused the old doubts. 88 While the doubters were left 
to ponder the psychological implications of the remark, 
Republicans, Democrats, and the world were expressing their 
reactions to the nomination and seeking to explain its cause. 
VI. THE COIVJ.MENTS .AND THE EXPL.AN.A TIONS 
The comments on Willkie's victory and the explanations 
concerning its cause reflected the magnitude of the political 
upset. Both were given freely as the nation and the world 
came to realize what had transpired. 
The comments issued by the Republicans clearly, and 
qu:lte naturally, pointed out that Willkie's campaign would 
prove to be a good one and would put the party back into 
control of the natiol). Dewey declared that Willkie v-1ould make 
"one hell of a good campaign." Taft's comments took on a more 
scholarly tone as he foresaw the Willkie victory restoring 
government based on reason, common sense, and business prin-
ciples. Hoover, quite optimistically, declared that Willkie 
would be elected just like that--a snap of his fingers. 89 
Landon applauded the nomination, stressing the importance of 
Willkie's foreign policy stand on aid to the .Allies.9° 
u.s.,n 
88 Dillon, ~· cit., p. 173. 
89"voters' Drafting of Willkie 
Newsweek, 16:17, July 8, 1940. 
Like Shot in the .Arm to 
90New York Times, June 28, 1940, p. 3. 
Vandenberg stated that the nominee had captured the imagination of 
the American people and that he would put his shoulder to the 
wheel to wo~k for Willkie's election. Gannett stated simply that 
the convention had selected Willkie and that he would work for 
him. Bridges remarked that the delegates had made an admirable 
choice and aQ_pealed to all members of the party to get 
together behind their candidate.91 
The Democratic party leadership regarded the nomi-
nation as beneficial to their chances to win the election. 
Roosevelt 1 s only public statement on the Willkie victory was 
that he v;.ould be glad to see vlillkie if the latter felt 
inclined to come to the White House to discuss international 
rela tion;s; however, Far· ley and Ickes revealed more specific 
reactions. Farley declarid that the nominition greatly clar-
ified the issues before the nation--which would contr•ol the 
nation: the historic American processes Ol"~ the new and some-
what foreign methods of concentrated control? Ickes declared 
that Roosevelt would be nominated, giving the people 
the choic,e between a man with_ experience in public affairs, 
possess1ng strength and training in international relations, 
and a man without experience except as a clever lawyer and-
succe ssf'ul public utili ties hold:!.ng company repre senta ti ve. 92 
91Lawrence E. Davies, "Fight for VJillkie Pledged by 
Losers,'' Ne\'!. York Times, June 29, 19~~0, p. 3.-
9~New Yor~ Time~, June 29, 1940, pp. 1,3. 
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Ickes was not so positive about the outcome of the election 
in his diary, for in it he wrote, "Nothing so extraordinary 
has ever happened in American politics. ~·93 In his analysis 
of the candidate's chances, Ickes recorded that Willkie was 
an attractive, colorful, ana utterly unscrupulous character 
ana that it would not be easy to defeat him, especially with 
Senator McNary on the ticket.94 
On the humorous side, Henry L. Mencken saw the 
Philadelphia events as representative of a miracle: 11 At one 
time I actually saw an angel in the gallery reserved for 
Philadelphia street railway curve-greasers. To be sure, the 
angel had on a palm beach suit, but nevertheless it was 
clearly an angel. n95 Damon Runyon de clare a, "vle are the 
fellow who aid not di~cover Willkie. rr96 
The reaction across the sea reflected the political 
position of each country. The Italian New Agency stated, 
"The fact that Willkie isn't a professional politician aug-
ments the probability of a Republican victory at the coming 
elections. rr97 The Frankfurter Zeitung. pictured vlillkie as a 
93Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 
Vol. III., Tl}~ Lowering CloUds, 1939-m-;- p:- 221-.--
u.s.," 
94Ibid. 
95Barnes, ~· cit., p. 174. 
96"Willkie in Print," Time, 36:53, July 8, 1940. 
97rrvoters' Drafting of Willkie Like Shot in the Arm to 
Newsweek, 16:18, July 8, 1940. 
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dynamic personality who could successfully oppose Roosevelt 
and his appalling domestic and foreign policy.98 The Hamburger 
Fremdenbl.a·tt reported that Willkie was not a professional 
politician, but .a businessmen; the paper also concluded that 
because tbe Republicans chose the latter type of candidate, it 
seemed to indicate that the electorate was fed up with party 
slogans and shibboleths.99 Reuters, the British news agency, 
declared that the news of the nomination brought pleasure to 
the belea:guered island, especially in light of all the isola-
tionist sentiment at the convention. It was also reported 
that Briti;sh newspapers ran headlines such as "Aid Britain Man 
to Run ror Presidency~ and VAllies Supporter to Fight for 
United States Presidency."lOO 
Not all of the comments were of a light nature, nor were 
they all congradulatory or optimistic. After the convention, 
the nation's political analysts and writers sought to explain 
the nomination to their readers and to one another. They 
attempted to evaluate the event and pinpoint the cause or 
rea son 1.vhich enabled Willkie, the utili ties executive, to 
capture the Republican nomination. 
The New York Times declared that the Republicans had 
98Ibid. 
99New York Times, June 29, 191W, p. 4. 
lOOibid. 
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put up the best candidate at their command, a man who stood 
head and shoulders above his rivals for the party's favor. As 
for the cause of the "miracle," the newspaper reported that the 
talk of "utility money" making the show of public opinion and 
influencing the delegates was quietly dismissed as nonsense by 
both the public and the delegates. The editor:Lal stated that 
the nomination had obviously sprung from the spontaneous wave 
of public sentiment, that as the seriousness of ~the war 
increased and as its implications regarding a threat to the 
United States grew, popular sentiment developed from virtually 
nothing to amazing proportionso The announced candidates, the 
Times stated, attempted to follow public opinion instead of 
lead it, advocating an ostrich-like isolation policy, while 
· Willkie declared that Britain and France constituted Amerj.ca 's 
first line of defense. The delegates knew that the flood of 
letters and telegrams and the shouts of the galleries was not 
part of a manufactured demonstration, but the spontaneous out-
burst of the feelings of the rank and file. 101 
Arthur Krock also attributed the nomination to the 
spontaneous public demand. He stated that democracy bad worked 
at a time when triumphant war machines had been erected on its 
ruins in nearly all the rest of the world. Krock labeled the 
nomination a "miracle" because it had been accomplished in the 
lOl"Political Miracle," an Edltorlal in the New York 
Times,June 30, 1940, IV, p. 8. -.- --
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face of powerful obstacles: Willkie had never held public 
office and had conducted no primary campaign; he had been 
identified as an utilities executive and a director of a Wall 
Street bank; and he had to defeat two strong professional organ-
izations possessing impressive commitments. Against these 
obstacles and every political device his opponents could bring 
to bear, Willkie rose to victory on the back of a wave of 
public support, manifested in th~ action of the galleries--
which only reflected a vast national gallery--and a deluge 
of telegrams, letters, and calls. There was no kingmaker 
involved in the Willkie nomination. 102 
Jonathan Mitchell, writing in J.he Ne__! Reeublic, also 
a1•gued that the verifiable petitions signed by fom• and one-
half million voters, plus the telegrams, contributed signifi-
cantly to the Willkie victory; however, he reported that they 
had not been the result of spontaneous support for the candi-
date, but of a carefully planned political maneuver. Mitchell 
reported that the Associated Willkie Clubs and the Willkie 
Mailing Committee had initiated the petitions, collected them, 
and had insured that they were dellvered to the appropriate 
delegates and that the entire processing had been administered 
through an office in Philadelphia. Mitchell also indicated 
that support from a group of politically-oriented businessmen 
l02Arthur Krock, "Nomination of Willkie Like a Revolution 
Here," New York Times, June 30, 1940, IV, p. 3. 
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and from several Southern delegations contributed to Willkie's 
successful bid for the nomination.l03 
Robert Bendiner, writing in The Nation, attributed the 
nomination to the Republican's attempt to make up for the lack 
of a sound political program •. He asserted that the confused 
G.O.P. platform--supporting national defense, but not the NevJ 
Deal's administration of the defense programs; collective bar-
gaining, but with a toned-down Wagner Act; and relief, but not 
the New Deal's "graft-ridden" programs--and the isolationist 
foreign policy stands of Dewey, Taft, and Vandenberg forced 
the Republican party leaders into an impossible situation: 
they had been caught between their hostility toward the candi-
date, and their mistaken confidence in their ability to stop 
him, and the strength of his appeal and the swiftness of the 
Willkie drive. 104 
Raymond Moley, writing in Newsweek, stated in his 
analysis of the nomination that it had not been the gallery-
inspired third ballot switches, the popular enthusiasm for 
Willkie, nor the illusion that the candidate was a great 
natural and could survive even serious political mistakes 
which had effected the phenomenal event. According to Moley, 
103Jona than rlli tchell, . "How They Won with Willkie' II The 
New Republic, 103:48, July 8, 1940. 
l04Robert Bendiner "Grand Old Paradox," The Nation, 
151~6, July 6, 1946. · ' 
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a partial explanation was that the Republican party had 
realized that they could not have won with any of the other 
candidates. He declared that the vote ~witching had been 
gradual, accomplished by delegates whose reason told them that 
the peculiar circumstances of 1940 demanded a new kind of 
candidate. The flood of petitions and telegrams served to 
indicate the surge of public opinion; but, according to Maley's 
analysis, the newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts did 
more to educate the delegates of the vastness of the Willkie 
appeal and materially influenced their reasonable selection of 
the nominee.l05 
Denis Brogan also believed that the nom:tnation had not 
been the result of a spontaneous political movement or of 
Wi1lkie's advanced position on aid to the Allies, but that it 
had resulted from the realization by the voter~ and, slowly 
and reluctantly, by the delegates that it ~las essential to 
have a candidate who was positive about something. 106 
J. C. Furnas ·saw in the Willkie nom5.nation a revolt 
against the old-line politicians, a revolt representative of 
the idea that amateur spontaneity could lick professional 
efficiency every time. The people had been responsible for the 
l 05Ra ymond Moley, "Perspective: A Clear Ca 11," News"!_eek, 
16':56, July 8, 1940. 
106Denis VI. Brogan, "The American Election," The Politlcal 
~uarterl~, Vol. XI, No. 4, p. 332, October-November,-r940. 
J· 
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Willkie boom and the resulting nomination, not the influence 
of money, business, or political organization. 107 
Luther A. H~ston, writing in The Living Age, also came 
to the conclusion that the convention had not been bossed by 
the political powers within the party, but by the voices from 
the gallery and from the floor. He pictured the nomination 
as being more representative of pure democracy than any other 
in a political generation. 108 
In an editorial, The New Republic attempted to refute 
the "official" theory concerning the nomination: that the 
plain people had asserted themselves over the will of the 
machine politicians. This theory, according to the magazine, 
was erroneous because the nomination had been one of the most 
skillful professional publicity jobs the country had ever seen. 
Russell Davenport, the ex-managing editor of Fortune; Robert L. 
Johnson, the publisher of Promenade, a foUnder of !ime, and a 
promotional expert; Fred Smith,. a publiclty expert from the 
firm of Selvage and Smith; Harry M. Shakleford, the Advertis-
ing manager of the Johns-Manville Corporation; Steve Hannagen, 
a publicity expert; and Ned Stevenson and Associates, counse-
lors on radio relations, had all been instrumental in presenting 
1°7J. c. Furnas, "Who \'!ants Willkie?" The Saturda~ 
~-vening_ Post, 213:12, November 2, 1940. - --
l08Lutber A. Huston, "Political Parties Choose Generals," 
The Li::~ ~ge,. 359:20, September, 1940. 
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Willkie to the delegates. In the performance of their task, 
according to the magazine, they suppressed the picture of 
Willkie the New Yorker, utilities executive, and Wall Street 
lawyer and built up the picture of a small-town boy from 
Indiana. 109 
Wendell Willkie had come to the Republican convention 
with a large pubiic following, riding the crest of a boom; 
but his candidacy had not been taken seriously by many pro-
fessional politicians of the party because he had few delegate 
votes and no political organization. He had, at best, only 
a slight chance of capturing the nominat:i.on, and that chance 
was contingent upon a deadlocked power struggle between Dewey 
and Taft. In addition, there were several other dark horse 
candidates in a much better position to gain strength in a 
deadlocked convention because they possessed both delegate 
votes and political organizations; howevet, it was Willkie who 
emergedas the Republican nominee, and the accomplishment of 
that feat represents one of the greatest stories in American 
political history. The opinions as to the prime cause of the 
phenomenal event differ widely; the question remains: how 
was Willkie able to overcome the obstacles to his nomination 
and become the Republican standard bearer? 
109 ··~~ho Wanted lNillkie? 11 Th~ Ne~ ~epublic, 103:105, 
July 22, 191~0. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
The explanations which have been advanced since the 
Willkie nomination attempt to affix its cat1se on certain events 
occurring during the Spring of 19~0; however, the authors of 
these theories have glossed over essential factors in their 
general sweep of the subject. Willkie's nomination did not 
result from the spontaneous surge of public opinion; the band-
ing together of the nation's businessmen; the support of the 
Sottthern delegations; the attempt to make. up for a paradoxical 
platform; the grassroots revolt against the professional 
politicians; the reactions of the galleries; the flood of 
telegrams, letters, telephone calls, and postal cards; nor the 
result of a professional publicity job. Each of these proposed 
explanations represents only a part of the total picture; 
collectively they still represent only a partial explanation. 
The authors of these explanations have neglected the most 
important factor--the attitude of the individual delegate and 
his ultimate decision. 
As the convention opened the main topic of conversation 
was Willkie's spectacular dark horse challenge. His boom had 
contributed to the uncertainties pervading the convention 
because he had risen in the polls from nowhere to the second 
position in party popularity, and he had obtained the support 
209 
of the larger metropolitan areas and the business and financial 
interests of the Eastern Seaboard~ In addition, Willkie's 
supporters had publicized the fact that the boom had continued 
to spread throughout the nation at an ever-increasing rate. 1 
His managers proclaimed that the impetus behind the boom was 
the man himself, and the reporters covering the pre-convention 
Republican campaigns concurred that a large measure of the 
candidate 1 s popularity could be attributed to his personal cam-
paign appearances and his unappeasable stands as a foe of the 
New Deal domestic policy •. Willkie's chance for the nomination 
depended on a deadlocked convention; however, the great 
question in ever~one's mind was wh~ther he could translate the 
tremendous surge of public opinion into delegate votes; this 
was the key to the nomination. 
It is the contention of the study that the European war 
triggered a reaction among the rank and file of the party which 
resulted in a switch in their support from Dewey to Willkie; 
the latter's nomination resulted from the delegates' realiza-
tion that such a switch had occurred and that the party needed 
a vote-getter of Willkie's caliber and popular appeal. 
I. WILLKIE AND THE RANK AND FILE 
An integral factor in Willkie's nomination was the great 
1Turner Catledge, "Willkie's Rise Puts G.O.P. in a 
Dilemma," New York Times, June 16, 1940, IV, p. 6. 
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amount of popular support granted to the candidate. S.ince it 
was this support which finally persuaded the delegates to 
switch to Willkie, it is essential to subject the formation 
of this rank and file support to careful analysis. 
The Republican party's defeat in 1936 resulted ·in a 
shake-up of the G.O.P. organization. Under the guidance of 
Chairman Hamilton, the Republican l~adership rebuilt the party 
structure and were successf~l in staging a political comeback 
in the Congressional elections of 1938. In these contests the 
Democratic party lost ground in thirty-six of the forty-six 
states they had carried in 1936; in twenty-seven of the states 
the G.O.P. gains amounted to a five per cent increase or more. 
The Republicans captured eleven Senate seats, 169 House seats, 
eighteen governorships, and control of both state houses in 
nineteen states. The public opinion polls published dtwing 
the Spring of 1939 predicted that the G.O.P. would captu~e the 
White house in 1940, although they reflected that the vote 
would be close. The Republican party was given New England in 
the polls, while the Democratic party was granted the South 
and the West. As the popular support for the opposition party 
grew, the members of the party became satiated with the desire 
to win in 1940. This prayer for a winning ticket grew in 
inten~ity as one went down the scale in the party. 2 
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This desire, most prevelant among the rank and file, 
stimulated the search for "a man on a wh;tte horse," a vote-
getter who would free the nation from Roosevelt and the New 
Deal. The first beneficiary of this attitude was Dewey, who, 
because of his vigorous prosecution of the rackets in New 
,.__ ____ _:=Yc-=co=r=k'-----'"'C=i__,_,ty, led in the public opinion polls of G.O.P. voters 
f1•om January, 1939, to Late June, 1940. In February, 1939, 
the Gallup Poll showed that he led other Republicans in par•ty 
popularity, obtaining 27 per cent of the vote to Vandenberg's 
21 per cent (his nearest rival); how~ver, 50 per cent of the 
G.O.P. voters indicated that they were undecided at that time. 
As a direct result of further crime-busting successes, Dewe~1's 
percentage had, by Niarch, increased to 50 per cent of the 
.Republican party popularity vote to 15 per cent for Vandenberg 
and 13 per cent for Taft. In the August polls Dewey still led 
all comers with 45 per cent, with Vandenberg increasing to 25 
per cent and Taft to 14 per cent; but 44 per cent of G.O.P. 
voters remained undecided as to their choice for the party's 
1940 standard bearer. Up to this point in the race for the 
nomination, ~he central issue had been the New Deal's domestic 
failures; hm'l'ever, in September the European war began, and 
its effect on the American political scene was far-reaching. 
The first apparent affect of the war was to be seen in 
the public opinidn polls. Taft had announced his candidacy in 
August, and his percentage in the popularity poll should ~ave 
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been affected as a result of the increased publicity;.how-
ever, the war news overshadowed his entrance and held his 
popularity index down. The war caused more serious repercus-
sion~ within the party. In early October Taft declared that 
the G.O.P. was bound to become the peace party in 1940; and 
Representative Hamilton Fish of New York, an isolationi~t, 
announced that he would enter the race if the candidates.con-
tinued to "soft-pedal" the importance of remaining neutral. 
The war also affected the Republican race by cutting 
down Dewey's popularity and by elevating Vandenberg's and 
Taft's. By October, Dewey's popularity had dropped to 39 per 
cent, while Taft's had risen to 17 per cent and Vandenberg's 
·,to 27 per cent; the undecided vote had dipped to 37 per cent. 
·.It may be noted that whenever Dewey's vote dropped during 
the period from January, 1939, to May, 1940, Vandenberg's 
rose correspondingly and Taft's remained virtually constant. 
This trend appeared to indicate that the rank and file, when 
deserting Dewey, preferred Vandenberg to Taft. Dur•ing r-ia y and 
June of 19~0, when Dewey's percentage again decreased, it was 
Willkie, not Vandenberg, who was the recipient of the switched 
support, while Taft's and Vandenberg's vote remained unchanged. 
The rank and file had decided to tqrow support behind a more 
experienced candidate immediately after the start of the war; 
however, after Vandenberg had been soundly defeated by Dewey 
in the primaries, he lost his place as the second choice of 
the rank and file. When the international situation 
deteriorated during the Spring of 1940, it was Willlde, not 
Vandenberg, who benefited from the desertion from the Dewey 
camp. 
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A partial explanation for Dewey's loss of support 
following the outbreak of war could be attributed to the fact 
that many G.O.P. leaders reportedly opposed h:Ls candidacy 
because they believed ·that his youth and inexperience would 
detract votes from the party in light of the tense interna-
tional crisis. The outbreak of war also affected the undecided 
· vote; for in August, 1939, the percentage had been 44 per cent, 
but the October poll indicated that it had fallen to 37 per 
cent. The war had forced many of the rank and file to make 
up their minds; this fact, plus the desertion of a considerable 
amount of De\'ley • s support, increased Taft 1 s and Vandenberg 1 s 
popularity. 
The war also had repercussions within the Democratic 
party. In November, 193p, 62.5 per cent of the electorate 
approved of the President; however, by December of 1938 this 
popularity i~dex had fallen to 55.5 per cent. In the after-
math of the Republican congressional victories of 1938 
Roosevelt's popularity again began to rise, 58 per cent in 
January, 1939, to 63.5 per cent by March. From this point, 
F.D.R.'s popularity again took a nose-dive, falling to 58.8 
per cent by May to 56.6 per cent by August; however, the out-
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break of .the war in Europe shattered this downward trend. By 
November, 1939, Roosevelt's popularity had risen to 62.7 per 
cent. The inroads which the G.O.P. political orators had made 
into the President's popularity during the period March to 
August of 1939 had been offset by the Roosevelt surge follow-
ing the declaration of war; however, all was not well within 
the ranks of the Democratic party. The party was in a state 
of confusion throughout 1939 because the President had refused 
to reveal his plans for 1940. His silence on the third term 
decision continued into 1940, and the Democratic presidential 
aspirants.were effectively blocked from entering the race for 
the Democratic nomination. 
The war also changed the political ~ituation between 
the parties by producing mass insecurity and the desire "not 
to change horses in mid-stream," thus elevating the Democratic 
party to the position of first choice amotlg the nation's 
electorate. In November, the polls indicated that 54 per cent 
of the electorate had indicated a preference for a Democratic 
victory in 1940; in April of 1939 the polls had reported that 
52 per cent preferred a Republican victory. 
Another extremely important effect of the war was the 
manner in which it had affected public opinion on the third 
term issue. F.D.R. had artfully dodged the issue throughout 
1939, and certain sources in the adminstration had reported 
that Roosevelt would. lose his power to conduct policy were he 
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to make any announcement relative to the third term decision. 
\'lhile the nation waited for his answer, the polls showed that 
sentiment .favoring a third term was on the increase. In 
March, 1939, only 31 per cent of the nation's voters favored 
a third term; by May it had increased to 33 per cent.· In 
August the Gallup Poll reported that 52 per cent of young 
Democratic voters had expressed themselves in support of the 
third term; however, the poll also indicated that only L!8 per 
cent of all Democratic voters held such an opinion. A survey 
of· all voters published during August revealed that L!O per 
cent of the nation's electorate favored a third term, repre-
senting an increase of seven per cent in three months. This 
increase in the pro-third term sentiment occurred at a time 
when Roosevelt's popularity was dropping from 63.5 per cent 
in March to 56.6 per cent in August. It was apparent that as 
the Republican campaign against the New Deal's domestic policy 
gained support from the nation's voter~, F.D.R. 's popularity 
dropped; and the rank and file Democrats began to look on the 
President as the man to save the party in 1940. The pro-third 
term sentiment increase resulted from the increased Democratlc 
support. Another Gallup Poll conducted during this pre-war 
period indicated that 48 per cent of all voters thought F.D.R. 
would attempt to secure a thlrd term, and L15 per cent believed 
that he t.·muld be successful; however, in September, after the 
outbreak of war, the poll showed that 48 per cent of the voters 
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approved o£ a third term--an increase of eight per cent after 
the war had begun. By November, after the initial shock of 
the war had passed, the pro-third term sentiment dropped down 
to 43 per cent; however, the Gallup Poll reported that four 
out of every five Democrats favored the third term. 
These changes in the political situation following the 
outbreak o~ war did not remain in force--the war continued to 
produce changes. After the initial impact following the decla-
ration of war--October through December, 1939--the nation's 
political scene underwent another series of alterations. 
In the Republican race the undecided vote moved from 37 per 
cent in January, 1940, to 36 per• cent in February to liQ per 
cent in March, representative of a trend which seemed to 
indicate that some reservations were held by the party mem-
bers as the war news filled the headlines. Dewey's popularity 
increased from 39 per cent in October to 60 per cent in 
January; however, after reaching this percentage, his vote 
again started to decrease, falling to 56 per cent in lt,ebruary 
to 53 per cent in March. During these first three months of 
1940, Taft'.s popularity rema1nea rather constant, although his 
popularity had dropped during the last months of 1939. 
Vandenberg dropped from 27 per cent in October to 16 per cent 
in January to 19 per cent in March--statistics which seemed to 
indicate t.ha t the pro-Vandenberg trend of September-·October 
had been halted after the initial shock of the war's beginning 
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wore off. The impact of the war cut into Dewey's popularity 
ana elevated Taft's and Vandenberg's; however, after this 
initial reaction, the situation was back as it had been in 
August, except that Dewey was stronger ana Vandenberg was 
weaker. Almost immediately Dewey began to lose strength; 
however, Vandenberg's popularity increase during these first 
months of 1940 indicated that he was not receiving the cast 
off Dewey support to the degree which had characterized the 
earlier trend. The war and the realization of the situation 
within the Democratic party stimulated a segment of the rank 
and file .to again survey the field of candidates for a new 
vote-getter to run under the new political conditions. 
Inthe Democratic party the aftermath showed no such 
drastic reversion back to the pre-war situation; the trend set 
into motion after the outbreak of the war continued to develop. 
In January the polls reported that 78 per ~ent of the 
Democratic voters preferred F .D .R. in 1940~ and in Febt•uary 
they reported that 64 per cent of the nation's electorate 
approved of the President. The pro-third term sentiment had 
been 43 per cent in November; however, by February the vote 
had increased to 46 per cent. There was a reversion in this 
sentiment, for the vote favoring the third term had dropped 
from 48 per cent in September to 43 per cent in November. The 
trend did not continue; the percentage again began to rise. 
An interesting development almost unnoticed was that the 1940 
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increase in the pro-third term sentiment accompanied a corre-
sponding rise in the President's popularity. The earlier 
growth of this sentiment had been attributed to the G.O.P. 
attacks; the new increase resulted from the international 
crisis. The February Gallup Poll also indicated that 52 per 
cent of all voters thought Roosevelt would attempt to secure 
a third term and that 60 per cent believed that he would be 
successful. By March the polls showed that the pro-third term 
sentiment had increased to ~7 per cent and that 55 per cent 
of the electorate favored a Democratic victory in 19~0. The 
President was firmly in command of his party, the party 
favored to win the election. F.D.R. refused to withdraw his 
name from the eleven primary contests in which his supporters 
had entered his name. His silence effectively halted the 
booms of the potential Democratic candidates and prevented 
the Republicans from having a distinct target upon which to 
craw a bead. 
The changes in the political situation following 
September, 1939, as well as those occurring during the fi.rst 
months of 1940, did take away a measure of the optimistic 
attitude which had pervaded the G.O.P., but the rank and file 
would not, nor could not, be counted out of the race. The 
Gallup Poll showed that even though the Democrats held a 55 
per cent to 45 per cent edge in national popularity, in some 
states, possessing sufficient electoral votes to sway the 
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election, the vote had been calculated to be extremely close. 
The G.O.P. went into.the primary contests knowing that the 
fortunes of politics could change at any time. The rank and 
file, though with reduced enthusiasm and support, continued to 
back Dewey's candidacy, believing that in him they had their 
best bet to win in November. In the primaries Taft avoided 
a direct confrontation with Dewey; however, Vandenberg and 
Gannett met the front runner head-on and were effectively 
eliminated from serious contention and consideration by the 
rank and file. As a result of his primary successes and his 
Western campaign tour, Dewey's popularity among the rank and 
file again inc1•ea sed. In the mid-r.'Iay Gallup Poll Dewey 
received 62 per cent, compared to Taft's 14 per cent and 
Vandenberg 's 13 per cent; hmvever, a new fj_gure had, by this 
time, entered the race. Willkie had scored less than 1 per 
cent in the t-1arch polls, but had increased' to 3 per cent by 
April and 5 per cent by Mid-May. The Willkie boom had 
started among the rank and file. 
During the pre-primary and primary campaigns Dewey, 
Gannett, and Taft had concentrated on domestic issues when all 
the nation had expressed concern over the tense international 
. situation. Taft had declared that there existed no immediate 
danger to the United States if Britain and France fell to the 
Nazi army and had warned that Roosevelt would become an all-
powerful leader in such a situation. This neglect of 
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foreign a.ffair.s would come back to haunt these candidates.· 
After the primaries Dewey held a commanding lead; in 
addition, the undecided vote had dropped to 32 per cent by 
May, indicating that more of the rank and file had found 
in Dewey a vote-getter with which to d~feat the Democrats. 
This situation was soon to change, for by late May Dewey's 
popularit~ among the rank and file had fallen to 56 per cent, 
while \<J'illkie 's bad risen to 10 per cent. Vandenberg's and 
Taft 1 s per.centages remained virtually unchanged. vHllkie 
appeared to be moving at a very rapid pace, detaching vdtes 
from Dev1e.y and grabbing off the remaining undecided votes. 
This chan,ge represented one of the dramatic repercussions 
evolving out of a change 1.n the course of the European war. 
·' The conduct of the war from September, 1939, to .April,, 
19'-4-0, has been labeled as the pel~iod of the "phony war" 
because only an occasional skirmish took place, both on land 
and on sea. The change in the war situation occurred on the 
day of the Illinois primary, ironically the date of one of 
Dewey's great primary viqtories---victories which had boosted 
his popularity from 53 per cent to 62 per cent and which 
placed the rank and file in his pocket as the champion vote-
getter. On that date Germany invaded Norway and Denmark; 
later, in early May, the Nazi war machine roared into the 
Lm·llands. The German offensive caused another round of 
changes in the United States political situation. 
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In the Democratic party the trend which had placed 
Roosevelt in the position of accepting the nomination or of 
naming his successor continued to devel~p after the German 
invasion. Before the escalation of the war, 47 per cent 
of the electorate favored a third term; after the invasion 
57 per cent expressed.the desire to have F.D.R. continue in 
office. In addition, 91 per cent of the Democrats and 8 per 
cent of the Republicans favored a third term. This change in 
public opinion was significant because the April primary 
results had indicated that the President would have a difficult · 
time in a third term attempt. The anti-third term vote given 
Garner plus the Republican vote in their primaries showed a 
near even split in publ:I.c sentiment over the third term. The 
April Gallup Poll also indicated that if the election were held at 
that time, its results would be close; the poll reported that 
in seven states the split between the two parties was 51 per 
cent to 49 per cent. 
In the Republican party the end of the "phony war" 
caused Dewey to lose the support of the rank and file, 
just as he had following the outbreak of the war in 1939. 
The defection from the Dewey camp was not the result of 
the activity or influence of the "Stop-Dewey'' movement because 
this group had attempted to stop the Dewey boom through 
their contacts with state party leaders and delegates, not the 
rank and file. Their attack on Dewey's youth, lack of larger 
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governmental experience, and inconsistant foreign policy stands 
did not af:fect the candidate's standing in the polls, The 
derection was not caused by the arguments of the party con-
servatives because their philosophy was not accepted by the 
rank and file in their desire for a vote-getter. When 
J--~~~~~V,._,an_denberfl' s ·chances were elipsed by Dewey in the primaries, 
he demonstrated to the rank and file that he was not the 
vote-gette.r for which they had been seeking; therefore, they 
apparentl~ discarded any thoughts of supporting the conserva-
tism of Vandenberg or Taft in favor of a potential vote-getter. 
Vandenberg stated that he had found amazing concern 
throughout the rank and file over the new development in the 
war; the press reported that Vandenberg's utter neutrality 
stand no l,onger had its appeal.3 In Taft's campaign, local 
Republican leaders informed the candidate that there was over-
whelming sympathy for the .Allied cause, a further indication 
that the isolationist stands were not popular. In addition, 
the Gallup Poll revealed that a rna jori ty of the electorate 
favored aid to the Allies. Taft did not heed the advice and 
continued his conservative, near isolationist, stand and con-
centrated on domestic issues. He further hurt his chances to 
gather the support of the rank and fiie by declaring that he 
opposed aid to the Allies on the grounds that it would be 
cowardly for the nation to send aid without sending men; he 
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did not move in the popularity polls. 
By mid-June, Dewey had dropped from 56 per cent to 52 
per cent, while Willkie's popularity had increased from 10 per 
cent to 17 per cent during the same period. Taft's popularity 
also dropped, falling from the 16 per cent held in mid-May to 
13 per cent; Vandenberg maintained his 12 per cent. It was 
apparent that Willkie was receiving the support of those 
members of the rank and file who were either undecided or who 
had supported Taft and Dewey. The final gallup poll, released 
on June 21, revealed that Dewey's vote had dropped to 47 .Per 
cent, a decrease of five percentage ppints in nine days. Dur-
ing the same period, Willkie's vote rose to 29 per cent, an 
increase of 12 per cent. Taft and Vandenberg lost heavily in 
these nine days: Taft dropped from 13 per cent to 8 per cent, 
and Vandenberg fell from 12 per cent to 8 per cent. The 
strength of the Willkie boom had certainly manifested itself 
during the closing stages of the pre-convention campaigns; the 
Indianan had somehow captured the imagination and support of 
the rank and file of the Republican party. 
Willkie's metoric rise in the public opinion polls 
resulted from two factors: first, the change in the course of 
the war put him in the position of possessing the soundest 
Republican foreign policy stand; and second, the formation of 
agencies for the distribution of his program to the rank and 
file. Prior to the Nazi invasion of April-May, 1946, Willkie 
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had achieved a measure of recognition as a critic of the New 
Deal domestic_policy; however, he possessed no organization to 
promote his candidacy, for he was not even a declared candi-
date. Willkie's condemnation of the Roosevelt administration's 
failure to solve the nation's economic problems attracted the 
interest o:r a young New York lawyer, Oren Root, Jr., who 
decided to, examine the possibility of running Willkie for the 
presioency •.. On April 11, 1940, Root announced that he had 
mailed· out nearly. 1,000 "declarations" to individuals through-.. . 
QUt the qottntry to sample the public SUpport.for his "candi-
date;" ara,p by April 15, he was able to report that he had 
•"i'>f•i' ' 
received.J:>rders for 20,000 "declarations." Late in April Root . ·;}.: ~. 
. . 
opened a~;¢ampatgn headquarters in New York from which pamphlets, 
.•( 
petitions, and buttons were sent to interested parties from 
· .. ·' 
coast to coast. By the er:-d of April Root declared that 200,000 
Americans had signed the "declarations" expressing support for 
.. 
Willkie; the boom was on, without the candidate. 
When Davenport, the Cowles, Luce, and the Retds joined 
the boom, Willkie's program reached millions of people through 
the newspap;er meaia; in addition, the formation of \'/illkie-For-
President clubs brought the candiaate's economic and political 
philosophles to still more people. By his own admission, he 
became a candidate late in May \vhen he accepted an in vita tion 
to meet \'lith Governor Stassen and other Republican leaders in 
Minnesota. It was during this period that the American 
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political system was attempting to recover from the impact of 
the Nazi invasion; Willkie began to gather support as his 
ideas became publicized in an intense propaganda campaign. 
Willkie Clubs and Willkie-For-President clubs sprang up all 
over the nation, and by June it was reported that the latter 
organizations numbered nearly 500 and were growing at a rate 
of twelve new clubs per day. It was also reported that the 
clubs had distributed 350,000 ca~paign buttons and 150,000 
copies of pamphlets explaining the candidate's program and 
that an estimated four and one-half million persons had 
signed the "declarations" calling for Willkie's nomination. 
The electorate, especially the rank and file Republicans, 
were being given the word. 
Basically, \'lillkie's appeal rested with his "liberal-
conservative" political philosophy: he supported Roosevelt's 
foreign policy, including aid to the Allies, and he condemned 
the New Deal domestic policy. He explained this rather 
contradictory program by declaring that the country would be 
endangered by offering the electorate a choice bettJeen two 
half-rotten apples in November: one supporting the correct 
domestic policy and the ~rong foreign policy, while the other 
represented the opposite. Instead of taking the Taft stand 
against aid to the Allies, a stand to which Dewey had become 
committed during the primaries and a stand to which Vandenberg 
had devoted years to defending, Willkie stated that Britain . 
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and France constituted America's first line of defense and 
that aid to the Allies was the most effective way to keep the 
nation out of the war. While the other .Republican candidates 
concentrated on domestic issues during May and June, Willkie 
was declaring that the war represented a threat to the United 
States foreign trade unless the country protected its European 
markets by aiding the Allies. The public op:l.nion polls 
indicated that Willkie's message was reaching the Republican 
rank ahd file; however, he was still far behind the front 
runners. 
The flood of petitions coming into the Willkie head-
quarters and the incredible growth of the clubs indicated that 
millions of the Republican rank and file had found their vote-
getter; however, Dewey still led in delegate strength, followed 
closely by Taft. As the center of attention focused on 
Phlladelphia, it was apparent that opinions within the party 
were split. The delegates, possessing the responsibility for 
the nomination, would vote according to the commitments of 
the pl"imary victories and prom:l.ses of support given to Dewey, 
Taft, and others. On the other hand, the rank and file had 
chosen another candidate; but, unfortunately for Willkie, they 
would have no vote in the convention. They could only attempt 
to influence the delegates to their way of thinking; for in 
order for Willkie to w:l.n, the delegates had to be persuaded 
that Willkie was the only candidate the Republicans could name 
c: __ 
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who had a chance to defeat Roosevelt or his chosen successor 
during the international crisis. Others also recognized the 
strength and appeal of the Willkie candidacy and sought to 
deflate the build up of popular sentiment for Willkie by 
emphasizing that he possessed no organization or delegate 
strength, that he had too many political liabilities, and that 
he could not possibly win either the nomination or election. 
II. THE STOP-VIILLKIE GROUP 
Under normal circumstances Willkie probably would not 
have been nominated because he would have been stopped by the 
methods of the professionals who opposed his candidacy; however, 
under the peculiar circumstances of 1940, their usual methods 
had little effect on the boom. Just as the "Stop-DevJey 11 move-
ment failed to dissuade the rank and file from Dewey when the 
latter's popularity was at its height, so then did the profes-
sionals fail to halt the delegates from switching to Willkie. 
The methods they employed were an appeal to partisan-
ship, emphasizing Willkie's conversion to Republicanism; an 
attempt to block his candidacy by matching his appeal against 
Dewey's personality and prior vote-getting ability; an effort 
to overcome the Willkie tide with Taft, stressing his strong 
Republican background and firmness of conviction; and, finally, 
an effort to construct an old-fashioned combination of the type 
which had been used in the past to weed out political intruders 
,----~---------------------- ·--
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or other individuals not wanted by the professionals •11 The 
Willkie forces countered the appeal to partisanship by empha-
sizing the character and importance of some of the Willkie 
converts, notably Governors Baldwin and Stassen; they effec-
tively blocked the combination--the group of twenty-one Cong-
gressmen from the Northwest who issued the statement that they 
would not attempt re-election were Willkie nominated--with the 
recruitment of Governor carr of Colorado and other important 
Western Republican leaders. The whisper campaigns against 
Willkie's business connections, utilities affiliations, and 
Wall Street influence were partially nullified by Willkie's 
personal conversations with the delegates and his public 
declarations that he was proud of his bcisiness associations. 
His supporters concentrated the issue by stating that a busi-
nessman's sense and ability were needed to right the nation's 
economy, to run the government on the pro~it side. All these 
attempts to block Willkie's chances failed· because the dele-
gates would not stand for it; they demonstrated their 
independence by thinking for themselves. They had always 
stood for it in the past; the situation was unique.5 
Throughout the convention period there were rumors that 
the "Stop-Willkie 11 forces planned to block his candldacy with 
4Arthur Krock, "Willkie Credited for Own Victory," New 
York Times, June 28, 1940, p. 1. 
5rbia., p. 6. 
... ~· 
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a Taft-Dewey combination; however, it was also reported that 
each front runner believed himself to be in a position to gain 
the nomination on his own and would not accept the second spot 
on the ticket and that the combination could not be effected 
because neither could deliver his support to the other.· 
The growth of Willkie's pre-convention boom represented 
an expression of the rank and file's enthusiastic support, 
support '\'Ihich had not yet been translated into delegate votes • 
.After the "Stop-Hillkie" movement failed in its attempt to keep 
the boom confined to the rank and file, Willkie's message was 
able to reach the unbossed delegates. 
III. THE WILLKIE .APPEAL AND 1~E DELEGATES 
The explanation of the cause of the delegates' switches 
to Willkie during the balloting rests on the premise that the 
political situation which existed after the Nazi invasion of 
the Lowlands created a body of delegates who were susceptible 
to the persuasive appeal of the rank and file and the Willkie 
campaign forces. As a result of their combined arguments the 
delegates slowly realized that Willkie was the best candidate 
they could nominate. 
Jhe S~'?~.Etibilij:;z of the ~).:.~ff.a.te.:?_: Before t~ Conventi<?E_. 
As active members in the G.O.P., the delegates felt the 
same desire for a winning ticket as did the rank and file; hmv-
ever, the change in the course of the war did not have the same 
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dramatic r.eprecussions among the delegates because they did 
not~ and could not~ switch as rapidly as the rank and file. 
Commitment.s placing support behind other candidates prevented 
the delegates from joining the popular movement for \IJillkie, 
even if they had so desired. It was easier to leave the 
DevJey camp and to sign a Willkie petition or join a Willkie 
club than it was to go back on promises of pledged support 
based on primary victories, favorite son considerations, or 
promises ·Of jobs or favor-s. 
The Nazi invasion and the resulting confusion within 
the Republican party during the Spring of 194'0 produced 
attitudes of anger, frustration, and anxiety within the party 
structure. The immediate effect of the outbrea l{ of the \'Jar in 
September, 1939, was a reversal of the nation's public opinion 
as to wh~ch party should lead the nation. Even with this 
change in public opinion, it was believed that the election 
would be close and that the G.O.P. still had a chance with a 
strong candidate, a vote-getter. The flare-up in the Spring 
of 1940 dealt this optimistic sentiment a severe blow because 
it a ssu:red the nomination of Roosevelt, or his carbon copy 
choice, and placed the Democratic party in excellent position 
to continue the New Deal administration. To win, the 
Republicans needed a strong candidate and program; in order to 
have even a slight chance, they had to put up the strongest 
candidate at their disposal. The question as to the identity 
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of this candidate and as to the problems involved in candidate 
switching contributed to the frustrated state of the delegates. 
Public opinion polls had indicated that an isolationist 
candidate and program could have a difficult time gaining 
public support during the tense international situation because 
a majority of the nations' voters had shown sympathy for the 
Allies and favored the granting of aid to assist them in their 
fight. This prevailing opinion only added to the difficult 
decision-making task of those delegates who 'lt'lere pledged to 
support candidates who had taken near or outright isolationist 
stands on foreign policy issues. 
The strong position held by the President and the Demo-
6ratic party also contributed to the breakdown of G.O.P. opti-
mism. By the time the delegates assembled.in Philadelphia, the 
polls had indicated that Roosevelt was the overwhelming choice 
of the rank and file Democrats, that the Democratic party held 
a commanding 54 per cent to 46 per cent lead over the Republi-
cans in national popularity, that a majority of the nation's 
electorate expected F.D.R. to seek a third term and be success-
ful in the attempt, and that the opposition to the third term 
had melted away with the deterioration of the international 
situation. By late June, Roosevelt, whose ~arne had been entered 
in eleven primary contests, had amassed over 700 pledged dela-
gate votes, nearly 200 more than the needed majority. It was 
obvious that the President could either secure the nomination 
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for himself or could dictate his successor. In either event, 
the Republicans were sure to face a candidate defending the 
New Deal, advocating a strong internationalist foreign poli.cy, 
and running under the banner of the majority party. 
The Stimson-Knox appointments, coming as they did just 
before the opening of the Republican convention, deepened the 
anxiety of the delegates. Roosevelt's maneuver triggered a 
revival of isolationist sympathies as G.O.P. leaders read the 
two Republicans out of the party and as the platform subcom-
mittee composing the foreign policy plank s~t about putting 
the party firmly in the isolationist camp with an anti-inter-
-- natlonalist program. The increase in conservatism was figured 
to hinder vlillkie 's chances for the norriina tion since he was 
:generally considered the most internationally-minded G.O.P. 
candidate; but after the initial impact of the isolationist 
revival, the Willkie boom regained its los£es and continued to 
grow. The final Gallup Poll, published on the same day as the 
appointment announcement, showed that Dewey had dropped to 47 
per cent, while Willkie had advanced to 29 per cent, demonstra-
tive of the fact that Willkie's support among the ra.nk and file 
had continued to increase. The great question facing the dele-
gates during this wave of isolationist sentiment was whether an 
isolationist candidate and program could defeat Roosevelt or 
his duplicate during an international crisis. The question 
had to be resolved, and there was not much time in which to 
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accomplish it. 
The Susceptibility of the Delegates: At the Convention. 
The delegates were to get no relief from the frustra-
tion surrounding their decision when the convention opened. 
During the pre-balloting days, event after event combined to 
first days of the convention, the reporters indicated that the 
delegates were unruled and unbossed, that they appeared to be 
shopping around for a candidate and a program. It was during 
this period that Dewey liberalized his foreign policy stand by 
declaring that he favored sending surplus materiel to the 
.Allies and that he favored the Stimson-Knox appo:l.ntments, 
positions which were near reversals of his earlier stands. 
While Dewey's new stands were being evaluated by the 
roaming delegates, events were taking shope which were to con-
found further the delegates' decision-making efforts. From 
the opening of their convention headquarters, Taft and Dewey 
supporters confidently issued statements of their candidates' 
pledged and promised delegate strength, with Dewey's forces 
predicting 400 to 450 votes, and Taft's 300. These attempts 
to effect a bandwagoning movement to elicit support from 
favorite son and unpledged delegates represented another factor 
which the delegates had to consider. Further problems resulted 
from the internal struggle between the isolationist and inter-
nationalist factions of the party; for, on one handJ it had 
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been reported that the platform subcommittee construction the 
foreign policy plank was leaning toward the isolationist 
viewpoint after the Stimson-Knox appointments, and, on the 
other hand, Governor Stassen's keynote address·called for 
support to the Allies and supported the appointments. This 
basic ideological difference of opinion· threatened to split 
the party wide open at a time when unity was absolutely 
essential for victory at the polls. The delegates would have 
to take: into account these two philosophies and choose the 
candidate and program most likely to be accepted by the 
.American poeple. 
The pressure began to mo~nt during the second and third 
days of the convention. The "Stop-vlillkie" forces issued 
statements and presented arguments explaining why, in their 
opinionsJ Willkie could not defeat the Democrats at the polls; 
off-setting this persuasionJ Willkie's newly established cam~ 
paign committee and the amateur organizations attempted to 
demonstrate why, in their opinions, Willkie was the only 
Republican candidate who could win. vJillkie 's forces and the 
candidate himself made a concerted effort to reach all the 
delegates, even those who were pledges to support the others 
in the race for the nomination. By the second day Willkie bad 
had personal interviews 1·lith 600 delegates, during 11hich he 
presented his views on both foreign and domestic issues and 
answered questions and challenges on his stands. His men 
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cornered delegates on the streets, on the convention floor, 
and in the hotels and sought to obtain their support with a 
variety of arguments, nearly all of which were based on the 
strength of the Willkie boom spreading throughout the nation. 
They emphasized Willkie's rising percentage in the public 
opinion polls, the efforts of the 50,000 volunteer workers in 
the hundreds of clubs and the conversion of Governors Stassen 
and Baldwin and other Republican leaders to the \'lillkie cause. 
Further evidence of Willkie's popularity was presented to the 
delegates by using the "sales promotional" technique of t.he 
testimonial, supplying the delegates with solicited ana 
unsolicited letters, telegrams, postal cards, newspapers, ana 
telephone calls from their local areas calling for Willkie's 
nomination. This double-edged campaign of explaining the candi-
date's stand on the issues ana of emphasizing the strength ana 
magnitude of his popular support to effect a bandwagon-type 
swing to Willkie did not immediately convert large numbers of 
delegates; the results of the campaign would be seen in the 
actual balloting, with the gradual defection from favorite son 
delegations and Dewey-held delegate votes. After the first 
ballot, delegates began to exercise their independence ana join 
the Willkie band\'mgon. This switching \'las so gradual that it 
probably caused the professionals to under-estimate the 
strength of the Willkie appeal; by the time they realized what 
was happening, it was too late. 
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On the first ballot Willkie trailed Dewey by 255 votes 
and Taft by eighty-four; but, he had received votes from twenty-
four delegations, including Connecticut's sixteen, nine from 
Indiana, and eight from New York. On the second ballot Willkie 
picked up nine from Maine, e:Lght from Massachusetts, and 
thirteen from Missouri and had votes in twenty-six delegations; 
however., he trailed Dewey by 167 votes and Taft by thirty-two. 
The third ballot results gave Willkie six from New Hampshire, 
twenty-eight from Massachusetts, twenty-seven from New York, 
fif'teen from Pennsylvania, six from .Arizona, six from DelevJare, 
and ten from Maryland; \-Jillkie had votes from thirty-four dele-
gations. , On this ballot \~ilJ.kie trailed Devw-y by fifty-six 
votes and led Taft by forty-seven. The fourth ballot saw Taft 
pick up t\•Tenty-seven votes from Illinois and Willkie pull in 
thirty-five from Nel'l York, tvwnty-three from New Jersey, and 
fourteen from Maryland; hov,Iever, the results v-1ere about the 
same as on the third. Willkie, possessing votes from thirty-
six delegations, led Dewey by fifty-six votes and Taft by 
forty-eight. .After the fourth ballot De~·.;ey 's support faded as 
the delegates began to line up behind Taft and Willkie; the 
fifth ballot demonstrated the effectiveness of the Willkie cam-
paign strategy. On this ballot Willkie obtained support from 
thirty-nine delegations and led Dewey by 372 votes and Taft by 
fifty-two; Willkie needed only seventy-two votes to win. The 
anti-Willkie forces' attempt to recess the convention to arrange 
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a deal had failed, but Taft was not out of the race by any 
means. The sixth ballot results were never made official 
because after the Michigan caucus gave Willkie thirty-five 
votes, state after state joined the bandwagon and Governor 
Bricker moved that th~ nomination be made unanimous; the 
finger had been removed from the dike, thus releasing an ever-
increasing amount of support for the candidate who had staged 
.an amazing political upset. 
Willkie 's nomination resulted from a comb:tnati"on of 
events beginning with the dramatic change in the course of the 
Etwopean war and concluding with the conversion of the dele-
gates to the Willkie cause. The rank and file Republicans 
demanded a ne~v,. exciting, and colorful candidate to bring 
"order out of chaos," to return the country to the influence 
of the G.O.P. philosophy. Before the Nazi invasion of April-
May, 1940, Dewey was the candidate selected by these grass-
roots Republicans because he had successfully met the require-
ments believed essential.for victory. The end of the "phony 
wai' 11 necessitated a re-assessment of the criteria for the 
selection of the 1940 nominee; and under the new circumstances, 
many members of the rank and file came to the conclusion 
that Dewey's isolationist tendencies represented a handicap 
to the party's chances, rather than an asset. The search for 
a candidate to meet the new criteria, a candidate who opposed 
the New Deal domestic program and who possessed a sound foreign 
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policy stand, led many of the rank and file to the liberal-
conservatism of Wendell Willkie. 
Willkie's liberalism manifested itself in his rather 
vocal support of much of the New Deal's reform legislation and 
his endorsement of the President's policy of aid to the Allies 
as the nation's first line of defense against totalitarianism. 
These liberal stands did not make Willkie a spokesman for 
American liberalism, for in his political philosophy existsd 
a belief in the laissez-faire approach to the relationship 
of government to businessJ of government to the individual. 
Willkie opposed government regulation of business and of a 
citizen's total life; he condemned the adminstration's severe 
taxation and vast spending programsJ decla~ing that they had 
the effect of restricting America•s·industrial capacity. This 
liberal-conservatism attracted the rank and file because it 
represented a logical and reasonable apprdach to the problems 
facing the nation in the Spring of 1940; such an approach was 
needed to attract the independent voteJ needed to capture the 
White House. 
The conversion of the rank and file was only one step 
in the nomination of Wendell Willkie; for the nomination rested 
not with the rank and fileJ but with the delegates to the con-
vention. The defection of this Republican body to the HilJ.kie 
cause resulted from frustration over the state of the inter-
national situation} the fear of facing Roosevelt during a 
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crisis 1 ana the indecision resulting from the change in the 
requirements of a winning candidate. The Willkie strategy of 
exposing the delegates to his program and of demonstrating the 
strength of the \'lillkie appeal among the rank ana file effected 
the gradual defection from the dynamic Dewey and the tactical 
TaftJ promulgating a race to get on the Willkie bandwagon. 
A:fter the nomination, a check of delegates from five 
states made by The Editorial Research Reports indicated that 
fifty per cent of the delegates switched to Willkie because of 
personal conversations with the candidate, while twenty per 
cent indicated that they had been swayed by discussions with 
,, fellow aelegates.6 'I'he delegates had come to the convention 
with confus-ed, but open, minds. Exposure to vlillkie 1 s philo-
sophy and popula.r appeal forced the delegates to recognize the 
fact that the peculiar c:J.rcumstances of 1940 called for the 
nomination of a special type of candidate, a candidate who 
could generate popular enthusiasm. Only the conversion of the 
remainder of the nation's electorate separated the Repu.bli.can 
party from regaining the reins of the national government. 
~rnes, £2.· cit., pp. 185-86. 
EPILOGUE 
Willkie's political philosophy of liberal-conservatism 
had spawned a great new movement among the rank and file of 
the Republican party. Enthusiastic amateurs began to take an 
increased interest in politics1 and the Willkie crusade was 
born. The crusade was brougnt-before the delegates at--th~e~---------~===== 
convention 1 and the latter were swept up in the whirlwind. 
Enthusiasm drowned out common sense; amateurism replaced sound 
politics. The philosophy was to be presented to the American 
people as it had been to the delegates; amateurism had tri-
umphed over professionalism at the convention 1 and it would 
do so again when introduced to the electorate. Willkie 
swallowed his own line, as it were, and became a crusader. 
There w:ere two factors vJhich led Willkie to make this 
decision. The first was his victory over the party's pro-
fessiona 1 poll ticians in securing the nomination. 1tlil1kie was 
cognizant of the power generated by the combination of his 
political stands and the intense enthusiasm of his supporters 1 
the power of persuasion which had compelled the delegates to 
jump on his bandwagon. To Willkie this combination signified 
an untapped source of political strength to which he had the 
only key. His political philosophy in the hands of these 
zealots would sweep the entire nation, and all the people would 
see the logic and the reason of his ideas and would join his 
crusade. 
The second factor which led Willkie to his decision 
was the national popularity which he had achieved immediately 
after his nomination. Time reported that at this critical 
point in the campaign Willkie had 47.1 per cent of the popular 
vote 1 and a Democrat other than Roosevelt had only 25.9 per 
cent. 1 After Roosevelt had been nominated by the Democratic 
party, Willkie led the President in six of the nine geographic 
sections of the country. In the South Atlantic States F.D.R. 
led 66.5 per cent to 16.4 per cent; in the East South Central 
States he led 64.8 per cent to 11.1 per cent; and in the West 
South Central States he led Willkie 62.8 pe.r cent to 15.9 per 
cent. In the Mountain States Willkie led Roosevelt 45.1 per 
cent to 39.3 per cent; in the East North Central States he led 
45.1 per cent to 38.8 per cent; in New England he led 47.2 per 
cent to 40.6 per cent; on the Pacific Coast he· led 51.1 per 
cent to 37.0 per cent; in the Middle Atlantic States he led 
by an even greater margin of 52.6 per cent to 35.9 per cent; 
and in the West North Central States Willkie led the President 
57.6 per cent to 33.1 per cent.3 
The Gallup Poll indicated that as of July, 19L10, if the 
election were to ~e held in August, Willkie would win with a 
majority in the electoral college, although he would lose to 
1"Polls," ~e, 36:12, August 5, 1940. 
2ibid. 
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Roosevelt in the popular vote. 3 
Willkie's decision to embark upon a crusade to save the 
country from what he considered the evils of the New Deal was 
the fatal error of the 1940 Republican campaign. It was ironic 
that the very instrument which had given Willkle the nomination 
would ·also prove to be the political millstone around the neck 
of the candidate of his party. Willkie was a loner; he had 
.drive and determination, but not the understanding of practical 
politics. He believed that the professional politicians were 
tainted individuals who had lost the confidence of the American 
people. Willkie's attempt to reform the party and to change 
its policies and aims during the campaign caused the party 
leaders to lose confidence in the candidate and contributed to 
the lack of unity within the party. 4 
Willkie was also suspicious of the Republican party 
political organization, the backbone of the party. He allowed 
his contempt. for the party professionals to deprive his crusade 
of the knowledge and experience of the modern political organ-
ization.5 
Willkie had been built up as a potential candidate by 
those who had been inspired by his liberal-conservatism. He 
311 \'Jill.kie in the. Gallup Poll," The Ne\'l Republic, 103:204, 
August 12, 1940. 
4nillon, op. cit., p. 2211-. 
5Henry o. Evjen, "The Willkie Campaign: An Unfortunate 
Chapter in Republican Leadership," The Journal of Politics, 
Volume 14, p. 245, 1953. 
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had come to the convention with little delegate strength and 
had been considered only a possible dark horse candidate in 
the event of a deadlocked convention. ~rom this low point he 
emerged as the leader of his party. In achieving this position 
he had not relied on a large initial amount of pledged support, 
and he had not formed a political organization to promote his 
candidacy until after the convention had convened. Willkie's 
~andidacy had been opposed by the professionals, a factor 
which all but killed his chances for the nomination; however, 
his amateur supporters had aroused public ~nthusiasm over the 
candidate's policies and programs. The Wi~lkie crusade grew 
and overwhelmed the professionals at the convention. It was . 
at this point that Willkie decided that he did not need the 
party, the organization, nor the professionals; he needed 
only the party's name and votes. In his addre~s to the con-
vention following the nomination Willkie declared that he 
hoped that "you Republicans" would help him achieve victory in 
the November election. 
Once he had made the decision to initiate a crusade to 
preserve the American way of life, Willkie became a messiah, 
not an effective political campaigner. He believed that the 
American people would flock to him and that he would again 
emerge victorious. As he carried the crusade to the people, 
large crowds came to hear what he had to say. During the 
campaign he declared, "If I can just keep the minds of American 
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citizens open so they will listen to argument, keep their 
minds free so they won't be slaves to political bosses or to 
prejudice, to vague argument or to bunk, I shall be satisfied. rr6 
The -conditions which had prevailed at the Philadelphia 
convention, the defeatist attitude and the frustration over 
the choice of a candidate and program, were no longer present. 
Willkie continued to draw crowds, but they would not listen--
he had become a dead whale. 
The professionals see the signs in the dice, 
the signs in the cards ana clouds, 
Over their drinks they curse at the candidate, 
a renegade enemy whose sudden cause 
Was rammed ·down their throats; he is wrecking 
their only chance. 
The Dream of Business is a failtng image. 
Among the predictions, statistics, in the cro\'lds, 
,, The explosive seeds of defeat. Their deadliest f'ears 
Run damp ln their bones. More than torches by night, 
More than pennons, candy, and speechmaktng, 
A campaign is slavery, they say, 
The tiring slavery: to plan, to counsel, to control. 
Above all: to carry out. 
Willkle shows courage. Willkie will shout. 
Forthright, alone, he speaks his mind. 
But the party needed another kind--
A man who will accept support. 
No benefit here of party or plan. 
Joe Martin sacrificed himself, want1rig a g1ant to f1ght 
·a giant. 
--He •·s not a giant! 
He draws his crowd. 
Dead whales on flatcars draw their crowds. 
Noboay votes for a dead whale.7 
Enters 
6"Boos and Tumult Muffle the Real Issues as campaign 
Its Final Month," Life, 9:23, October 14, 1940. 
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A. SELECTION OF THE DELEGATES 
--
------
STATE PRIMARIES CONVENTION COMMITTEE 
Demo :1091} Rep:lOOO Demo Rep Demo Rep Demo Rep 
--
. 492 448 534 532 68 20 
Alabama 22 13 
Arizona 6 6 
Arkansas 18 12 
California 44 44 
Colorado 12 12 
Connecticut 16 16 
Deleware 6 6 
Florida 14 12 
Georgia 14 24 
Idaho 8 8 
I1linols 50 50 8 8 
Indlana 28 28 
Iowa 22 22 
Kansas 18 18 
Kentucky 22 22 
Louisiana 12 20 
Maine 10 13 
Maryland 16 . 16 
Massachusetts 34 34 
Michigan 38 38 
Minnesota 22 22 
Mtssissippi 18 11 
Missouri 30 30 
Montana 8 8 
Nevada 6 6 
New Hampshire 8 8 
New Jersey 32 32 
Ne\'l Mexico 6 6 
New York 86 84 8 8 
North Carolina 26 23 
North Dakota 8 8 
Ohio 52 52 
Oklahoma 22 22 
Oregon 10 10 
Pennsylvania 72 72 
Rhode Island 8 8 
South Carolina 16 10 
South Dakota 8 8 
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Tennessee 22 18 
Texas 46 26 
Utah 8 8 
Vermont 6 9 
Virginia 22 18 
Washlngton 16 16 
West Virginia 16 16 
Wisconsin 24 24 
Wyoming 6 6 
Alaska 6 3 




Puerto Rico 6 2 
Philippines 2 
Canal Zone 6 
Virgin Islands 2 
1"2,091~ Delegates to Go to Big Conventions; State Sessions 




B. ESTIMATES OF PROBABLE FIRST-BALLOT VOTES 
Alabama: 13 votes -- 10 claimed for Taft, 7 for Dewey • 
.Arizona: 6 votes-- Doubtful. Dewey and Gannett claimed support. 
Arkansas: 12 votes-- All claimed for Taft,. though Dewey expected 
some. 
California: 44 votes-- 18 claimed for. Dewey (opponents concede 
only 9); 20 claimed for Taft (regarded as too high). Hoover 
had influence on a majority of the delegates. 
-----·C0naee-t-i--eu-t-:-1-e-v-o-te-g-----Ea-l-dwirLha-d_the_f_a"Y_Qr_it_e son votes • 
Colorado: 12 votes -- 4 claimed for Dewey, but a ~s~o~l~i~d~d~e~l~e~g~a~t~i~o~n--~===== 
was figured to follow Governor Carr: uncommitted delegationo 
Deleware: 6 votes All claimed by Taft; 3 claimed for Dewey. 
Florida: 12 votes-- To be determined by state convention. 
Georgia: 14 votes -- All claimed for Taft, altho~gh some Dewey 
support • 
. Idaho: 8 votes -- All for Dewey by instruction. 
Illinois: 58 votes -- 50 to 52 claimed for Dewey as a result of 
prima~y victory; oppo~ition limits Dewey to 40. 
Indiana: 28 votes-- 16 to 18 claimed for Dewey; opposition 
estimated 16 for Taft, 6 for Dewey, 2 for Vandenberg, 2 for' 
Willkie, and 2 uncertain~ 
Iowa: 22 votes-- MacNider had favorite.son vote on first ballot. 
Kansas: 18 votes --~ Senator Capper• had favorite sone vote on first 
ballot. 
Kentucky: 22 votes -- Over 16 claimed for Dewey; 16 claimed for 
Taft; Dewey's opposition gives him no more than 4; state 
convention instructed the delegate-at-large to vote for Deweye 
Louisiana: 12 votes-- Probably 10 for Taft and 2 for Dewey. 
Maine: 13 votes -- Probably be solid for ~ridges on the first 
ballot; 1 claimed for Dewey. 
r~ryland: 16 votes -- Probably all for Dewey on the first ballot 
as a result of his primary victory. 
Massachusetts: 34 votes -- Saltonstall or Martin predicted to 
receive favorite son vote; Dewey claimed 2, and opponents 
give him none. 
Michigan: 38 votes -- All for Vandenberg on first ballot. 
Minnesota: 22 votes-- Vote divided, with Dewey, Taft, Willkie, 
and Vendenberg receiving votes on the first ballot. 
Mississippi: 11 votes -- All for Taft, unless National Committee-
man Perry Hm·1ard changes his mind. 
Missour•i: 30 votes-- 8 to 15 votes estimated for DevJey, although 
some support for Taft and Willkie. 
~1ontana: 18 votes -~ 7 to 8 for De Hey. 
Nebraska: 14 votes -- .All to Dewey as a result of h:ls pr:i.mary 
victory. 
Nevada: 6 votes -- Doubtful, l'1ith 3 claimed for Dewey. 
New Hampshire: 8 votes -- Ali for Bridges. 
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New Jersey: 32 votes -- A maximum of 28 claimed for Dewey as a 
result of his primary victory; opponents concede no more 
than 15; Taft and Willkie support also in the state. 
New Mexico: 6 votes -- 4 claimed for Dewey. 
New York: 92 votes -- 70-75 claimed for Dewey; opponents give · 
him below 60; impartial estimate of Dewey vote is 62 to 66; 
Gannett and Willkie have support in the state. 
North Carolina: 23 votes -- ·12 claimed for Dewey, 18 for Taft; 
Vewey's opponents concede him 5. 
I'------------.-.Nc-o-r--.-t-.--h--'--=Dc-a-.--k-=o--.-t-a-:-8: votes -- All to Ma cNider on first ballot. 
Oklahoma.: 22 votes -- State convention backed Dewey; 17 sure 
votes claimed by Dewey; opponents concede 10. 
Ohio: 52 votes -- All for Taft, with Bricker as second choice. 
Oregon: 10 votes -- All to McNary on the first ballot. 
Pennsylvania: 72 votes -- All to Governor James on the first 
ballot, making a bloc available for trading purposes; Dewey 
supporters hope to get 20-25 votes on the second ballot. 
Rhode Island: 8 votes-- 2 to 4 claimed for Dewey; opponents con-
cede none; majority expected tQ follow the lead of Governor 
Vanderbilt. 
South Carolina: 10 votes-- State convention to decide. 
Tennessee: 18 votes -- Doubtful. 14 claimed for Dewey; over 
majority claimed for Taft; Dewey's opposition concede him 
no more than 4 . 
. Texas: 26 votes-- Doubtful or uncommitted. Hoover or Taft pos-
sibilities. · 
Utah: 18 votes -- All for Dewey. 
Vermont: 9 votes -- Doubtful, probably uncommitted. Taft and 
DeY.Iey hopeful; Bricker with some support in state. 
Virginia: 18 votes ~-· 14 claimed for Taft, lt for Dewey; Dewey's 
opponents concede none. 
Washington: 16 votes -- 14 claimed for Dewey, with 2 unpledged; 
Del1ey 's opponents concede him no more than 8. May go for 
McNary on first ballot. 
West VirgiDia: 16 votes-- Taft claimed 15 and concede Dewey 1; 
Dewey claimed 4. 
Wisconsin: 24 votes-- All for De\.,rey as a result of mandatory 
primary. 
Wyoming: 6 votes -- 4 claimed for Dewey; opponents concede Dewey 
none; 4 votes for Dewey likely. 
Territories, Territorial ~ossessions, and District of Columbia: 
13 votes: Not known. 
2James A. Hagerty, "First-Vote Choice of De\'iey Is Found 
Unlikely in Survey," New Yor~ Tim~~, June 3, 1940, · p. 1. . 
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C. Sur<1MARIZATION OF THE 1940 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM1 
' 
The platform began with the accusations that the New 
Deal had deliberately fanned the flames of class hatred; 
attempted to place the judiciary under executive domination; 
made impossible the normal friehdly relations between employers 
and emplo~ees; spent billions of dollars, yet left the coun·ry 
unprepared to resist foreign attack; doubled the national· debt 
and imposed taxes where they did the most harm; and imposed on 
the people a regimentation which deprived the individual of 
his freedom. 
National Defense. The plank opened with the statement 
that the Republican party was firmly opposed to :tnvolving the 
United States in foreign vJars and stressed. the losses of the 
earlier World War. The plank then declared that the party 
stood for Americanism, preparedness, and peace and charged that 
the New Deal had to take full responsibility for the unprepared 
state of the nation and consequent danger of our involvement 
in war. The G.O.P. pledged to rebuild national defenses so 
that the United States could not only defend its own soil, but 
uphold the Monroe Doctrine as well. The plank stated that the 
party would, in the meantime, support the belated efforts of 
the New Deal to build up the defense system; however, the party 
would continue to condemn all Executive aGts and proceedings 
lNew York Times, June 27, 191~0, pp. 1,5. 
r----------------·-·-·------·-
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which might lead to war without the authorization of Congress. 
The plank also pledged the extension to all peoples fighting 
for liberty of such aid as would not be in violation of inter-
national law or inconsistent with the requirements of our own 
national defense. 
~e-employment. This plank charged that the New Deal 
had failed to solve the problem of unemployment and pledged 
the Republican party to recreate opportunity for the nation's 
youth and to put the millions of unemployed back to work in 
private industry 1 business 1 and agriculture. The plank also 
declared that the restriction holding back the wheels of 
individual enterprise would be ellm).nated. 
Relief ?-n£ Social §ecur~~l.· These planks called for the 
removal of waste 1 discrimination, and politics from the relief 
programs through administration by the States with Federal 
grants-in-aid on a fair and non-political basis. The party 
promised the extension of necessary old-age benefits on a pay-
as-you-go basis to the extent that the revenues raised for that 
purpose would permit and favored the extension of the unemploy-
ment compensation to those groups and classes not presently 
included. The administration of the program, the plank 
advocated, should rest with the States. 
Labor Relations. Thi.s plank opened with the statement 
that the Republican party had always protected the American 




organization and collective bargaining. The plank also called 
for the amending of the National Labor Relations Act in fair-
ness to employers and all groups of employees so as to provide 
the freedom for~ and orderliness in, self-organization and 
collective bargaining. 
Agriculture. In this rather lengthy_plank the G.O.P. 
promised to effect permanent and temporary government policies 
to establish and maintain an equitable balance between labor, 
industry, and agriculture by expanding industrial and business 
activity, eliminating unemployment, and lowering production 
costs--thereby creating increased consumer _buying power for 
agr:l.cultural products. Until the balance was reached the party 
would continue to support benefit payments based on a soil 
conservation program administered, as far is possible, by the 
farmers themselves. The plank pledged to support incentive 
payments to encourage production, a cooperative system of 
adequate farm credit supervised by an independent government 
agency, a system of government re-financing of the heavy 
Federal farm debt load through an agency segregated from 
commodity credit, a national land use program for Federal 
acquisition of nonproductive farm lands, tariff protection 
for farm products, an orderly development of reclamation and 
irrigation projects, and stabilization of agricultural income 
through intelligent management of accumulated stwpluses. 
Tariff and Reciprocal rrrade. This plank called for 
262 
tariff protection for agriculture, labor, and industry as being 
essential to the nation 1 s standard of living and stated tha~ 
the measure of protection would be determined by scientific 
methods with due regard to the interest of the consumer. The 
plank also condemned the manner in which the Nevl Deal 1 s 
reciprocal trade treaties were put into effect without adequate 
hearings, with undue haste, without proper consideration of the 
nation 1 s domestic producers, and ~ithout Congressional approval. 
The Republicans declared that they would correct the stated 
defects. 
Mone~ ~'1d Job~ §_~~ Idl_~ Money. In these planks the 
Republican party declared that the Congress should reclaim its 
,·constitutional pOI'lers over money and withdraw the President 1 s 
arbitrary authority to manipulate the currency~ that the 'l'homas 
Inflation Amendment of 1933 and the Silver Purchase Act of 1934 
should be repealed, that it was possible to keep the securities 
market clean without paralyzing it, and that to get the billions 
of idle dollars and millions of idle men back to work and to 
promote national defense the Secut'ities Act should be revised 
and the policies of the commission changed to encourage the 
flow of private capital into industry. 
Taxation, Public Credit, and Public Spending. The 
platform condemned the Nell! De a 1 tax structure and pledged the 
party to revise the tax system and remove those practices which 
had impeded recovery and apply policies which would stimulate 
enterprise. The plank added that the. taxing power would not 
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be used as an instrument of punishment.or to secure objectives 
not otherwise obtainable unde~ existing law. The platform 
cr1ticized the twenty-riine billion dollar increase in the 
national debt resulting from the New Deal's borrowing and 
promised to conserve the public credit for all-essential pur-
poses by levying taxation sufficient to cover all necessary 
civil expenditures, a substantial part of the defense cost, and 
the interest and retirement of the national debt. The plank 
on public spending condemned the New Deal's deficit spending 
policies and declared that private enterprise, if allowed to 
go to work, could rapidly increase the wealth, income, and 
standard of living of all the people. 
Equal Rights, Negro, Un-American Activities, an~ Free 
Speech. In these related planks the Republican party pledged 
itself to support a Congressional amendment providing for equal 
rights for men and women; to work to give the Negro a square 
deal in the economic and political life of the nation and to 
promote legislation to curb mob violence; to get rid of "Fifth-
columnists" who were appointed to positions of trust in the 
National Government by the New Deal; and to support the appli-
cation o£ free press and free speech principles to the radio 
and to re·voke licences only ~>Ihen, after public hearings, due 
cause for cancellation was shown. 
Immigration, Veterans, Indians, and Hawaii. In These 
four planks the Republican party promised to enforce all lavl's 
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controlling immigration, in addition to recommending that all 
aliens who sought to change the American form of govel'nment 
by force and violence be deported; to support adequate com-
pensation and care for veterans disabled in the service of the 
country~ and for their widows, orphans, and dependents; and to 
ef:fect an immediate and final settlement of all Indian claims 
between the government and the Indian citizenship of the nation. 
The platform declared that Hawaii was entitled to the fullest 
measure of home rule and to equalit-y with the States in the 
rights of her citizens and in the application of the nation's 
_eeti~_loE... In these three related planks the pla t.f'o.rm pledged 
the party to rEgulate business only so as to protect the consu-
mer, employee, and investor and without restricting the produc-
tion of more .and better goods at low prices; to enforce anti-
trust legislation without prejudice of discrimination and with-
out the use or threatened use of criminal indictments to obtain 
through co,nsent decrees objectives not contemplated by la\'r; and 
to reduce to the minimum Federal competition with business, 
continuing only those enterprises whose maintenance is clearly 
in the public interest. 
S~ll Busi~, _§toe~ and Commodi t~ Exch<:J.E.f~, and 
Insurance. The Republican platform condemned the Nev1 Deal's 
policy o.f interference and arbitrary regulati.on of business and 
promised to encourage the small businessman by removing unnec-
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essary bureaucratic regulations and interference. The platform 
also stated that the party favored regulation of stock and com-
modity exchanges, but that they should be accorded the fullest 
measure o£ self-control consistent \'lith the discharge of their 
public trust.and the prevention of abuse. The insurance plank 
condemned the New Deal for its attempt to destroy the confidence 
of the people in private insurance companies and declared that 
the regul:ation of insurance should continue to fall to the 
states. 
Government Reorganizatio~ and the Third Term. The plat-
form pledged the G.O.P. to extend the merit system to all non-
policy-f'orming positions, to enact legislation to standardize 
, and simpli.fy quasi-judicial and administrative agencies, and 
to insure that the balance of powers principle guide the 
policies affecting the organization and operation of our form 
of goyernment. The platform also declared that the Republican 
party, to i:nsure against the overthrow of the American form of 
government, favored an amendment to the Constitution providing 
that no person could serve more than two terms as President. 
The platform closed with the statement that the nominee, 
by accepting the nomination, was honor bound to be true to the 
principles and program set do1m in the platform. 
